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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,

by

KENNETH R. GIBSON

xi

1892-1970

This study makes use of a previously untapped source
of scientific literature,

the speeches given by the presi

dents of the American Psychological Association since its
founding in 1892,

as the basis for a systematic historical

analysis taking Watson's prescriptive approach.

The 75

APA presidential addresses were selected for analysis be
cause

(1) they express the thinking of very eminent psy

chologists,

(2) they are likely to be sensitive to current

issues and developments in the discipline,

and explicit

about the author's preferences and biases,

and

provide temporal continuity from 1892,

(3) they

thus making it possible

to investigate trends in the history of American psychology.
For these reasons,

it was assumed that the APA presidential

addresses constitute a body of scientific literature which
reflects the major conceptions in American psychology.
Watson's historical approach provided the conceptual frame
work for the analysis.

This approach is based on the concept

of prescriptions, or attitudes taken by psychologists toward
matters of psychological concern.
intellectual dispositions,
of conceptualization.

They may be thought of as

orientative assumptions, or modes

The ultimate goals of the study were

to trace the status of the prescriptive conceptions in the
development of American psychology,
xii

and to assess their

status in contemporary American psychology.
The method used to achieve the goals of the study was
content analysis.

Three judges,

including the author,

each

coded each of the 75 APA presidential addresses in terms of
Watson's 36 prescriptive concepts.

The concepts and rules

governing the coding process were made explicit in the
Coding Man ua l, which was followed by all three judges.

The

prescriptions whose expression took the form of acceptance
by authors were used as the basis for tracing changes in the
status of contrasting prescriptions over time.
It was found that American psychology,
historical perspective,

viewed in

may be characterized by certain

accelerated prescriptive trends.

These are: the use of

methods open to verification by another competent observer
(Methodological objectivism),

the consideration of psychologi

cal data as behavior of individual

(Contentual objectivism),

the stress upon knowledge which is countable or measurable
(Quantitativism), the emphasis upon discovering general laws
(Nomotheticism), the emphasis upon changes with time

(De-

velopmentalism), and the seeking of knowledge for its useful
ness in other activities

(Utilitarianism).

American psychology,

viewed in historical perspective,

shows certain prescriptive trends which have decreased over
time.

These are trends in the emphasis on awareness of men

tal structure or activity

(Conscious mentalism), the viewing

of psychological data as mental structure or activity of
individual

(Contentual subjectivism), the consideration of

psychological categories as contents

(Structuralism), the

stress upon psychological events taking place within the
body

(Centralism), and the use of methods not open to

verification by another competent observer

(Methodological

subjectivism).
In addition to increasing and decreasing prescriptive
trends,

findings were presented concerning prescriptions

which exhibit patterns of rise and fall,

and which show a

consistent pattern of acceptance in the development of
American psychology.
In terms of contemporary American psychology,

it was

found that certain prescriptions of contrasting pairs of
prescriptions are so dominant that they have no counter
dominant prescription.
and Naturalism.

These are Empiricism,

Determinism,

Other prescriptive conceptions in contem

porary American psychology are dominant but do have counter
dominant prescriptions: Methodological objectivism is dom
inant,

and Methodological subjectivism counter-dominant;

Quantitativism is dominant,
Functionalism is dominant,

and Qualitativism counter-dominant;
and Structuralism counter-dominant;

Developmentalism is dominant,

xiv

and Staticism^ counter-dominant;

Nomotheticism is dominant,

and Idiographicism counter-dominant;

Contentual objectivism is dominant,

and Contentual sub

jectivism counter-dominant; and Dynamicism is dominant,
Staticisrr^ counter-dominant.

Still other prescriptive con

ceptions manifest no dominance,

since the members of the

pair are about equally widely accepted.
Inductivism,

Purism-Utilitarianism,

xv

and

These are Deductivism-

and Molarism-Molecularism.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This study has two interrelated purposes.

The specific

purpose is to analyze the contents of some special documents
in psychology,

the speeches given by the presidents of the

American Psychological Association since its founding in 1892.
The broader and more significant purpose is to determine the
status of the conceptual bases of American psychology in
historical perspective.

Consequently,

this introduction con

siders the documents of central importance and then widens
in scope to include the use of those documents for a study
of psychology's conceptual bases.

The Historical Documents
Each year an eminent psychologist is elected to the
office of president of the American Psychological Association
(APA), the major organization for psychologists in the United
States

(Appendix A ) .

by the Council

Until 1918,

the president was nominated

(a six-member body elected by the membership)

and elected by the membership.

Beginning in 1918,

the presi

dent has been nominated and elected by the membership.
ginning in 1946,

B e

he has been elected as the president-elect,

to begin office the following year.'*'

Basically an honorary

1
J. D. Hildreth, personal communication,

December 1, 1971.

2

position,

the presidency nevertheless implies an importance

to a wide range of people —
community,

the profession,

the membership,

the scientific

and even the general public.

The

single most overt expression of this office is the presiden
tial address delivered to the membership at the end of the
year of office

(Appendix B ) .

Most of the addresses have been

a scholarly discussion of some aspect of the president's own
work,

although some,

especially those given in the early

years of the Association,

were a discussion of the current

state of the discipline.

Some of the characteristics of the

A PA presidential addresses which enhance their value as
historical documents may be elaborated as follows.
(1)
ologists .

They express the thinking of very eminent psych
Election to the office of president of the APA is

an honor received b y few psychologists.
"Important Psychologists,

1600-1967"

A recent study of

(Annin, Boring,

& Watson,

1968) makes it possible to assess the relative eminence of
45 of the 78 APA presidents,
This assessment

(Gibson,

both individually and collectively.

1972)

compared the eminence of 45

deceased APA presidents with 129 of the most important de
ceased American psychologists since 1600
in press).

It was found that

(Watson & Merrifield,

(a) the mean of the judgments

for the APA presidents was considerably higher on a scale
from 11 to 27 than that of the most important American psych-

3

ologists

(23 vs. 19),

and

(b) a much higher percentage of

APA presidents was judged at the highest level of eminence
(38% vs. 13%).

These comparisons testify to the eminence of

the APA presidents as operationally defined with reference to
the Annin et al. study and the Watson and Merrifield study
(Appendix c).
(2)

They are likely to be sensitive to current issues

and developments in the discipline,
author's preferences and bias es .

and explicit about the

Compared to journal articles

which report empirical research or make theoretical statements,
and whose underlying assumptions are deeply implicit,
presidential addresses are a more personal,

the APA

reflective,

and

evaluative psychological document.

One would thus expect to

find in the addresses,

concerns with the defin

ition of psychology,
psychology,
fession.

for example,

with the diversity of viewpoints in

and with psychology's status as a science and pro

This characteristic of the addresses maximizes their

utility as primary source materials for a study of American
psychology.
(3)

They provide temporal continuity from 1892,

thus

making it possible to investigate trends in the history of
American psychology.

The addresses have been published

annually since the first meeting in 1892.
historically in three different journals,

They have appeared
first the Psychological

4

Review

(1892-1938),

1946),

and then the American Psychologist

However,

then the Psychological Bulletin

(1939-

(1946-1970).

there are four exceptions to the continuity of the

APA presidential addresses.
the first address,

(1)

In 1892,

G. Stanley Hall gave

"The History and Prospects of Experimental

Psychology in America",

but it was never published, and un2
fortunately the manuscript cannot be located.
(2) In 1918,

John W. Baird was too ill to prepare an address.

(3) In

1924, G. Stanley Hall died early in his year of presidency.
(4)

In 1968, Abraham H. Maslow was too ill to prepare an

address.

Other than these four years,

there is a published

address for every year, making 7 5 addresses through 1970,

the

terminal year of this study.
As a study of presidential addresses,
two precedents.

this study has

The first was a study of the presidential

addresses of the American Historical Association,
(Ausubel,

1950).

1884-1945

The second was a study of the 25 most re

cent presidential addresses of the American Psychiatric Asso
ciation,
of topic,

1944-1968

(Mora,

1969).

In spite of the similarity

the present study differs from these two studies

by using an explicit conceptual framework for analysis and
by employing quantitative methods to secure historical per2
W. A. Koelsch,

personal communication, M a y 11,

1972.

5

spective.

But the present study is not only a study

APA presidential addresses,

the

it is also a study using the

addresses for another purpose.

The Conceptual Framework
One of the characteristic features of psychology among
the sciences is the presence of disagreement and controversy.
Psychologists are not neutral toward either the subject matter
or methods of their science —
and biases.

they have definite preferences

In 1925, Madison Bentley felt it discreditable

for an "established science to sustain such radically diver
gent views upon the essential nature of its material"
p. 75).

(1926,

Bentley considered that one of the APA's greatest

services to psychology was the annual occasion it offered for
psychologists with opposing views to meet under a truce on
neutral ground.

In 1929,

E. G. Boring published a paper en

titled "The Psychology of Controversy", in which he said
that the history of science including psychology is "one long
series of theses,

set off by ardently advocated antitheses,

with ultimate syntheses terminating controversy and making a
step forward"
subsided,

(1929, p. 98).

of course,

The ferment of the 1920's has

but it is still true today that psych

ology is characterized by a diversity of viewpoints,
methods,

and activities.

approaches,

6

Much more than other scientists, psychologists rely
on habits of thought which are partly a matter of temperament
and partly due to the influence of their teachers,
reading,

their

and the ethos of the school which they attended.

These habits of thought,
of orientation;

or conceptions,

serve the function

they allow the psychologist to procede about

his business without getting bogged down with questions about
the ultimate nature of the subject matter or its proper avenue
of approach.

The conceptions which serve this function and

which can be traced historically over an appreciable period of
time, thus forming trends or themes, have recently been iso
lated by Watson

(1967, 1971)

and termed prescriptions.

Pre

scriptions are basically attitudes toward some matter of
psychological interest.
perspectives,
assumptions,

They may be thought of as attitudinal

intellectual dispositions, basic orientative
or modes of conceptualization,

and they play an

important role in enabling the psychologist to deal with the
problems of subject matter and methodology.

Examples of

psychological conceptions which serve as prescriptions are
the tendency to view psychological data as behavior of the
individual,

seeking knowledge for its own sake,

knowledge which is countable or measurable.
tions,

or prescriptions,

and stressing

These concep

may be explicit or implicit,

dominant

in the Zeitgeist at a particular time or opposed to it, or

7

salient or non-salient in a school of psychological thought.
One of the ways prescriptions may be conceived as
functioning is in contrasting pairs.

Since the opposition

of prescriptions is sometimes present in history,

it is one

of the meaningful ways of using the prescriptions in approach
ing historical material.

This approach makes it possible to

compare the relative strength of contrasting prescriptions
empirically.

Watson wrote:

"At some time, past or present,

when both of the opposed prescriptions had or have supporters,
it is possible to make some sort of an estimate of their rela
tive strength? in other words, we may speak of dominant and
counterdominant prescriptions"
scription is one which,
scription,

(p. 439).

A dominant pre

compared with the contrasting pre

is held by a significantly larger portion of the

psychological community.

A counter-dominant prescription is

one which is held by a portion of the psychological community
but is less widely accepted than the contrasting prescription.
In this study an attempt will be made to trace changes in
dominance and counter-dominance of contrasting prescriptions
over time.
Prescriptions influence and are inextricably bound
up with the more formal procedures of scientific practice.
Watson has selected and defined the most historically im
portant psychological conceptions.

These conceptions were

8

selected on the basis of knowledge of the whole history of
psychology,

and no claim is made that they are all relevant

to any one historical period.

The group is selective in that

it includes only those conceptions which meet the criteria
of serving an orientative function and existing over an
appreciable period of time; it is also comprehensive in that
it is based upon the history of psychology from ancient times
on and is intended to encompass the whole history of psychology.
For these reasons, Watson's prescriptive conceptions will be
adopted as the conceptual framework for this study.

Watson's

entire list of 36 prescriptions arranged in contrasting pairs
follows.

Elaborations of these definitions were made by the

writer for the purposes of this study,

and these elaborated
3

definitions are contained in Appendix D.
Conscious mentalism - Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on
awareness of mental structure or activity —
unawareness)
Contentual objectivism - Contentual subjectivism (psychologi
cal data viewed as behavior of individual — as
mental structure or activity of individual)
Determinism - Indeterminism (human events completely explicable
in terms of antecedents — not completely so explicable)
Empiricism - Rationalism^ (major, if not exclusive source of
knowledge is experience — is reason)
3
In the case of Mechanism, an additional meaning was given
to supplement Watson's original definition.
This was the
only substantive change in the prescriptive system.

9

Functionalism - Structuralism (psychological categories are
activities —
are contents)
Inductivism - Deductivism (investigations begun with facts
or observations — with assumed established truths)
Mechanism - Vitalism (activities of living beings completely
explicable by physiochemical constituents — not so
explicable)
Methodological objectivism - Methodological subjectivism (use
of methods open to verification by another competent
observer — not so open)
Molecularism - Molarism (psychological data most aptly de
scribed in terms of relatively small units -relatively large units)
Monism - Dualism (fundamental principle or entity in universe
is of one kind — is of two kinds, mind and matter)
Naturalism - Supernaturalism (nature requires for its operation
and explanation only principles found within it —
requires transcendent guidance as well)
Nomotheticism - Idiographicism (emphasis upon discovering
general laws — upon explaining particular events or
individuals)
Peripheralism - Centralism (stress upon psychological events
taking place at periphery of body — within the body)
Purism - Utilitarianism (seeking of knowledge for its own
sake — for its usefulness in other activities)
Quantitativism - Qualitativism (stress upon knowledge which is
countable or measurable — upon that which is different
in kind or essence)
Rationalismo - Irrationalism (emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sense and intellect — intrusion
or domination of emotive and conative factors upon
intellectual processes)
Staticism-) - Developmentalism (emphasis upon cross-sectional
view — upon changes with time)

10

Staticisnu - Dynamicism (emphasis upon enduring aspects —
upon change and factors making for change)
The ultimate goal of this study is to trace the status
of the prescriptive issues in the development of American
psychology by using quantitative methods.

Thus,

this study

assumes that the APA presidential addresses constitute a body
of scientific literature which reflects the prescriptions in
American psychology,

and it aspires to derive an empirically-

based characterization of the dominant prescriptions in con
temporary American psychology by viewing them in historical
perspective.

Qualitative exposition based on the addresses

and additional materials will be used to supplement the quan
titative analysis.

Relevant Literature
Although there are several quantitative studies taking
the prescriptive approach,
Mirabito,

at least in part

1970; Fuchs & Kawash,

relevant to the present study.

(Ross, 1970;

1971), none is directly
There are, however,

two quan

titative studies of historical trends in psychology which are
relevant to the present study,
journal articles

(Allport,

one based on an analysis of

1940; Bruner & Allport,

1940)

the other based on ratings of psychological theorists
& Zagona,

1962; Coan,

1968).

and

(Coan
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The first major study was a joint project by Gordon
W. Allport and Jerome S. Bruner, who classified the contents
of the 14 leading psychological journals in America at ten-year
intervals from 1888 to 1938 to assess changes in the nature
of psychology.
1,627.

The total number of articles classified was

The classifiers disregarded the titles and delved

into the body of each article.
ployed in the content analysis.
fields,

techniques,

There were 32 categories em
These covered type of subjects,

conceptual modes,

and issues.

The number

of articles classified under each category for each of the
years 1888-1898,

1908,

1918,

1928,

and 1938, was converted to

percentages to facilitate comparison.

While an article could

in theory be entered under all 32 categories or none at all,
in practice most of the articles were entered in from 5 to 15
categories.

This study,

including the findings from each of

the 32 categories, was published in 1940 as "Fifty Years of
Change in American Psychology".

Nine of the categories em

ployed in this study are essentially the same as prescriptive
conceptions or similar enough to prescriptions to be compared
with them.

For example,

the category named "Use of statistics"

can be compared with the quantitative prescription,

the cate

gory "Applied psychology" compared with Utilitarianism,

and

"Articles dealing with the single case" with Idiographicism.
When Allport gave his presidential address before the
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APA in 1939,

"The Psychologist's Frame of Reference",

he chose

to present some of the most representative findings from the
study undertaken with Bruner and to discuss the implications
of those findings.

As it happens,

the categories which Allport

chose to present in his address included all but one of the
nine categories which are relevant to the present study.
Allport's summary thus provides a preview of the findings
which will later be discussed in relation to the present study.
Reviewing the evidence, we find mental faculties
and hypostasized psychic processes vanishing
rapidly, though here and there still masquerading
behind new terms.
The body-mind problem, never
solved, has been declared popularly null and void.
Dualism evokes rejection responses of considerable
vehemence.
(Indeed, of all philosophical pollens,
psychologists seem most allergic to this.)
The
appeal of the unconscious is dwindling.
Higher
mental processes as exhibited in the speech of
human beings are relatively neglected, marked pre
ference being shown for studies of non-verbal be
havior and for animal subjects.
A schism is
apparent between pure and applied psychology, and
there is a growing disregard for studies of single
cases.
It also looks as if modern psychology were
becoming appreciably unhistorical.
Among accelerated trends we find a striking
rise in the employment of statistical aids, in the
use of animal subjects, in the spread of physio
logical research.
At the same time there is a
growing recognition of the importance of context,
which has led to many fruitful studies of dynamic
segregation. Methodological studies have mounted,
characterized especially by philosophical theorizing
concerning the nature of psychological constructs.
Operationism is the current watchword of an austere
empiricism.
Synoptic systems, such as those of
McDougall and Stern, have given way to miniature
systems, and embracing theories expounded in the
grand manner have yielded to diminutive theories
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implemented with great precision.
Immediate ex
perience is rigidly excluded from most modern
systems, and in its place surrogate operational
functions are sought (1940, pp. 11-12).
The findings of the Bruner-Allport study were also summarized
by Allport at a more general level than the specific categories
which were employed.

Strong support was found for Bills'

(1938) characterization of the psychology of 1938 as increasingly
empirical, mechanistic,

quantitative,

nomothetic,

analytic,

and operational.
The second relevant study

(Coan & Zagona,

1962; Coan,

196v3) was designed to investigate both historical trends in
psychological theory and dimensions independent of time.
study tested several hypotheses made earlier by Brunswik

The
(1952).

Brunswik hypothesized that there are two independent dimensions
of psychological theory,

the subjectivity-objectivity dimension

and the molar-molecular dimension.

Beyond the issue of the

number of dimensions of psychological theory,
two other hypotheses:

Brunswik made

(1) "There seems to be a continuous

change-over from subjectivism to objectivism in psychology",
and

(2) "Within each of these two avenues of approach there

seems to be a development . . . from a static and molecular
to a dynamic and molar type of approach"

(1952, p. 50).

In order to test these hypotheses,

Coan used a rating

method in which the names of 54 psychological theorists were
rated on 34 variables by 42 psychologists with appropriate
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background in the area of history and systems of psychology.
The data were subjected to centroid analysis and six factors
emerged.

The first two factors were interpreted as Subjecti-

vistic versus Objectivistic and Holistic versus Elementaristic,
thus confirming Brunswik's two basic dimensions.

However,

the four additional factors were needed to account adequately
for the structure of psychological theory.
To test Brunswik's hypotheses concerning trends,
ratings of the 10 most important theorists per decade from
1880 to 1959, were obtained

(Coan & Zagona,

1962).

After ob

taining ratings of these theorists on the 34 variables,

the

factor scores for each set of 10 theorists were averaged and
a comparison made of the resulting means across decades.

The

results supported Brunswik's first historical hypothesis but
not his second.

There was a progressive increase in objectivism,

but the trend in holism showed a rise and then fall, with the
peak in the 1 9 2 0 's.

Further evidence concerning changes in

these two dimensions may be obtained from the present study.
In addition,

two other of C o a n 1s factors are relevant to the

present study:

the Quantitative versus Qualitative factor

and the Dynamic versus Static factor.

Predictions
Before tracing the status of the prescriptive issues
in the development of American psychology,

it is possible to
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make some predictions regarding the evolution of certain pre
scriptions.

The predictions which follow were formulated on

the basis of general knowledge of the history of psychology
and a list of the titles of the presidential addresses, but
before reading or coding the addresses.

Although some are

conventional beliefs and others are original propositions,
are genuine contingent statements.

all

The first few predictions

concern the nature and scope of the addresses, while the
others concern the status of the prescriptive issues in the
development of American psychology.

Predictions are made con

cerning trends in seven of the 18 pairs of contrasting pre
scriptions.

The status of the other 11 pairs is not predicted.

The findings with respect to temporal changes will be dis
cussed in two chapters:

one devoted to predicted prescriptive

trends

(Chapter IV) and one devoted to descriptive prescriptive

trends

(Chapter V ) .
Prediction 1 :

There will be a decrease over time in

addresses characterized as expository, whose burden does not
directly depend upon empirical data,

and a simultaneous in

crease in addresses characterized by the presentation of
information based upon empirical or even experimental data,
or the presentation of a viewpoint deriving from empirical
data.

Furthermore,

this transition will occur around 1930,

so that the addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly
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expository-oriented and those after about 1930 will be pre
dominantly research-oriented.

The rationale for this pre

diction is that 1890 through the early 1930's was the
particularly controversial period of schools in psychology,
and the 1930's to the present the somewhat more tolerant
factual period in American psychology.
Prediction 2 ;

Fewer prescriptions will be expressed

in the research-oriented addresses than in the expository
addresses.

The rationale for this prediction is that exposi

tory addresses provide more freedom for an author to comment
on issues and viewpoints than do research-oriented addresses.
Prediction 3 ;

The proportion of prescriptions which

are expressed implicitly,

whatever its value relative to those

expressed explicitly, will be larger in the research-oriented
addresses than in the expository addresses.

The rationale

for this prediction is that many prescriptions are implicit
in the activities of psychologists as research workers,

and

therefore research-oriented addresses would be expected to be
based upon more underlying assumptions and conceptions than
expository addresses.
Prediction 4 ;

There will be a decrease over time in

addresses which encompass psychology as a whole, or treat a
problem which transcends specific areas and is significant
for psychology as a whole,

and a simultaneous increase in
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addresses which are limited to a specialized area or problem
within psychology.
around 1930,

Furthermore,

this transition will occur

so that the addresses before about 1930 will be

predominantly broad in scope and those after about 1930 will
be predominantly narrow in scope.

The rationale for this pre

diction is that before the early 1930's was the period in the
history of American psychology in which the various schools
each claimed comprehensiveness for its psychological system,
and after the early 1 9 3 0 's the more specialized factual period
in American psychology.
Prediction 5 ;

Since the prescriptive approach was for

mulated to encompass the history of psychology from ancient
times on, there is undoubtedly extreme variation in the ex
pression of prescriptions in the relatively short history of
American psychology.

In this period,

the following pre

scriptions will be among the most prominent of the 36 pre
scriptions,
mentalism,

irrespective of temporal considerations:
Contentual objectivism,

Conscious

Contentual subjectivism,

Empiricism, Methodological objectivism, Methodological sub
jectivism,

and Nomotheticism.

The following prescriptions

will be among the least prominent of the group:
Monism,

Dualism,

Rationalism-,
^

Naturalism,

Irrationalism,

Supernaturalism,

Vitalism,

Idiographicism,

Staticism , and Staticism .

1

2

This prediction is based on the writer's general background
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reading and personal judgments.
Prediction 6 :

Contentual objectivism will be in

creasingly accepted after 1913,

the date of the formal

founding of behaviorism with the publication of John B. Watson's
article "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, " to the
point where it is so pervasive a conception in contemporary
American psychology that it is the major ingredient in the
definition of psychology.

Contentual subjectivism will de

crease in acceptance after 1913 but will recover to the
point where it is an important part of contemporary American
psychology,
tivism.

although still overshadowed by Contentual objec

In other words,

Contentual objectivism is dominant

and Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant in contemporary
American psychology.

The aspect of this prediction concerning

Contentual objectivism is based on general reading of standard
sources in the history of psychology
Boring,
1971)

1950; Brunswik,

(Heidbreder,

1952; Marx & Hillix,

and the findings of other studies

1933;

1963; Watson,

(Allport,

1940; Coan,

1968) , while the aspect concerning Contentual subjectivism
is based on the writer's own speculation.
Prediction 7 ;

Methodological objectivism and

Methodological subjectivism will follow roughly the same
pattern as Contentual objectivism and Contentual subjectivism
in the history of American psychology,

except that Methodologi-
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cal subjectivism will show a progressive decline after 1913
rather than gradual recovery.

The basis of this prediction

is general reading of standard sources in the field
Heidbreder,
Hillix,

1933; Boring,

1963; Watson,

(Allport,

1940; Coan,

Prediction 8 :

1950; Brunswik,

1971)

(e.g.,

1952; Marx &

and the findings of other studies

1968).
Peripheralism and Centralism will show

roughly the same pattern as Contentual objectivism and Con
tentual subjectivism in the history of American psychology
(Allport,

1940; Coan,

1968),

although they will not be as

widely accepted as the latter.
Prediction 9 :

Functionalism will increase in accep

tance after the turn of the century and continue its pervasive
influence up to and including the present.

The most explicit

expression of this prescription occurred shortly after the
turn of the century in the form of a broad,

loosely articu

lated movement known as functional psychology.

Functionalism

does not exist as a system of psychology today; it has been
absorbed into the mainstream of American psychology.

For this

reason it has often been said that contemporary American
psychology is functional in character
Marx & Hillix,
Watson,

1971).

1963; Watson,

(Heidbreder,

1933;

1965; Chaplin & Krawiec,

1968;

Structuralism in the form of the school of

structural psychology will collapse around the turn of the
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century,

but Structuralism as a prescription will continue

to be a viable conception,

regardless of whether the data of

psychology are conceived as mentalistic,
physiological.

behavioral,

or

This last aspect of the prediction is based

on the writer's speculations stemming from prescriptive theory.
Prediction 1 0 :
ance

(Bills,

Quantitativism will increase in accept

1938? Allport,

1940; Watson,

1965), with a con

current decrease in acceptance of Qualitativism.
Prediction 1 1 :

Nomotheticism will be dominant and

Idiographicism counter-dominant throughout the history of
American psychology up to the present

(Allport,

1940; Watson,

1965) .
Prediction 1 2 :

Purism will be accepted throughout

the history of American psychology.

Utilitarianism will be

come accepted shortly after the turn of the century and then
will increase steadily in acceptance, but will remain counter
dominant in contemporary American psychology

(Misiak & Sexton,

1966) .
Prediction 13;

There will tend to be a higher pro

portion of explicitly accepted prescriptions before 1930 than
after, because during the period of the schools of psychology
the issues were controversial, whereas afterward psychologists
became more tolerant of alternative viewpoints and less likely
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to defend their own.

Therefore,

the proportion of implicity

accepted prescriptions will increase as one moves closer to
the present.
Prediction 1 4 :

The following prescriptions will be

among the most widely accepted prescriptions in comtemporary
American psychology
considerations:

(1951-1970),

Conscious mentalism, Contentual objectivism,

Contentual subjectivism,
Nomotheticism,

irrespective of temporal

Empiricism, Methodological objectivism,

Purism, Utilitarianism,

and Quantitativism.

This prediction is based on the writer's background reading
and personal judgments.
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II.

METHOD

This chapter contains information pertaining to five
aspects of the method used in the study:
procedure of content analysis,
tion of categories,

(1) the general

(2) the coding system: defini

(3) the training period and pilot study,

(4) the reliability of the judges,

and

(5) the treatment of

the data.

General Procedure of Content Analysis
This study assumes that history can be approached
using some of the same methods as are used in scientific re
search.

One of such methods is known as content analysis.

According to a recent evaluation,

content analysis is "any

technique for making inferences by systematically and ob 
jectively identifying specified characteristics of messages"
(Holsti, Loomba, & North,

1968) .

In this content analysis,
presidential addresses,

the messages were 75 APA

and the specified characteristics to

be identified were the 36 prescriptive concepts.

Each address

was studied to see which prescriptions the author expressed
and how they were expressed.

The results of this process

were systematically recorded on a coding form.
The writer's procedure for studying the addresses had
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two aspects,

one qualitative and one quantitative.

As each

address was read, beginning with Ladd's address in 1893,

the

writer noted particularly forceful expressions of prescriptions
and any other statements of particular significance,
expressions of wisdom, humor,

or prediction.

such as

Addresses which

stood out for reason of clarity or originality were also
noted.

The data from this qualitative study were recorded

in a special notebook with the intention that it would later
be integrated with the quantitative findings.
After each individual address was read,
filled out the formal coding form,

the writer

and this data constituted

part of the quantitative data in the study.

The rest of the

quantitative data was obtained from two other judges, who were
paid for their services.

Each of the three judges read and

coded the entire set of 75 addresses.
using three judges,
pool of data,

It was assumed that by

each contributing one-third to the total

the study would be based on a firmer founda

tion than if only one judge was used.
All three judges had been students in the Department
of Psychology at the University of New Hampshire.
to the writer,

In addition

the other judges were Elizabeth S. Goodman

and Marilyn Merrifield.

All three of the judges possessed an

initial familiarity with the history of psychology in
general and prescriptive theory in particular,

although a
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pilot study to be discussed later showed that this background
was not essential to achieve reliable codings.
Three xeroxed copies of each address were made, one
for each judge.

The judges were instructed to note the ex

pression of prescriptions in the text,

if possible, by

putting an abbreviation for the prescription in the margin.
After reading the entire article,

each judge filled out a

coding form to provide data on that address.
It was decided to make the codings of the other two
judges as objective as possible.
were employed.

Two methods of control

(1) The addresses being coded were not iden

tified by author,

title, or year of publication.

This in

formation was clipped off each address prior to coding,
the address identified by a number.

(2) The order of the

addresses was randomized prior to coding,
effects.

By using these methods,

and

to avoid sequence

codings based solely on

the contents of the individual addresses were assured from
the other two judges.
In order to standardize the coding procedure,

it

was necessary to be as explicit as possible about the basis
upon which the judges were to make their decisions.
this aim in mind,
the judges.

a manual was written and distributed to

The Coding Manual

coding system,

With

(Appendix D)

contained the

an illustrated dictionary of prescriptions,

25

and some general guidelines for coding.

In the illustrated

dictionary each prescription was defined in the original way
by Watson

(1967) and then elaborated by the writer.

Some

times additional definitions, which were taken from standard
dictionaries of psychology,

were also included.

Further

clarification of each prescription was attempted by the use
of multiple examples —
per prescription —

an average of about eight examples

culled from the literature.

Each judge

was given a copy of the Coding Manual to serve as a basis for
learning the coding procedure and for future reference.
In sum,

the experimental design of the study consisted

of three judges each coding each of 75 presidential addresses
in terms of 36 prescriptive concepts.

The results of this

coding process were systematically recorded on coding forms.
The concepts and rules governing the coding process were made
explicit in the Coding M a nu a l, which was followed by all three
judges.

The next section describes the coding system as it

was presented in the Manual.

The Coding System:

Definition of Categories

The initial task of the judge was to determine,

for

a given address, whether each of the 36 prescriptions was
Present or Absent.
all other judgments.

This initial judgment took priority over
If a prescription was judged Present,

the judge immediately made some further judgments about it.
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If judged Absent,

the prescription was left blank on the

coding form.
If the prescription was Present,
additional judgments about it.

the judge made three

In order of occurrence these

judgments concerned the author's position or attitude toward
the prescription,

its degree of centrality,

and its form of

expression.
First,
categories

the judge indicated which of three possible

(existing along a single dimension) best described

the author's position.
Neutral,

and Rejection.

These categories were Acceptance,
Definitions of these categories

follow.
Acceptance - The prescription is supported,

advocated,

or otherwise accepted by the author.
Rejection - The prescription is disapproved,
diated,

repu

or otherwise rejected by the author.
Neutral - The prescription is expressed, but the

author does not take a position or reveal an attitude of
acceptance or rejection.

This does not mean that the author

has no position, but rather that the prescription,
pressed,

is not accepted or rejected.

accepts nor rejects the prescription,

as ex

If the author neither
then it is neutral in

status with respect to that particular manifestation.
The second judgment was an attempt to determine the
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importance,
an address.

significance,

or emphasis of a prescription in

Each prescription was scaled on the Dimension

of Centrality.

The assumption underlying the Centrality Di

mension was that the more central a prescription is,

the

greater the amount of evidence for it in the address.

The

Centrality Dimension was presented as follows.
Central

1
Salient

Peripheral

2
Notable

3
Moderate

4
Incidental

The specific meaning of the categories on this scale is as
follows.
(1)

Salient - This category is reserved for prescrip

tions which stand out conspicuously from the others in terms
of their centrality to the address.
(2 )

Notable - This category is for prescriptions

whose expression is notable but not salient in the address.
(3)

Moderate - This category is for prescriptions

whose expression is moderate in comparison to the overall
significance of the address.
(4)

Incidental - This category is for prescriptions

expressed incidentally in the address, _i.,e., as a minor
concomitant.
The third judgment concerned the form of expression
of a prescription.

Some prescriptions are verbalized explicitly.
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Others are not explicit but nevertheless present in the ac
tivities of the psychologist,
entific writing.
tions,

including the activity of sci

In addition to identifying explicit prescrip

this study aimed to identify prescriptions which the

author took for granted, but in doing so to be sensitive only
to stimuli presented in the address.

With this aim in mind,

the following criterion was suggested.
An author accepts a given prescription implicitly
if the ideas expressed in the address are logically
dependent upon the prescription or if his view
point could not reasonably be maintained without
assuming the prescription.
This criterion called for the judicious use of inference on
the part of the judges,

so that the communication being coded

was not limited to manifest or surface meaning,

but included

latent meaning as well.
Although it was recognized that explicit and implicit
forms of expression of a prescription are extremes on a con
tinuum,

the judges were instructed to indicate toward which

extreme the prescriptions fell.

Was it primarily explicit or

primarily implicit in mode of expression?
this question,

To help answer

some additional meaning was attached to the

Explicit and Implicit categories.
Explicit - In this form of expression of a prescrip
tion the writer shows recognition that there is an issue in
volved,

or that the concept he is using needs to be defined
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(not necessarily labeled).

If the concept is named,

should be included in this category —

it

but the name need not

be the "formal" name of the prescription.

For example,

writer may describe himself as a behaviorist,

a

in which case

the description warrants a coding of "Contentual objectivism
—

Acceptance —

objectivism)

Explicit" even though that name

(Contentual

is not used.

Implicit - This form of expression of a prescription
means that the writer thinks in a certain w a y without
clarifying the concept which he is employing and without
using a special name to designate his position.

Thus in the

implicit form of expression the prescription is simply taken
for granted, but it is capable of being understood from the
author's language.

For example,

efficients of correlation,

a writer talks about co

etc., or presents numbers as

data, but does not articulate his commitment to the quanti
tative prescription.

Or an author presents some kind of

evidence or data but does not show recognition that he is
following the empiricistic prescription.

Or an author bases

his study on many subjects but does not say he is interested
in general laws

(Nomotheticism).

Or an author contributes to

knowledge but does not make explicit that he is interested
in knowledge for its own sake

(Purism).

In addition to the coding system,

the judges were
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supplied with some general guidelines for coding.

The most

important guideline specified:
The prescriptions should be treated singly and
individually.
This means that when a judge is
coding an address he should consider each of the
36 prescriptions separately as much as possible,
so that whatever relations exist among prescrip
tions are permitted to emerge from the data.
In sum, a judge was to decide on the Presence or
Absence of each of the 36 prescriptive concepts.

Prescrip

tions which were judged to be expressed in the addresses were
considered further in terms of the author's position
tance, Neutral,

(Accep

Rejection), the Centrality Dimension,

their form of expression

(Explicit or Implicit).

were systematically recorded on the Coding Form

and

The results
(Appendix E ) .

Training Period and Pilot Study
Special considerations were followed to see that the
judges were properly informed about their task.

A training

period was initiated which consisted of two phases,

study

of the Coding Manual and actual practice coding of psycho
logical articles.
study,

Each of the judges was given a Manual to

and discussion sessions were held to raise questions

about its contents or about any phase of the coding task.
Then followed practice coding of selected articles.

The

articles used were not the APA presidential addresses but
similar in nature to them.

Two presidential addresses of
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another psychological society,

the Southern Society for

Philosophy and Psychology, published in the same journals as
the APA presidential addresses during roughly the same years
were used.

These two addresses were chosen for practice

coding because they expressed many prescriptions and therefore
afforded many opportunities to make judgments.
There were four reasons for undertaking the training
period.

(1) To provide some "feedback" to the judges on how

their codings compared with each others',

as a means of

maximizing the initial agreement on concepts.
methods used to compute reliability,
to follow these methods.

(2) To compare

and program the computer

(3) To get an idea of the level of

reliability among the judges before they began coding the APA
presidential addresses.

(4) To measure the extent to which

the codings could be made solely on the basis of information
in the Coding M a n u a l , exclusive of any prior psychological
knowledge.
The training period made possible the achievement of
the four goals.

(1) Informal discussion sessions were held

to analyze and discuss agreements and disagreements in the
codings, and these sessions contributed to the judges' under
standing of the task.
ment

(2) Scott's Index of Inter-Coder Agree

(1955), which measures the extent to which the coding

reliability exceeds chance, proved to be a satisfactory method

32

for determining reliability
computer-analyzed.

(See Appendix F ) , and the data were

(3) Initial levels of reliability were

high enough to procede with the coding of the APA presidential
addresses.

(4) The extent to which the codings could be made

solely on the basis of information in the Coding M a n u a l , ex
clusive of prior psychological knowledge, was measured.

The

last two of these goals provided the basis of a pilot study
and therefore require elaboration.
Some measure of the reliability among judges was
needed before they began coding the APA presidential addresses.
The two articles used in the pilot study provided for 72
possible Present or Absent codings.

All three judges were in

agreement on 50 of the 72 decisions,

or a percentage of agree

ment of .69.

In terms of inter-judge reliability between each

combination of two judges,

the finding,

expressed in terms of

average percentage agreement, was .80.

Expressed in terms of

Scott's Index of Inter-Coder Agreement

(1955), which measures

the extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance,
corresponding average value was .60.

the

These reliability levels,

.80 and .60, were considered sufficient to warrant coding the
APA presidential addresses.
The final purpose of the pilot study was to measure
the extent to which codings could be made solely on the basis
of information in the Coding Man ua l, exclusive of prior
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psychological knowledge.

This was felt to be necessary be

cause the three judges all had some initial knowledge of the
history of psychology in general and prescriptive theory in
particular.

A person was selected who did not possess a for

mal background in psychology beyond two courses

{Meribeth

Simpson), and she underwent the same training experience,
the same coding practice,
other three judges.

had

and was paid the same rate as the

The findings were that the "non-psycholo

gist" judge obtained slightly lower inter-judge reliabilities
than the "psychologist" judges did among themselves, but far
greater than would be expected b y chance alone.

This was true

when reliability was measured using both the conventional
percentage agreement and Scott's Index.

With the conventional

percentage agreement the "non-psychologist" versus "psycholo
gist" reliabilities were .75 versus .80, and with Scott's
Index they were .50 versus .60.

These findings suggest that

a "non-psychologist" can be trained to perform the coding
task almost as reliably as "psychologist" judges.

The im

plication of this finding is that the results of the APA
study are not esoteric but are objective and continuous with
all other scientific knowledge.

Reliability of Judges
The last section described a pilot study which has as
one of its goals the determination of the level of reliability
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among the judges before they began coding the APA addresses.
The information concerning reliability reported in this sec
tion was obtained from the actual data which formed the basis
of the study.

Therefore,

it provides an estimate of how

likely it is that similar findings would result if the same
study was done using different judges.
There are three kinds of information pertaining to
the reliability of judges:

(1) information concerning the use

of the coding categories by the three judges,
reliability information,
formation.

and

(2) inter-judge

(3) intra-judge reliability in

The complete data providing the findings for these

three kinds of information are contained in Appendix F, while
the findings themselves are described below.
The average number of prescriptions coded Present in
each address out of 36 possibilities was relatively consistent
for the three judges:
address,

respectively

12.3,

13.0, and 15.5 prescriptions per

{Appendix F-6) .

That is,

the judges

used roughly the same criterion for "Present" when coding pre
scriptions.

As far as the categories pertaining to the autho r’s

position are concerned

(Appendix F-7), all judges used the

Acceptance category by far the most frequently:
76%, respectively.

75%, 83%, and

The Neutral and Rejection categories also

contained proportions of codings which were similar for the
three judges.

For the Neutral category,

the proportions were:
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16%,

11%,

and 16%, respectively;

for the Rejection category,

they were 7%, 5%, and 6%, respectively.
mension of Centrality,

In terms of the Di

the judges differed considerably on the

criteria of "Salient" and "Incidental".

The proportions of

prescriptions receiving Salient codings were;

41%,

21%, and

15%,

respectively; for the Incidental codings they were:

25%,

and 37%, respectively.

pression

14%,

In terms of the form of ex

(Explicit or Implicit), all three judges considered

most

prescriptions to be expressed explicitly:

72%,

respectively.

These findings show that,

judgments on the Centrality Dimension,

68%, 64%,

and

except for their

the judges employed

roughly the same criteria to identify prescriptions and the
role they play in scientific discourse.

However,

more pre

cise information is needed concerning reliability.
Reliability among the judges was measured for the two
major decisions made by the judges:

Presence or Absence of

prescriptions and the author's position
Rejection).

(Acceptance,

In terms of Presence-Absence,

Neutral,

the average percen

tage of agreement between the judges was .76

(Appendix F - 8 ) .

A second reliability coefficient on the same data was obtained
by using the more conservative measure proposed by Scott
called jai.

(1955),

It yielded an average reliability of .50, which

shows that the value resulting from the conventional percen
tage of agreement measure was not simply due to chance.

In
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terms of the author's position,

the average percentage of

agreement between the judges was
coefficient was

.82, and the average jai

.47 (Appendix F - 9 ) .

Inter-judge reliability is a measure of the extent to
which different judges agree on the coding of documents.

But

how likely is the same judge to agree with his own codings at
a later time?

To estimate test-retest stability of an indivi

dual judge over time,
and re-coded.

a sample of four addresses was selected

The average length of time between first and

second codings was about one month.

The four addresses used

for re-coding were selected at random from within each se
quence of 20 addresses coded by each judge.
Presence or Absence,

the intra-judge percentage of agreement

reliabilities for the three judges were:
(Judge 2), and .90
(Appendix F - 1 0 ) .

In terms of

(Judge 3) —
As expected,

.88

(Judge 1),

.78

yielding a mean of .85
this value is somewhat larger

than the corresponding average inter-judge reliability of .76.
There is more agreement between two codings done at different
times by the same person than between codings done by two
different persons.

In terms of the author's position,

intra-judge reliabilities were .97
and .84

(Judge 3) —

(Judge 1),

yielding a mean of .91

.91

the

(Judge 2),

(Appendix F -l l ) .

This value is also larger than the corresponding value of .82
reported for inter-judge reliability.
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Treatment of the Data
The treatment of the data and the forms in which the
findings will be presented require explanation.

This section

provides the necessary explanation.

Nature and Scope of Addresses
Most of the APA presidential addresses have been a
scholarly discussion of some aspect of the president's own
work,

although some, especially those given during the early

years of the Association,

were a discussion of the current

state of the discipline.

In order to provide an overview of

the tradition of APA presidential addresses and to relate them
to changes in the history of psychology in general,

the

addresses were analyzed along two logically independent di
mensions,

one involving the nature of the address and one in

volving the scope of the address.

Each dimension required

a dichotomous decision on the part of the judge.
The nature of the address was determined by classi
fying each address as having an Expository-orientation or
a Research-orientation.

The criterion of an address which

is primarily or completely Expository-oriented is the presence
of an exposition of the meaning of some aspect or all of
psychology, whose burden does not directly depend upon concrete
empirical data.

This criterion is meant to differentiate,
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among other things,

addresses which pertain to the funda

mental conceptual bases of psychology from those which pre
sent findings within an established conceptual framework.
This class of addresses includes discussions of major problems,
issues and methods in psychology; discussions of the relation
of psychology to other sciences; expositions and critiques
of psychological doctrines and concepts;

theories not de

rived from empirical data; and general historical summaries.
The criterion of an address which is primarily or completely
Research-oriented is the presentation of information based
upon empirical or even experimental data.

This class of

addresses includes research summaries; presentations of the
results of an original investigation;

theories or concepts

based upon empirical data; and reviews of the research litera
ture.

In other words,

an address coded as Research-oriented

is essentially the same as a research article published in
a standard psychological journal.
The scope of the address was determined by classifying
each address as Broad or N a r r o w .

A Broad address was de

fined as one which encompasses psychology as a whole,

or

treats a problem which transcends specific areas and is signi
ficant for psychology as a whole.

A Narrow address was de
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fined as one which is limited to a specialized area or problem
within psychology.
For both nature and scope,
three times, once for each judge.
the address the same way,

each address was coded
When all three judges coded

the common coding determined the

final classification of the address.

In cases of disagreement,

the decision concerning the nature and scope of an address
was based on the criterion of 2/3 of the codings.

For example,

if two judges coded a particular address as Expository in
nature and one judge coded it Research,
sidered to be Expository in nature.

the address was con

The same criterion was

used to determine the scope of an address.

Prescriptive Issues in the Development of American Psychology
A prescription is not a static entity but a conception
whose status changes over time.

It has already been noted that

prescriptions tend to function in contrasting pairs.

What

then has been the changing status of prescriptive issues in the
development of American psychology?

This question can be an

swered by plotting the changes in the Acceptance codings of
contrasting prescriptions on individual graphs.

The Acceptance

codings made up 78.3% of the total number of Present codings
(Appendix F - 7 ) .

Each graph would represent the changing

status of a pair of prescriptions as a function of time.
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If the prescriptions are to be plotted on graphs,

one

must be reasonably sure that the addresses expressing the pre
scriptions sample the interests of American psychologists at
the time the addresses were delivered.

The presidents of the

APA were sleeted after they made their contributions to
psychology.

Hence,

some of their addresses,

ones that are related to their own work,

particularly the

could reflect areas

of interest that were strong some time before the addresses
were given.

However,

this is not a serious problem,

because

the addresses which are related to the president's own work
are not simple summaries;

they contain significant new mater

ial which is a contribution in its own right.

Also,

the

presidents are surely as innovative and original as American
psychologists who were not elected to the presidency; hence,
their work,

including their addresses,

of time rather than behind time.

may be slightly ahead

For these reasons,

it is

unlikely that there is a systematic "time lag" with research
areas in the addresses.
While no single address is representative of American
psychology for a particular year,

a series of ten addresses

may be considered representative of a decade.

Ten addresses

each coded by three judges provides a data-base of 30 codings,
which is large enough to provide reasonably stable findings.
Yet it provides more precise information than 20-year units
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would.

Hence,

the status of the prescriptions was plotted by

decade-units.
When decades are used as units to plot the status of
prescriptions in addresses,

there are 10 addresses per decade

for four of the eight decades, but because of the missing
addresses mentioned in the Introduction,
with nine addresses and one decade,
addresses.

there are three decades

1891-1900, with only eight

This makes it necessary to transform the number

of Acceptance codings for each decade to percentages.
each address was coded three times,

Since

the percentage is based

on three times the number of addresses available for the
decade, _i._e., on 30,
presented later,

27, or 24 codings.

On the graphs to be

the ordinates are labeled "Percentage of

Acceptance Codings of All Addresses in Decade".
To ease the interpretation of the results,

a percentage

may be thought of as a number of Acceptances in 10 addresses.
For example,

a prescription which achieves a status of 45%

for a certain decade may be thought of as being accepted in
4.5 out of 10 addresses.

Also,

a difference of 20% in the

status of a prescription in two adjacent decades is equivalent
to about six Acceptance codings out of about thirty, and is
probably a change worthy of interpretation.
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III.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF ADDRESSES: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The findings in this chapter will be preceded by

the relevant predictions and followed by discussion.

Nature of Addresses
Prediction 1 :

There will be a decrease over time in addresses

characterized as expository, whose burden does not directly
depend upon empirical data,

and a simultaneous increase in

addresses characterized by the presentation of information
based upon empirical or even experimental data,

or the pre

sentation of a viewpoint deriving from empirical data.
Furthermore,

this transition will occur around 1930,

so that

the addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly ex
pository-oriented and those after about 1930 will be pre
dominantly research-oriented.

The rationale for this pre

diction is that 1890 through the early 1930's was the
particularly controversial period of schools in psychology,
and the 1 9 3 0 ’s to the present the somewhat more tolerant
factual period in American psychology.

When the 75 APA presidential addresses are dichotomized
in terms of their nature,
and 17 Research addresses.

there are 58 Expository addresses
The temporal changes in the nature
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of the addresses are shown in Figure 1.

The findings shown

in Figure 1 support part of Prediction 1 but not all of it.
There is a decrease in Expository addresses and an increase
in Research addresses, which is most pronounced for addresses
before and after 1930.

However,

the addresses after 1930 are

not predominantly Research-oriented,

as was predicted; only

about 4 0 % of them are.
The trends depicted in Figure 1 are probably a re
flection of the changing nature of American psychology from
an immature to a mature science.
work,

The nature of the president's

and the addresses which relate to his work,

have changed

significantly: later addresses rest upon a firmer empirical
basis.

They are more likely than earlier ones to present a

strictly scientific,

rather than a purely conceptual,

con

tribution.

Nature and Prescriptions
Prediction 2 :

Fewer prescriptions will be expressed in the

research-oriented addresses than in the expository addresses.
The rationale for this prediction is that expository address
es provide more freedom for an author to comment on issues
and viewpoints than do research-oriented addresses.

On the average,

there were 13.87 prescriptions ex

pressed in the Expository-oriented addresses, and 12.62

Hi
I

Expository orientation

I Research orientation

Percentage of All
Addresses in Period

100
80
60
40

18911910

19111930

1931
1950

19511970

Years
Fig. 1.
Presidential addresses of the
American Psychological Association with expos
tory orientation and research orientation in
four periods.
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expressed in the Research-oriented addresses.

A _t test

showed that the difference between the means was not signifi
cant at the .05 level.

It is concluded that Expository

and Research addresses express about the same number of pre
scriptions.

Prediction 3 :

The proportion of prescriptions which are

expressed implicitly, whatever its value relative to those
expressed explicitly, will be larger in the research-oriented
addresses than in the expository addresses.

The rationale

for this prediction is that many prescriptions are implicit
in the activities of psychologists as research workers,

and

therefore research-oriented addresses would be expected to be
based upon more underlying assumptions and conceptions than
expository addresses.
Table 1
Explicit

Implicit

Expository

72%

28%

13.87

Research

53%

47%

12.62

Table 1 shows that 28% of the prescriptions in the
Expository addresses were expressed implicitly, whereas
47% of the prescriptions in the Research addresses were
implicit.

A chi square test done on the cell frequencies

indicated that the difference was significant at the .01 level,
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It is concluded that the proportion of implicity expressed
prescriptions is significantly larger in the Research addresses
than in the Expository addresses.
Scope of Addresses
Prediction 4i

There will be a decrease over time in addresses

which encompass psychology as a whole,

or treat a problem which

transcends specific areas and is significant for psychology as
a whole,

and a simultaneous increase in addresses which are

limited to a specialized area of problem within psychology.
Furthermore,

this transition will occur around 1930,

so that the

addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly broad in scope
and those after about 1930 will be predominantly narrow in scope.
The rationale for this prediction is that before the early
1930's was the period in the history of American psychology in
which the various schools each claimed comprehensiveness for
its psychological system,

and after the early 1930 's the more

specialized factual period in American psychology.

When the 75 addresses are dichotomized in terms of
their scope,
addresses.

there are 47 Narrow addresses and 28 Broad
The temporal changes in the scope of the addresses

are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 shows that about 72% of the

addresses given during the first 20 years of the Association,
1891-1910,

encompassed psychology as a whole or were signifi

cant for psychology as a whole, while most of those given

Broad scope
I

| Narrow scope

Percentage of All
Addresses in Period

100
80
60
40

20
0

18911910

19111930

19311950

E

19511970

Years
Fig. 2.
Presidential addresses of the
American Psychological Association with broad
scope and narrow scope in four periods.
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later were limited to a specialized area or problem within
psychology.

The transition does not occur around 1930,

was predicted.

as

The greatest specialization in the tradition

of the APA president's address occurred relatively early,

in

fact as early as the second and third decades of the century.
This fact is based upon the results of a chi square test done
on the cell frequencies which showed that the shift from the
first period

(1891-1910)

to the second period

(1911-1930) was

significant at the .01 level, while none of the other shifts
in adjacent periods were significant.

Nature and Scope Considered Jointly
The foregoing discussion has focused on the changes
in the nature and scope of the addresses separately.

The

distribution of addresses on both dimensions jointly is con
sidered in this section.

These two dimensions dichotomously

treated result in four possible combinations.

The average

number of addresses for each combination is shown in Table 2.
A chi square test indicated that there was a significant
difference between observed and expected frequencies at the
.01 level of significance.
Table 2
Nature

Scope
Broad

Narrow

Expository

28

30

58

Research

0
28

17
47

17
75
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Table 2 shows that two possible combinations are
most frequent, one combination is moderately frequent,

and

one possible combination is without any addresses at all.

The

two most frequent types are the Expository-Broad and the
Expository-Narrow.
in nature,

Of the addresses classified as Expository

about half were Broad and half Narrow in scope.

All of the addresses which were classified as Research-oriented
were Narrow in scope.
The changes which have taken place in the APA tradition
with respect to the three types of addresses are shown in
Figure 3.

The years 1891 to 1910 were characterized by

expository addresses which were broad in scope, while the
years 1911 to 1930 were mostly expository addresses which were
narrow in scope.

The last 40 years have seen varying proportions

of all three types of addresses, with no one type predominant.
Overall,

the results show that two major transitions

have occurred in the tradition of APA presidential addresses.
The first was a transition toward specialization, which
occurred shortly after the first decade of the twentieth
century.

Before that time the presidents thought in broad

terms and frequently discussed the philosophical foundations
of psychology or psychology's relation to other sciences.
Hall's first address,

"The History and Prospects of Experi

mental Psychology in America," may have served as a prototype.
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Expository - Broad
I

| Expository-Narrow
Research—Narrow

Percentage of All
Addresses in Period

too
80
60
40

1891-1910

1911-1930

193! -1950

1951-1970

Years
Fig. 3.
Presidential addresses of the
American Psychological Association with three
orientations in four periods.
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Examples of broad addresses include:
Psychology"
(Cattell,

(Ladd,

1893),

"Psychology and the Other Sciences"

1895) , "Psychology and History"

"Psychology and Social Practice"
and Physics"
1903),

"The Problems of

(Sanford,

1902),

(Dewey,

(Milnsterberg,
1899),

After 1910,

"Psychology

"Theory and Practice"

"The Province of Functional Psychology"

1898) ,

(Bryan,

(Angell,

1906).

the addresses became more limited in scope.

Although far too numerous to mention in their entirety,

some

of the specialized addresses may serve as illustrative:
"Ideo-Motor Action"

(Thorndike,

Psychological Method"
of Intelligence"
1950),

(Terman,

(Garrett,

1912),
1923),

1946),

"The Mental Test as a
"A Developmental Theory

"Creativity"

"Analytic Studies of Drive and Reward"

(Guilford,
(Miller,

1961).

The second transition which occurred in the APA
tradition was less pronounced than the first and occurred
later.

It was the trend away from addresses which were

expository in nature toward more formal research presentations
This trend showed its greatest shift in the 1930's and 1940's,
and has progressed to the point where almost 40% of the
addresses since 1931 have been research-oriented.
Taking these two trends together,

it may be concluded

that the tradition of APA presidential addresses has been
characterized by a progression from broad expositions about
psychology to narrow research investigations within psychology
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Of course,

there have been some recent distinguished ex

ceptions to this transition which preserve the early spirit
of the founding fathers,
(1957), Hebb
(1970).

such as the addresses by Cronbach

(I960), Bruner

(1965), Miller

(1969),

and Albee
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IV.

PREDICTED PRESCRIPTIVE TRENDS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter and the next examine changes over time

in the status of contrasting prescriptions.
changes can be interpreted,

however,

4

Before individual

the average Acceptance

of all 36 prescriptions for each decade must be known,

to see

if there is any general trend in the Acceptance of prescriptions
over time.

The average Acceptance of all 36 prescriptions

across judges for each decade was calculated,
are shown on the graphs which follow.

and the results

The results are rela

tively consistent across decades at about 30% of the codings
of all addresses in each decade.

This means that there was

no general trend of prescriptions to increase or decrease in
Acceptance;

therefore,

significant deviations from the hori

zontal line representing the average of all prescriptions may
be interpreted as individual phenomena.
This chapter is devoted to findings concerning those
pairs of prescriptions for which some prediction was made;
the next chapter examines findings concerning those pairs of
prescriptions for which no prediction was made.

However,

for

convenience findings of interest other than those strictly
4
Prediction 5, which concerns the prominence of prescriptions,
is examined in Appendix G.
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relating to the predictions are discussed here.
of the discussion is as follows.

The outline

First will be considered the

acceptance over time of the first prescription of the contrasting
pair.

Then will be considered the acceptance of the second

prescription.

These two considerations pertain to the

acceptance of the prescription in relation to all prescriptions,
as represented by the horizontal line on the graphs.

Third

will be considered the acceptance of the two contrasting pre
scriptions relative to each other,
is dominant over the other.

to see if one prescription

The discussion will procede from

a consideration of the findings of this study,

to a considera

tion of the relation of the findings to other quantitative
studies of historical trends in psychology,

to some illustra

tions of the conceptions in the history of American psychology.
Sources other than presidential addresses will be used fre
quently when needed.
The reader is reminded that the definitions of the
prescriptions may be reviewed by consulting the Introduction
(for Watson's definitions)

or Appendix D

(for Watson's

definitions elaborated by the w r i te r) .

Contentual objectivism - Contentual subjectivism
Prediction 6 :

Contentual objectivism will be increasingly

accepted after 1913,

the date of the formal founding of be

haviorism with the publication of John B. Watson's article
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"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It ," to the point where
it is so pervasive a conception in contemporary American psy
chology that it is the major ingredient in the definition of
psychology.

Contentual subjectivism will decrease in acceptance

after 1913 but will recover to the point where it is an im
portant part of contemporary American psychology,
still overshadowed by Contentual objectivism.

although

In other words,

Contentual objectivism is dominant and Contentual subjectivism
counter-dominant in contemporary American psychology.

The

aspect of this prediction concerning Contentual objectivism
is based on general reading of standard sources in the history
of psychology
M ar x & Hillix,
studies

(Heidbreder,

1933; Boring,

1963; Watson,

(Allport,

1940; Coan,

1971)

1950; Brunswik,

1952;

and the findings of other

1968), while the aspect concerning

Contentual subjectivism is based on the writer's own speculation.

Figure 4 shows a pronounced overall increase in the
acceptance of Contentual objectivism.

The initial sharp

increase occurred around the second decade of the century,
with a somewhat irregular pattern developing after that.
The initial increase corresponds to the inception of be
haviorism.

Overall,

the results show that psychological

data were conceptualized in behavioral terms by the 1930's,
and that this has been a conception of vital significance
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Contentual objectivism

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade

100

□

Contentual subjectivism
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19211930

19311940

19411950

19511960

19611970

Years
Fig. 4.
Author's acceptance of Contentual
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism in 75 APA
presidential addresses coded b y three judges.
(The average acceptance of all 36 prescriptions is
shown by the horizontal line.)
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during the last forty years.

This aspect of the findings

corresponds with the prediction.
Figure 4 also shows that Contentual subjectivism has
decreased consistently in acceptance from a position of para
mount importance in the 1890's.

The remarkable feature of

this pattern is the consistency with which the decrease has
taken place, with each succeeding decade showing a slightly
lower degree of acceptance of the prescription.
acceptance-decrease-recovery pattern,

The predicted

with the decrease

corresponding to the rise of Contentual objectivism,
occur.

Instead,

does not

the finding is one of an initially strong

commitment to the study of mind or experience by psychologists,
followed by constant weakening of that commitment to the point
where experience is part of the subject matter of contemporary
psychology but of less importance than behavior.
In terms of the relative acceptance of the two pre
scriptions,

the findings are that Contentual subjectivism

was dominant and Contentual objectivism counter-dominant
during the first 40 years,
during the last 40 years,
finding,

1891-1930,
1931-1970.

and the reverse true
Within this general

there are several further points of interest.

The

years 1891 to 1910 show the almost complete dominance of the
mentalistic prescription over the behavioral one, but this
gave way to a much weaker degree of dominance during the next
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two decades,

1911-1930, when behaviorism came in vogue.

after behaviorism had begun,

Even

subjective phenomena were con

sidered a vital part of the subject matter of psychology and,
although losing some ground,

they have never ceased to be so.

But during the last forty years Contentual objectivism has
been dominant and Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant,
a finding which accords well with the initial prediction.
These findings showing a shift from the use of
mentalistic concepts in psychology to behavioral ones are
consistent with those of several other studies
Bruner & Allport,

1940; Coan,

1968).

{Allport,

Bruner and Allport

1940;
(1940)

found a sharp decline over time in the treatment of mental
processes as entities and a simultaneous increase in their
treatment as constructs.

C o a n 1s (1968)

jectivistic versus Objectivistic,
crease in objectivism.

first factor,

Sub-

showed a progressive in

The findings from the three studies

support the hypothesis of Brunswik

(1950), who predicted a

continuous change from subjectivism to objectivism in psy
chology.
One of the greatest problems in the history of
psychology has been the problem of defining the subject matter
of psychology.

Psychology was classically defined as the

science of the conscious mind.
stated:

" [The psychologist]

Fullerton,

for example,

is . . . concerned with the
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contents of consciousness,

mental phenomena and their inter

relations, and whatever else

(if there be anything else)

sufficiently resembles mental phenomena to be found in a
consciousness"(1897, p. 4).

This view prevailed for about

three decades in American psychology,

from the 1880's through

the first decade of the twentieth century.
During the first decade of the twentieth century the
definition of psychology as the science of consciousness began
to be questioned.

The first suggestion made by an APA president

that psychology should study something other than consciousness,
was made by C. H. Judd in his address in 1909.
The science of psychology will not find itself
until it turns away from impressions and sensory
details and recognizes that the inner processes
of conscious organization so transform sensory
elements that there is in sensation little of
value for the student of consciousness.
Behavior
on the other hand is the expression and end of all
inner organization.
To study behavior more com
pletely is therefore the most urgent of our problems,
— in a very important sense it is our chief problem
(1910, p. 95).
Of course there were those who thought psychology should
embrace both the mental and the behavioral

(Warren,

1914),

or who employed the awkward term "mental behavior" to
designate psychology's subject matter
1932),

(Terman,

1923; Miles,

or who preferred to include both the mental and the

physiological within psychology

(Langfeld,

1931).

But the

growing tendency was to conceive of the subject matter of
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psychology in exclusively behavioral terms.
The behavioristic phase of the history of psychology
formally begins in 1913 with John B. Watson's manifesto,
"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It."

In this paper

Watson asserted:
The time seems to have come when psychology must
discard all reference to consciousness; when it
need no longer delude itself into thinking that
it is making mental states the object of observa
tion.
We have become so enmeshed in speculative
questions concerning the . . . mind, the nature
of conscious content (for example, imageless
thought, attitudes, and Bewusseinslage, etc.) that
I . . . feel that something is wrong with our pre
mises and types of problems which develop from
them (1913, p. 163).
Going further, Watson prescribed the next step:
need to do is to start work upon psychology,

"What we

making behavior,

not consciousness, the objective point of attack"

(1913,

pp. 175-176).
Another behaviorist, Walter S. Hunter,

attempted to

delineate the meaning of behavior for psychologists in his
address in 1931,

"The Psychological Study of Behavior."

In doing so he hoped to separate psychology from physiology.
In attempting to indicate the essential character
istics of that behavior which constitutes the core
of the subject matter of psychology, I have found
it necessary to use such terms as external adapta
tion, extrinsic behavior, and social environment.
If I were now to attempt a definition of contemporary
American psychology, not as it ought to be, nor as
I wish it were, but as I think it is, the result
would be as follows:
Psychology seeks to describe
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and explain, to predict and control, the extrinsic
behavior of the organism to an external environment
which is predominantly social. It is thus to be
contrasted with physiology which describes and ex
plains that behavior which is intrinsic to the
various structures of the organism, behavior which
is essentially subcutaneous and which involves
adaptations to the highly uniform internal environ
ment (1932, pp. 23-24).
Hunter's definition of psychology illustrates how behavior
was frequently conceived during the behavioristic phase of
the history of psychology.
The later behavioristic phase of the history of psy
chology is characterized by its treatment of internal events—
formerly called consciousness —
theoretical constructs.
addresses by Hull
Osgood

(1963).

as intervening variables or

Illustrating this trend are the

(1936), Tolman

(1937), Mowrer

(1954), and

Their common conviction was well stated by

Hebb, who said in his 1960 address:
sensations and perceptions,

"Mind and consciousness,

feelings and emotions,

all are

intervening variables or constructs and properly part of a
behavioristic psychology"

(I960, p. 740).

Methodological objectivism - Methodological subjectivism
Prediction 7 :

Methodological objectivism and Methodological

subjectivism will follow roughly the same pattern as Contentual
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism in the history of
American psychology,

except that Methodological subjectivism

will show a progressive decline after 1913 rather than gradual
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recovery.

The basis of this prediction is general reading

of standard sources in the field
Boring,
1971)

1950; Brunswik,

(e.g., Heidbreder,

1952; Marx & Hillix,

and the findings of other studies

1933;

1963; Watson,

(Allport,

1940,

Coan,

1968) .

Figure 5 shows that Methodological objectivism was
quite widely accepted in the early decades of psychology's
history and then, with the rise of behaviorism,

became a pre

scription of overwhelming significance in American psychology,
and has maintained its importance to the present.

At the

same time Methodological subjectivism began as quite widely
accepted and has tapered off to the point where it is no
longer a viable conception in American psychology.

Relatively

speaking, Methodological subjectivism has not competed success
fully with Methodological objectivism since before the rise
of behaviorism in the second decade of the century.

Since

that time Methodological objectivism has been so dominant
that it has incited relatively little opposition.
Congruent with these findings are the findings of
Allport

(1940) and Bruner and Allport

(1940).

Their findings

show that there were relatively few articles published in
American psychology which were based on strictly introspective
procedures,

and that a marked decline was apparent in these
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studies in 1938.

The authors were prompted to remark:

entries under Category 10

[Introspective studies]

"The

indicate

that the pages and pages of critical discussion devoted to
the problems of introspection were scarcely justified by the
slim output of articles based on strictly introspective pro
cedures.

In all years the figures are low"

On the other hand,

(1940, p. 766).

the composite category designated

"Methodological positivism" revealed both a large percentage
of articles and a pronounced increase in the percentage of
articles across the years.
The findings of this study are also related to those
of Coan

(1968).

Coan's first factor, which was labeled Sub-

jectivistic versus Objectivistic,

showed "a progressive in

crease in objectivism" from the decade of the 1880's to the
decade of the 1950's.

While showing no progressive increase,

the present study shows an overall increase of major pro
portions in the methodologically objective orientation of
American psychology.
Wh e n psychology emerged as a discipline the first
method used was self-observation or introspection.
method was usually combined with experiment?

This

experimental ,

introspection was the classical method of psychology.

Later,

experiment alone became the preferred method.
In 1890, William James asserted in the Principles
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that introspection was psychology’s primary method:

"Intro

spective Observation is what we have to rely on first and
foremost and always.
defined— it means,

The word introspection need hardly be

of course,

the looking into our own minds

and reporting what we there discover"

(1890, p. 185).

George

Trumbull Ladd was even more forceful in his address in 1893.
He said;

"That no method can be developed in psychology which

will enable us to dispense with introspection,
cease to be very largely dependent,

or which will

for its own value,

upon

the value of the introspection which accompanies it, is too
obvious to require discussion"
However,
changing,

(1894, p. 6).

the Zeitgeist— the spirit of the times— was

and in 1913 Watson declared:

"Psychology as the

behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental
branch of natural science.

. . . Introspection forms no

essential part of its methods"

(1913, p. 158).

Watson was

elected to the presidency of the APA two years after his
classic statement.

He began his address in 1915,

"The Place

of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology," by saying:
Since the publication two years ago of my somewhat
impolite papers against current methods in psychology
I have felt it incumbent upon me before making further
unpleasant remarks to suggest some method which we
might begin to use in place of introspection. . . .1
wish in my remarks tonight to report what progress
has been made in this direction (1916, p. 89).
Psychology was to adopt the method of conditioned reflexes,
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modeled after either Pavlov's conditioned secretion reflexes
or Bekhterev's conditioned motor reflexes.

This method,

which did not depend for its validity upon verbalization,
could be applied to either animal or human subjects,

and so

was thought to serve admirably the purposes of an objective
psychology.
text,

In 1919, Watson published his most comprehensive

Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist.

he presented the objective methods of human psychology.

Here
Watson's

classification included the following.
I.
II.

III.
IV.

Observation, with and without instrumental control.
The conditioned reflex methods.
(a) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned
secretion reflexes.
{b) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned
motor reflexes.
The verbal report method.
Methods of testing.

When he included verbal report among the legitimate
methods in psychology, Watson did not go back upon his
commitment to objective methods.

He considered verbal report

a speech reaction or, more broadly,

language behavior.

The

verbal reports themselves were the data and not the exper
iences described by the verbal reports.

In this sense, verbal

report,

is open to verifica

like any other kind of behavior,

tion by another competent observer,

and is an expression of

Methodological objectivism.
Despite some controversy,

the use of objective methods

in psychology became even more widespread in the wake of the

67

behaviorist revolution.

Walter S. Hunter described the

phenomenon in his address in 1931.
In America we seem to be emerging at last from an
era of controversy concerning what psychology is
or ought to be.
For good or ill the onward march
of experiment, which no mere speculation and con
troversy can halt, has carried psychology along
the way of the objective study of human behavior.
With the development of institutes for the study
of the child and for the investigation of human
relations, not to mention the post-war developments
in the study of behavior tests and animal behavior,
this objective tendency is ever more firmly estab
lished (1932, p. 2).
In sum,

around the turn of the century the methodologi

cal issue was controversial,

and Methodological subjectivism

and objectivism vied for supremacy.

But ever since the rise

of behaviorism in the second decade of the century,

there

has been a growing emphasis upon objective methods in psychol
ogy, with the implication that such methods lead to reliable
results.

Bergmann

(1956),

for example,

"methodological behaviorism,
itself to death.

It,

recently remarked that

like Functionalism, has conquered

too, has become a truism.

Virtually

every American psychologist, whether he knows it or not,
nowadays a methodological behaviorist"

(1956, p. 270) .

is
The

reliance upon objective methods is one of the most salient
characteristics of contemporary American psychology.

Peripheralism - Centralism
Prediction 8 ;

Peripheralism and Centralism will show roughly
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the same pattern as Contentual objectivism and contentual
subjectivism in the history of American psychology
1940; Coan,

1968),

(Allport,

although they will not be as widely

accepted as the latter.

One of the noteworthy features of the results dis
played in Figure 6, as contrasted with those for Contentual
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism,

is that Peripheralism

and Centralism are not as widely accepted prescriptions.
Furthermore,
but then,

Peripheralism shows an increase through the 1 9 3 0 's,

unlike Contentual objectivism,

to the present.

decreases in acceptance

The decline in the acceptance of Peripheralism

since the growth of behaviorism in the 1930's, but not in
Contentual objectivism,

may be interpreted as a change in

the behavioral prescription.

The behaviorists began by

delimiting the subject matter of psychology in terms of the
criterion of public observation.
The later behaviorists,

Behavior had to be seen.

however, were more liberal:

they

admitted internal events into the realm of legitimate data,
but they insisted upon conceptualizing those events in be
havioral terms.

Behavior as the major category of psychology

now included internal events as well as external ones,

so

that Peripheralism, with its exclusive emphasis on external
events, was no longer sufficient to characterize the subject
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matter of psychology.

Consequently,

now a viable conception,

Peripheralism is not

except for a few exceptionally

tough-minded behaviorists.
Centralism was widely accepted from the 1 8 9 0 1s through
the 1920's,
time,

and was dominant over Peripheralism during that

but it has since decreased in strength so that its

current status is moderate.

The sharpest decrease in Centralism

occurred during the 1930's, which was also the decade of the
strongest acceptance of Peripheralism.

This shift may be due

to the influence of behaviorism.

Functionalism - Structuralism
Prediction 9 ;

Functionalism will increase in acceptance after

the turn of the century and continue its pervasive influence
up to and including the present.

The most explicit expression

of this prescription occurred shortly after the turn of the
century in the form of a broad,

loosely articulated movement

known as functional psychology.

Functionalism does not exist

as a system of psychology today;

it has been absorbed into

the mainstream of American psychology.

For this reason it

has often been said that contemporary American psychology is
functional in character
Watson,

(Heidbreder,

1965; Chaplin & Krawiec,

1933; Marx & Hillix,

1968; Watson,

1971).

1963;

Struc

turalism in the form of the school of structural psychology
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will collapse around the turn of the century, but Structuralism
as a prescription will continue to be a viable conception,
regardless of whether the data of psychology are conceived as
mentalistic,

behavioral,

or physiological.

This last aspect

of the prediction is based on the writer's speculations stemming
from prescriptive theory.

Figure 7 shows that Functionalism has increased in
acceptance after the turn of the century and has maintained
a consistent level of very wide acceptance since that time.
This was the predicted course of the functional prescription
in American psychology.

Structuralism,

on the other hand,

has decreased in acceptance since the turn of the century to
a position of moderate acceptance,

and is even weaker today.

Part of this trend probably reflects the demise of the structural
school of psychology and was predicted,

but the decline in

acceptance was not predicted to be so great.

It was thought

that the structural conception would remain after the collapse
of the structural school,

implicit,

if not explicit,

formulation of the subject matter of psychology.

in the

Considering

the relative acceptance of Functionalism and Structuralism,
the results show that Functionalism has been consistently
dominant and Structuralism counter-dominant in American
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psychology since the second decade of the century.
Structuralism declined in acceptance around the turn
of the century,

a trend which is a reflection of the demise

of the structural school of psychology.

At this time,

classical structural school was challenged by a broad,
articulated movement known as functional psychology.

the
loosely
Joseph

Jastrow helped to usher in this movement in his address in
1900,

"Some Currents and Undercurrents in Psychology."
The conception that will serve as the background for
my survey will be that of psychology as the science
of mental functions.
The attitude towards mental
phenomena which this conception emphasizes came into
prominence in the wake of the evolutionary wave that
so wonderfully and so permanently altered the face of
the waters.
The conception of mental endowment as a
growth-process and as a response to complex environ
mental conditions at once cast a blinding light upon
an area of dimly-lit chaos in which dogmatism and
misconception and neglect held a confused occupation.
Not alone the illuminating truth that human mentality
was intimately and significantly related to the men
tal endowment of animals was thus realized as a living
and momentous reality, but, like the discovery of a
new planet in the solar system, there entered our
universe a new pivotal force.
It brought us to realize
that human history from its embodiment in the stone
axe or the bone amulet, from the sculptured rocks of
ancient America and the picture writings of ancient
Egypt, from primitive cult to old-time science and
to modern superstition, from savage myth to medieval
legend and present-day folk-lore, is of a nature all
compact.
These and all other spheres of human achieve
ment became suffused with the glow of a new interest,
took on a richer coloring and shone with a fuller
meaning in the light of this supremely significant con
ception.
Into the dry bones was breathed new life,
and the thoughts of men were widened by a keener in
sight of the increasing purpose that through the ages
runs (1901, pp. 5-6) .
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Jastrow described Functionalism as an undercurrent but said
he wanted to see it become one of the main currents in psy
chology.
The advent of functional psychology prompted Titchener,
the champion of structural psychology,

to undertake a clari

fication of structural and functional psychology in his paper
"The Postulates of A Structural Psychology" in 1898.

He

contrasted them in the following way.
The point
employing
represent
of modern

which I wish now to make is this:
that,
the same principle of division, we can
modern psychology as the exact counterpart
biology. . . .

1. We find a parallel to morphology in a very
large portion of "experimental" psychology.
The
primary aim of the experimental psychologist has been
to analyze the structure of mind; to ravel out the
elemental processes from the tangle of consciousness,
or (if we may change the metaphor) to isolate the
constituents in the given conscious formation.
His
task is a vivisection, but a vivisection which shall
yield structural, not functional results. . . .
2.
There is, however, a functional psychology,
over and above this psychology of structure. . . .
We may regard [the mind] . . . as the collective
name for a system of functions of the psychophysical
organism. . . .
Just as experimental psychology is to a large
extent concerned with problems of structure, so is
"descriptive" psychology, ancient and modern, chiefly
occupied with problems of function. Memory, recogni
tion, imagination, conception, judgment, attention,
apperception, volition, and a host of verbal nouns,
wider or narrower in denotation, connote, in the
discussions of descriptive psychology, functions of
the total organism.
That their underlying processes
are psychical in character is, so to speak, an
accident; for all practical purposes they stand upon
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the same level as digestion and locomotion,
tion and excretion (1898, p. 449-450).

secre

A structural prescription and a functional prescription
existed side by side in American psychology at the turn of
the century,

each held primarily by a distinct group of

psychologists.

The structural psychologists were united by

their belief that psychology should make its business the
"structure" of mind, _i.,e., the mind's conscious contents,
sensations,

images,

and affections.

gists soon came to oppose this view,
was not a group of contents,

like

The functional psycholo
arguing that the mind

but a system of activities which

better enabled the individual to adjust to his environment.
The structural and functional prescriptions were
each functioning effectively around the turn of the century,
guiding different groups of psychologists in their activities.
But in 1905, Mary Calkins attempted to reconcile the two
prescriptions in her address,

"A Reconciliation Between

Structural and Functional Psychology."

She wrote:

The object of this paper is to show that the two
conceptions, structural and functional, are readily
combined, if only the basal fact of psychology be
conceived as a conscious self, that is, as a self
being-conscious.
The combination of the two pro
cedures is— I shall argue— in this w a y made possible
because a self-being-conscious is not only analyzable
into elements but is also a complex of relations to
its environment, social and physical (1906, p. 63).
While Titchener was sharpening the contrast between
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structural and functional psychology,
to reconcile them,

and Calkins was trying

others sought to evaluate the current

status of the new functional psychology.

The best exposition

was presented in 1906 by James Rowland Angell in his address,
"The Province of Functional Psychology,"

Angell believed

that the aim of functional psychology was interpreted in
several different ways,
of functionalism.

and he delineated three conceptions

The three conceptions were

(1) functionalism

conceived as the psychology of mental operations in contrast
to the psychology of mental elements,

(2) the functionalism

which deals with the problem of mind conceived as primarily
engaged in mediating between the environment and the needs
of the organism,
psychology.

and

(3) functionalism as psychophysical

Angell later argued that these three conceptions

are all aspects of a single problem,

the problem "of deter

mining just how mind participates in accommodatory reactions"
(1907, p. 88) .
It may be said in summary that the functional school
of psychology,

like all schools, was founded upon protest

and, with the demise of the structural school,
dominant.
against,

became

Since there was then nothing left to protest
it too passed away.

But the main tenet of the

functional school— the prescription that psychology should
concern itself with what the processes of mental life and
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behavior do to help the organism adjust to its environment—
was quickly absorbed into the mainstream of American psychology.
For this reason contemporary American psychology is often con
sidered to be functional in character.
Quantitativism - Qualitativism
Prediction 1 0 :
(Bills,

Quantitativism will increase in acceptance

1938; Allport,

1940; Watson,

1965), with a concurrent

decrease in acceptance of Qualitativism.
Figure 8 shows an overall increase in the acceptance
of Quantitativism.

The specific pattern is a very pronounced

increase in acceptance during the second decade of the cen
tury,

followed by a drop,

several decades.
the 1 9 6 0 's.

and then strong recovery lasting

Finally,

Qualitativism,

there is a notable decrease in
by contrast, has maintained a

consistent level of "average" acceptance from the 1 8 9 0 's to
the 1 9 6 0 's.

This finding differs from the prediction,

which

postulated a stronger initial acceptance of Qualitativism
and subsequent decrease in strength.

Considered in relative

terms, Quantitativism has been dominant and Qualitativism
counter-dominant in American psychology since the second de
cade of the century.
The above findings are congruent with those of Allport
(1940) and Bruner and Allport

(1940).

Their category,

use of statistics," included all articles that employed

"The
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statistical aid, ranging from simple measures of variability
and correlation to complex factorial procedures.

This cate

gory showed the greatest increase of the 32 categories em
ployed by Bruner and Allport.

The authors concluded:

Quantitatively, the most striking change in 50
years is the great increase in the use of statis
tical aids in psychological research, shown in
Category 11.
In part this rise reflects the grow
ing proficiency of psychologists in the use of
techniques of critical investigation, and in part,
no doubt, it reflects the preoccupation with quanti
tative standards of excellence characteristic of
most American cultural activities— even science
(1940, pp. 766-767).
Coan's
Qualitative,

(1968)

fourth factor, Quantitative versus

showed a trend over time in psychological theory

from quantitative to qualitative to quantitative emphases,

in

which the second quantitative emphasis was stronger than the
earlier one.

This finding differs from the present study and

the Bruner and Allport study,

which both show a unidirectional

increase of major proportions in the quantitative orientation
of American psychology.
Even in the early years of the history of psychology
there were psychologists who were advocating the use of
measurement.

One of the strongest advocates of the quanti

tative prescription at that time was J. McKeen Cattell, who
as early as 1895 said:
Now it seems to me . . . that measurements have just
the same place in psychology as in the material
sciences, except in so far as they have not been as
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yet so successfully prosecuted.
The immediate end
of science, whether physical or mental, is to describe
the world . . . in so far as a description of the
world is an end in itself, measurements are a part
of this description, and by far the most exact,
general and economical method of description hitherto
devised (1896, p. 140).
The acceptance of Quantitativism was,
extent,

to a large

a consequence of the general behavioristic recon

ception of psychology's subject matter in terms of behavior.
Behavior is concrete and tangible;
measurement.

it can be subjected to

Although the quantitative prescription appears

in APA addresses as widely diversified as those devoted to
the psychology of music
(Scott,

(Seashore,

1919), and factor analysis

1911), vocational guidance
(Thurstone,

most explicit in Woodrow's address in 1941,
General Quantitative Laws in Psychology."

1933),

it is

"The Problem of
Woodrow expressed

the sentiments of many psychologists when he wrote:
The viewpoint believed to be the most serviceable
in the formulation of quantitative laws rests
largely upon the nature of the primary, quantitative
data of psychology.
If one examines any large
number of psychological investigations, he will find
that the actual observations deal with the activities
of organisms or the more or less immediate results
of these activities.
These activities are usually
described in connection with the environmental cir
cumstances under which they occur. . . . One after
another, psychological systems come to the fore and
then subside; but the measurements of psychology
continue to be, as they have always been, measure
ments of attributes of behavioral responses or their
products and of the environmental conditions under
which these responses occur.
From the fact that the
primary observations of psychology are in the first
instance almost entirely observations of surface
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behavior and its products, and from the further
fact that the attributes of such behavior are
measurable, it follows naturally that psychology
is very largely a quantitative science . (1942, pp. 1-2).
Today qualitative speculation, no matter how brilliant,
"is apt to be considered worthwhile only if it be a prelude
to a form in which it can be restated so as to be measured"
(Watson,

1965).

The use of quantitative techniques and pro

cedures is so widespread that American psychology may be
characterized as predominantly quantitative in nature.

Nomotheticism - Idiographicism
Prediction 11;

Nomotheticism will be dominant and Idio

graphicism counter-dominant throughout the history of American
psychology up to the present

(Allport,

1940; Watson,

1965).

Figure 9 shows a similar pattern for Nomotheticism
and Idiographicism:

initial acceptance followed by attenuation

and then growing acceptance again.

This pattern is not as

striking for Idiographicism as it is for Nomotheticism, but
the parallel between the two prescriptions is noteworthy.
Nomotheticism shows very strong acceptance since the 1930's,
although it drops precipitously during the last decade.
Idiographicism shows moderately strong acceptance during the
last three decades.

In terms of relative acceptance, Nomo

theticism has been dominant and Idiographicism counter-dominant
throughout the history of American psychology,

as was predicted.

82

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade

lOOr
Nomotheticism
80□

idiographicism

60

40-

20

—I

-

19111920

19211930

19311940

19411950

19511960

19611970

Years
Fig. 9. Author's acceptance of Nomotheticism
and Idiographicism in 75 APA presidential addresses
ocoded by three judges.
(The average acceptance of
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)

83

The relation of dominance and counter-dominance
between Nomotheticism and Idiographicism has existed through
out the development of American psychology.
goal rather than an artistic one,

Being a scientific

the search for general laws

was taken for granted as being the aim of psychology, while
explaining particular events or individuals was of interest
to a minority of psychologists.

The strongest acceptance of

Idiographicism was during the 1890’s; since that time there
has been a decline,
its acceptance.

but most recently a slight increase in

The increase in the acceptance of Nomotheti

cism has been far more rapid, however.
The above finding of initial strength of Idiographicism
followed by decline is supported by the findings of Bruner
and Allport

(1940).

Their category of "Articles dealing

with the single case" is substantially the same as the idiographic prescription,

and it received the highest percentage

of articles in the decade of the 1890's and then declined
through 1938.
ed,

1938,

With respect to the last decade they consider

the authors commented,

regard clinical cases,

"Most psychologists do not

individual life histories, or single

historical events as appropriate material for professional
publication"

(1940, p. 768).

While this statement is still

true, the findings of the present study, which extends beyond
1938 to the present,

show a moderate increase in the idio-
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graphic point of view in American psychology.

Purism - Utilitarianism
Prediction 12:

Purism will be accepted throughout the

history of American psychology.

Utilitarianism will become

accepted shortly after the turn of the century and then will
increase steadily in acceptance, but will remain counter
dominant in contemporary American psychology

(Misiak & Sexton,

1966) .

Figure 10 shows that Purism has been very widely
accepted in the history of American psychology,

although a

noteworthy decline occurred during the last decade.

Utili

tarianism has also been very widely accepted, although not
as strong as Purism, and it has become more widely accepted
during the last few decades.

Examination of the relative

acceptance of these two prescriptions shows that Purism has
been dominant and Utilitarianism counter-dominant in American
psychology until the last decade,

when the reverse was true.

Although both Purism and Utilitarianism have been
very widely accepted in the history of American psychology,
the acceptance of pure research has been,

on the whole,

considerably stronger than the acceptance of applied psy
chology.

It has been felt by most psychologists that pure

psychology is more basic than applied and that progress in
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the latter depends upon a strong commitment to the former.
However,

a distinct trend is apparent:

there has been a

marked increase in the acceptance of applied psychology in
the last 40 years,

and in fact it was more widely accepted

in the 1960's than was pure psychology.
Bruner and Allport's

(1940)

category "Applied psy

chology, " defined as including theoretical and experimental
contributions aimed primarily at the direct application of
psychological principles to life outside the laboratory,
showed a decline in percentage of articles over time.
ever,

How

in view of the activity of the American Association for

Applied Psychology (AAAP)
cal Study of Social Issues

and the Society for the Psychologi
{SPSSI), Allport

(1940) was led

to remark:
The conclusion to be drawn, I think, is not that
our membership as a whole is less interested in
the usefulness of psychology, but that a certain
professional cleavage is developing.
Psychologists
using the fourteen journals studied are, in their
writings, becoming more and more remote from living
issues and more abstract in the presentation of
their subject matter.
The consulting, applied, and
socially-minded psychologists are turning to other,
more specialized, journals not included within our
survey.
Thus, the indication is that "pure" and
"applied" psychology are parting ways to some ex
tent— an event which some will deplore and others
welcome (1940, p. 7).
This interpretation was elaborated by Bruner and Allport
in the following way.

(1940)
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The year 1938 presents in fairly dramatic form two
alternative courses for the future.
Briefly, these
courses might be designated as 'psychology for
science's sake' and 'psychology for society's sake.'
These designations do not imply, however, simply a
choice between pure and applied psychology, nor
between isolationism and participationism.
For the
course selected will determine inevitably the design
of mental science in the future— the character of its
presuppositions, the systematic nature of its con
cepts, the structure of its theories, the fashioning
of its techniques, as well as the content of its
research (1940, p. 775).
According to a textbook account

(Misiak & Sexton,

1966) ,

the contrast between pure and applied psychology was evident
from the beginning in American psychology,
issue was discussed,

but, although the

there was no sharp rift at that time,

probably because applied psychologists held academic positions
and contributed to psychological science.
American psychology developed,

Gradually,

as

the rift widened and the dual

character of the discipline became a bipolarity between
scientific and professional interests.

The principle factor

responsible for accelerating this trend was the role of
psychologists in the two world wars,

particularly World War II.

The following discussion of this factor is taken from the
presentation of Misiak and Sexton,

and is offered to provide

a context for later discussion of the views of some of the
APA presidents on the Purism-Utilitarianism issue.
Psychology was given impetus by America's entry into
World War I in 1917.

Although psychologists performed many
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applied services in the war effort,

their single most

significant function was to devise effective techniques by
which civilian recruits could be selected and allocated to
military assignments.

The success of psychologists in dealing

with the manpower problem opened up new possibilities for
applied psychology in education,
Clinical psychology,

business,

vocational guidance,

psychology made significant gains.
of Applied Psychology in 1917.

and industry.
and industrial

Hall founded the Journal

After 1920,

applied psychology

began to develop as an independent field.
America's entry into World War II came in 1941,

and

once again psychologists were called on to select and classi
fy military personnel in induction centers.

They also engaged

in "human factors engineering," the designing of military
equipment according to human specifications.

Once again the

success of psychologists in these applied tasks gave prestige
to psychology and accelerated the development of applied
psychology.

When World War II ended in 1945 there followed

in America enthusiastic support for the behavioral sciences
in general and psychology in particular.

Psychology's success

during the war led to an unprecedented demand for psychological
services in the community.
psychology was achieved.

Formal recognition of professional
At the same time many psychologists

were happily engaged in research in academic settings.

It
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was as if psychology— at least two major groups of psycholo
gists— were moving in opposite directions.

It could be

estimated that the turning point was around 1945; prior to
that time psychology was predominantly academically oriented,
after 1945 it became more professionally oriented.

The

cleavage between pure and applied psychology grew to con
siderable proportions.
The cleavage between pure or academic psychology
and applied or professional psychology deepened during the
1 9 6 0 's.
gists,

Academic psychologists, who train future psycholo
are in the minority.

In 1965 one estimate concluded

that "6 out of 10 psychologists are primarily concerned with
the applications of psychology"

(Watson,

1965, p. 132).

Having provided an overview of the development of
the pure and applied prescriptions in psychology,
views of APA presidents will be discussed.

some specific

These are dis

cussed at somewhat greater length for the Purism-Utilitarianism
issue than for other prescriptions, because of the significance
of the implications of this issue.
As early as 1893 George Trumbull Ladd spoke to the
issue of psychology’s applications.

He said:

"The more I

study and teach this science the deeper does the impression
become that it is able and destined to contribute greatly to
the welfare of mankind"

(1894,

p. 19).

Ladd pointed out
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that this fact implied a certain responsibility,
of a quasi-ethical sort," upon the Association,

"which is
and he added

that the Association "should enter upon its career with a
sufficiently generous estimate of its privileges and of its
responsibility"

(1894, p. 21).

Other addresses given before World War I which ex
pressed the utilitarian theme included Dewey's

(1899)

address,

"Psychology and Social Practice," which dealt with the appli
cation of psychological knowledge to education and served as
an impetus for the progressive education movement,
(1904)

address,

"Theory and Practice,11 in which he stressed

that all knowledge is potentially practical.
of a Singer"

(1911),

In "The Measure

Seashore dealt with a problem in the

applied psychology of music:
musical ability.

and Bryan's

the measurement of an individual's

He claimed that "measurements of the kind

we commonly accept in psychology may be so employed as to
furnish a serviceable invoice of the natural capacity,
plasticity,

skill and knowledge a particular individual may

have for doing a particular thing"

(1912, p. 212).

In 1917, Robert M. Yerkes gave his address,

"Psychology

in Relation to the W a r , " in which he outlined the history of
the organizing of psychological military service in that
year.

He noted:
The obvious and significant trend of our psychological
military work is toward service.
Psychologists who
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develop methods or accumulate information which
promises to aid us in winning the war are shortly
appointed to positions which give them opportunity
to apply their special knowledge effectively.
At
present our profession is importantly represented
in the Department of the Adjutant General, in the
Navy, the Signal Corps, the Medical Corps, the
Sanitary Corps and the Quartermaster Corps (1918,
p. 113).
However, Yerkes noted that the future demand for psychologists
and psychological services threatened to outstrip the supply.
Walter Dill Scott published in 1903 the first book
by a psychologist aimed to help business,
vertising.

Scott followed this with two other books,

Psychology of Advertising
Business

The Theory of Ad

(1911),

(1910)

The

and Influencing Men in

Considered the "father of applied psy

chology" he was elected to the presidency of the APA in 1919,
and gave his address on "Changes in Some of Our Conceptions
and Practices of Personnel."
Although applied psychology received a great deal of
support from the functional school of psychology,

it was

even more strongly advocated b y classical behaviorism.
Drawing the ethical implications of his environmentalistic
position,

J. B. Watson sought to develop a social philosophy

dedicated to the secular salvation of the human race.

His

"experimental ethics" was based on the assumption that since
man is determined b y the environment,

he ought to be inten

tionally molded by the social environment.

Wit h his usual

enthusiasm, Watson envisaged a future society based on the
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principles of behavioristic psychology.
Behaviorism ought to be a science that prepares
men and women for understanding the principles
of their own behavior.
It ought to make men and
women eager to rearrange their own lives, and
especially eager to prepare themselves to bring
up their own children in a healthy way.
I wish
I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful
individual we should make of every healthy child
if only we could let it shape itself properly and
then provide for it a universe in which it could
exercise that organization— a universe unshackled
by legendary folk-lore of happenings thousands of
years ago; unhampered by disgraceful political
history; free of foolish customs and conventions
which have no significance in themselves, yet which
hem the individual in like taut steel bands.
I am
not asking here for revolution; I am not asking
people to go out to some God-forsaken place, form
a colony, go naked and live a communal life, nor
am I asking for a change to a diet of roots and
herbs.
I am not asking for 'free l o v e . 1 I am try
ing to dangle a stimulus in front of you, a verbal
stimulus which, if acted upon, will gradually
change this universe.
For the universe will change
if you bring up your children, not in the freedom
of the libertine, but in behavioristic freedom— a
freedom which we cannot even picture in words, so
little do we know of it. Will not these children
in turn, with their better ways of living and
thinking, replace us as society and in turn bring
up their children in a still more scientific way,
until the world finally becomes a place fit for
human habitation? (1924, pp. 303-304).
In 1928, Watson dedicated his book, Psychological Care of
the Infant and Child, to "the first mother who brings up a
happy child."
In 1935, Albert T. Poffenberger gave his address,
"Psychology and Life."

This address departed from tradition

and limited itself to the organization and administration of
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the APA,

rather than to psychology as a discipline.

The

address took the form of a statement of recommendations of
policy for the APA by its president.

Poffenberger asserted

that psychology was of necessity both a pure and applied
science,

touching particularly closely upon everyday life.

In recognition of this, he recommended that the APA take the
following steps:

(1) Define the homo psychologicus, (2) Pro

pose minimum standards for his training,

(3) Determine the

training needed for at least the most active of the appli
cations,

and recommend the means for obtaining it,

tend psychological service within the community,

(4) Ex

thereby

increasing jobs for psychologists,

(5) Protect psychology

against the inroads of charlatans,

(6) Insure against the

misinterpretation of psychological findings and the spread
of unsound conclusions therefrom.
In 1939,

Gordon W. Allport presented his address,

"The Psychologist's Frame of Reference," which has already
been cited numerous times in this chapter,

including his

reference to the growing cleavage between pure and applied
psychology.

Allport disparaged that psychology was in danger

of losing sight of "the true source of the eminence of the
elder sciences."

He said:

"Their enviable glory consists

in the unexampled power they have given mankind in predicting,
understanding, and controlling the course of nature for
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mankind's own benefit.

As a mature science psychology,

will find its justification,

...

the power to achieve these ends"

too,

in contributing to humanity
{1939, p. 16).

America had been at war for two years when John E.
Anderson gave his address in 1943,

"Freedom and Constraint

or Potentiality and Environment."

In view of the amazingly

effective organization of the country at that time, Anderson
wondered what might be accomplished in peacetime by expending
equal thought,
said:

energy,

and effort upon human welfare.

He

"Our wartime experience suggests that the possibilities

of effectively utilizing human and material resources are
almost limitless,

if only the constraints inherent in our

normal environments,
time, and energy,

which inhibit us from expending money,

could be removed"

(1944, p. 2).

In succeed

ing years there were presidents calling for the integration
of pure and applied psychology
that the two are interdependent

(Murphy,
(Hunt,

1943),

or stressing

1951) , or discussing

applied psychology in relation to some practical problem
(Bruner,

1965; Hobbs,

1966).

The theme of the annual meeting of the APA in 1969
was "Psychology and the Problems of Society."
theme,

To honor that

George A. Miller presented his address on "Psychology

as a Means of Promoting Human Welfare."

In Miller's view,

the impact of psychology will be felt, not through technologi

95

cal products, but through a new conception of man.
conception— or paradigm,

The new

as he calls it— differs from the

traditional one in emphasizing the multiple bases of behavior,
positive reinforcement rather than punishment,
vention of problems,

emotional and irrational bases of be

havior rather than the rational,
than symptoms,

etc.

the early pre

focusing on causes rather

The difference might be characterized

as a "proactive view" of human nature and the social order
rather than a "reactive view."

In order for this image of

man to be absorbed by the public, Miller said that psy
chologists must endeavor to give psychology away in every
way possible.
The most recent address included in this study was
"The Uncertain Future of Clinical Psychology," given by
George W. Albee in 1970.

Albee called for a complete

separation between scientific and professional psychology.
He said:

"I fear that all these basic incompatibilities between

the science of psychology and the profession of psychology
may be so serious as soon to require a separation or divorce
. . . Looking ahead 10-20 years,

I predict that there may be

an American Scientific Psychological Association and an
American Professional Psychological Association coexisting
side by side"

(1970, p. 1078).

For the first time in the

history of the APA the membership was being called upon not
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to close ranks in a spirit of cooperation but to pursue
their separate ends.

It is too soon to tell whether the

current period is a significant turning point in which efforts
to couple the science and profession of psychology are finally
abandoned.
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V.

DESCRIPTIVE PRESCRIPTIVE TRENDS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
In addition to the findings concerning those pairs

of prescriptions for which some prediction was made,
are other findings of interest.

there

The findings from each pair

of prescriptions not discussed in Chapter IV are examined
here.

Conscious mentalism - Unconscious mentalism
Figure 11 shows a sharp irregular decrease in
Conscious mentalism from a point of very wide acceptance
around the turn of the century.

This pattern is probably

a reflection of the general attenuation of the status of
subjective phenomena in psychology,

but is even more pro

nounced than Contentual subjectivism because Conscious
mentalism specifically emphasizes awareness as a special
characteristic of mental activity and this is a character
istic which is likely to be objectionable to tough-minded
behaviorists.

Unconscious mentalism,

by contrast,

shows an

increase up through the 1 9 2 0 's, and then irregular decrease
to the present.

The strong acceptance of Unconscious mentalism

in the 19 2 0 's is probably an effect of the introduction of
psychoanalytic ideas and concepts into psychology during the
preceding decade.

Prior to that time Conscious mentalism
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Conscious mentalism

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade

□

18911900

Unconscious mentalism

1901
1910

19111920

19211930

19311940

19411950

19511960

19611970

Years
Fig. 11. Author's acceptance of Conscious
mentalism and Unconscious mentalism in 75 APA
presidential addresses coded by three judges.
(The
average acceptance of all 36 prescriptions is shown
b y the horizontal line.)
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was dominant and Unconscious mentalism counter-dominant in
American psychology;

since that time neither prescription

has maintained a consistent position of dominance over the
other.
The data of Bruner and Allport

(1940)

also show a

pattern of rise and fall in their category relating to the
unconscious,

"Explicit manifestations of the unconscious."

However, while the two findings are parallel in terms of
showing a rise and fall of interest,

the historical time in

which interest was at its peak is different in the two
studies:

in 1908 for Bruner and Allport,

in the present study.

Parenthetically,

and in the 1920's

this difference may

be due to the more stringent criteria employed by Bruner and
Allport:

either the concept of the unconscious had to be used

in an explanatory manner or else some phenomenon had to be
treated as a manifestation of the unconscious to qualify an
article for inclusion in the category.

In the present study

an expression of acceptance of the concept was enough to meet
the criterion of the prescription.
of the unconscious,

The explanatory efficacy

as measured by Bruner and Allport,

may

have been more sensitive to the growing antagonism of b e 
haviorism toward mentalistic explanations and thus show an
earlier decline than the findings from this study.
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Determinism - Indeterminism
Figure 12 shows that Determinism has been a widely
held prescription in American psychology,
not been consistently accepted.

Rather,

accepted during the 1920's and 1930's,
haviorism.

although it has
it was most widely

in the wake of be 

In the 1 9 4 0 's there was a decrease in the

acceptance of Determinism and simultaneous increase in the
acceptance of Indeterminism.

The findings show only two

phases of the history of American psychology when Indeter
minism was even moderately widely accepted.
just prior to the turn of the century,

The first was

and the second was a

temporary resurgence in the 1 9 4 0 's, which may have been due
to the increased interest in clinical activities at the time.
The overall finding,

however,

is that Determinism,

although

very much operative,

incites very little opposition in

twentieth century American psychology.
The rationale behind the adoption of the deterministic
assumption in psychology was discussed by Warren in his pre
sidential address in 1913.

He said:

Let us face the issue squarely.
Scientific re
search points more and more in the direction of
a rigid, mechanistic interpretation of the physi
cal universe.
It is time for scientists to
recognize that the data of psychology conform to
a uniformitarian pattern also.
Hitherto mental phenomena have been too
often regarded as something apart from the
world-order— something out of harmony with its
regularity.
In Newton's day the movements of

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade
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Fig. 12.
Author's acceptance of Determinism
and Indeterminism in 75 APA presidential addresses
coded by three judges.
(The average acceptance of
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal
line.)
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the heavenly bodies were considered something apart
from the movements of terrestrial bodies.
The
burden of proof and the fear of anathema rested on
those who sought to harmonize them.
Now the com
plexion of the world has changed.
Chemists and
physicists have demonstrated the uniformity and
regularity of events in their domain.
The doctrine
of conservation is only one striking example.
Physiologists are extending the same notion of uni
formity to the more complex realms of cytology and
organic processes. Animal psychologists have begun
to trace out uniformities in the activities of
organisms.
Sociologists have discovered many
regularities in the interaction of living creatures.
All these sciences have done their best work under
the inspiration of the uniformity hypothesis.
If
the glory of modern science is its determinism, why
should uniformity be considered degrading in the
sphere of mental events alone?
If the 'reign of l a w 1
means automatism, should not the term automatism be
purged of its stigma?
Is psychology to remain under
the imputation of holding a primitive conception of
the world from which the other sciences are fast
escaping? Must we not amend the traditional inter
pretation of choice, reason, and volition, so as to
bring these phenomena into harmony with the scientific
conception of uniformity in nature? (1914, p. 86)Warren went on to ask of his audience:

"With the uniformities

in behavior of simpler organisms staring up at us from below,
and the social uniformities of human groups staring down at
us from above,

are we not bound to work under the assumption

that human choice is fully determined by natural antecedents?
(1913, p. 89) .
The attitude illustrated by Warren was adopted by
the majority of American psychologists,

and Determinism soon

became part of their psychological creed.
his textbook,

For example,

Psychology: A Study of Mental Life

(1921),

in
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Woodworth stated:
To the psychologist, conduct is a matter of cause
and effect, of natural law.
His business is to
know the laws of that part of nature which we call
human nature . . . For him, even the most capricious
conduct has its causes, even the most inexplicable
has its explanation— if only the cause can be un
earthed {1921, p. 18).
In contemporary American psychology, Determinism is
so

dominant that it incites practically no opposition. One

of

the most vocal exponents of the deterministic viewpoint is

B. F. Skinner.

In his book,

Science and Human Behavior

(1953),

Skinner wrote:
The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to
the application of scientific method to the study
of human behavior.
The free inner man who is held
responsible for the behavior of the external biologi
cal organism is only a prescientific substitute for
the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course
of a scientific analysis.
All these alternative
causes lie outside the individual {1953, p. 447).
While few psychologists would go so far as Skinner in insisting
that all of the causes of human behavior are outside the
individual,

it is generally recognized that science in general

and psychological science in particular depend upon an assump
tion of determinism:

that mental events and human action in

general are not arbitrary,

capricious,

or uncaused,

but are

determined like the rest of nature.

Empiricism - Rationalism^
Figure 13 shows the overwhelming pervasiveness of
the empirical prescription in American psychology.

Rationalism,

104

Empiricism
[

| Rationalism,

100
Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade

il

80

60

40

20

1891
1900
-

1901
1910

-

1911
1920
-

LL

1921
1930
-

1931
1940
-

1941
1950

-

1951
1960
-

1961
1970
-

Years
Fig. 13.
Author's acceptance of Empiricism
and Rationalism^ in 75 APA presidential addresses
coded b y three judges.
(The average acceptance
of all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal
line.)
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as a reliance on reason as the major,
source of knowledge,

if not exclusive,

is for all practical purposes non

existent in American psychology.

Reason is involved in

various phases of the scientific enterprise,

but it is

secondary to the more basic empirical commitment,
an autonomous prescription.

and is not

So Empiricism remains unopposed,

a finding that is consistent across decades.

Inductivism - Deductivism
Figure 14 shows a consistent level of moderate
strength for Inductivism from the 1890's through the 1930's,
and then an increase in the 1940's and 1950's,
a decrease in the decade of the I960's.

followed by

Deductivism has

followed a cyclical course in American psychology in which
it was very weak for three decades,
during the war years,

rose to moderate strength

and then rose sharply in acceptance

during the 1950's, but has decreased during the last decade.
The apex of acceptance of Deductivism during the 1 9 5 0 's may
be a reflection of the general increase in theory construction
at that time.
Mechanism - Vitalism
Figure 15 shows that neither Mechanism nor Vitalism
has been widely accepted in American psychology.

Mechanism

was moderately accepted during the development of behaviorism,
in the second,

third, and fourth decades of the century.
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The only noteworthy acceptance of Vitalism occurred around
the turn of the century,

but even then it was not widely

accepted.

the following discussion focuses

Consequently,

on the status of Mechanism and Vitalism in the second,

third,

and fourth decades of the century, when behaviorism was making
important gains in American psychology.
About the time that behaviorism was making its
appearance in psychology,

the Mechanism-Vitalism issue was

of concern to some psychologists.
by Warren in his address,
(1913),

The issue was discussed

"The Mental and the Physical"

and his discussion illustrates the rationale of

psychologists'

general preference for Mechanism when they

do take a position.
Can vital phenomena be wholly explained in physical
and chemical terms or not? The term vital force
may be employed in two different ways: either to
indicate our ignorance of certain physiological
processes, or to designate a sort of process quite
distinct from physical or chemical change.
In
the former sense it has no bearing on the dispute.
In the latter sense it presents a definite problem
for investigation.
Now what is known about vital
forces?
The advocates of vitalism claim only that
certain vital phenomena are not fully explicable
in physicochemical terms.
They have no alternative
explanation to offer— only the name Entelechy, which
serves to label the unsolved problems but does not
advance one whit our understanding of them.1 Driesch,
for example, brings forward three separate proofs
of vitalism;^ every one of these rests on the incon
ceivability of imagining a machine so constructed
as to perform certain processes observed in organisms.
This is the inconceivability of antipodes over again.
A century ago it was inconceivable that the chemical
composition of distant stars should ever be known;
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and it is not many years since the earth's curvature
rendered the notion of radiotelegraphy absurd.
Mechanism is not synonymous with artificial machinery.
A ny process which involves only physicochemical
changes is mechanistic, though it differ radically
from a linotype or a refinery.
The organic processes are every year brought
more and more within the domain of physics and
chemistry.^ Unless some new force is definitely
discovered, should not the scientist assume that the
unexplained processes harmonize with those already
worked out?^ Vitalism is a possible hypothesis, but
it is not scientifically acceptable, for it stands
without direct support.
The present evidence from
biology justifies the assumption that physicochemical
processes govern the growth and activity of organisms,
— that uniformitarianism and mechanism are inter
changeable terms (1914, pp. 88-89).
Some of the behaviorists,

in turn, were eager to re

ject anything as unscientific as Vitalism,
embraced Mechanism.
McDougall in 1924,
(1928),

declared:

J. B. Watson,

and they sometimes

in his debate with William

later published as The Battle of Behaviorism
"The behaviorist finds no scientific evi

dence for the existence of any vitalistic principle . . . We
need nothing to explain behavior but the ordinary laws of
physics and chemistry"
Karl Lashley,

(1928, pp. 26-28).

stated in his address,

Another behaviorist,

"Basic Neural Mechanisms

of Behavior," that there was general agreement among psy
chologists that "the final explanation of behavior or of
mental processes is to be sought in the physiological activity
of the body and,
nervous system"

in particular,
(1930, p. 1).

in the properties of the
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A secondary conception of Mechanism— that man is a
machine— was also held by a few psychologists.
"The Experimental Embryology of Mind"

In his address,

(1940) , Carmichael

claimed validity for the conception of man as a machine.

He

summarized his address by saying:
In this paper I have attempted to demonstrate that
the fetus may be described as machine-like in the
precision and repetition of many of its patterns
of response in the same stimulus situations.
I have
also suggested that the complex behavior of the adult
organism may in certain aspects be viewed in a similar
manner.
That is, the machine character of the fetus
does not seem to be lost as development progresses,
provided only it is recognized in its early stages
when it can be most clearly seen.
The machine, as
well as what it can do, becomes more complex, but
it does not become in any sense non-mechanical.
This is still true, it seems to me, when the organism's
behavior is of the sort that external observers call
purposive, or when it is adaptively modified by
learning (1941, p. 24).
In sum, although the Mechanism-Vitalism issue had its
origin in the middle of the nineteenth century and was most
controversial in biology,
chologists.

it was of concern to some psy

Mechanism received its strongest acceptance

from behavioristically-inclined psychologists.

The associated

doctrine— that man is nothing but a machine— seems to be
essentially an article of faith, not implied by the more
fundamental physiological hypothesis.

Today the vast majority

of psychologists accept neither Mechanism nor Vitalism as
necessary assumptions of psychology.
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Molecularism - Molarism
Figure 16 reveals that Molecularism and Molarism
have been moderately accepted as prescriptions in American
psychology.

Molecularism follows an irregular pattern of

"average" degree of acceptance,
Molarism,

by contrast,

fall,

rise,

and fall again.

shows a somewhat more consistent

level of moderate acceptance.

The differences in status

between these two prescriptions are not great;

there is no

dominance of one prescription over the other.
Brunswik

(1950) predicted an historical trend from

a molecular type of approach in psychology to a molar type
of approach.

In testing this hypothesis,

Coan

(1968) found

a U-shaped progression from elementarism to holism to elementarism, with the peak for holism in the 1920's.
study shows no systematic trends.

The present

It shows more acceptance

for Molecularism than for Molarism in psychology's early
history,

more acceptance of Molarism than Molecularism in

the 1920's,

and slightly more acceptance of Molarism than

Molecularism in contemporary American psychology.

The only

conclusion that can be made on the basis of these results
is that the evolution of Molecularism and Molarism in psy
chology is not a simple unidirectional progression but is
characterized by fluctuations in acceptance.

112

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Decade

100

Molecularism

60

Molarism
40

18911900

19011910

19111920

19211930

19311940

19411950

19511960

19611970

Years
Fig. 16.
Author's acceptance of Molecularism
and Molarism in 75 APA presidential addresses coded
by three judges.
(The average acceptance of all 36
prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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Monism - Dualism
Figure 17 shows a pattern in which the only out
standing acceptance of either prescription is of Dualism
during the first two decades of the century.
time that the mind-body problem was discussed,
the relative merits of interactionism
interacting processes)

and parallelism

correlated series of events).

It was at this
especially

(two separate and
(two separate but

Since that time there has

been a sharp decline in metaphysical speculation and this
is reflected in the findings:

neither prescription was

accepted at all during the last two decades.
These findings are corroborated by the findings of
Bruner and Allport

(1940) , who also found a decline in treat

ments of the mind-body problem.
the shift, Allport remarked:
solutions to the problem
dualistic terms;

today

Commenting on the nature of

"In the earlier literature

were boldly offered in monistic or

[1938]

the fashion is to deny the

existence of the body-mind problem,

the denial being generally

effected with the aid of Vienna logic"

(1940, p. 3).

John B. Watson may have set the example for modern
psychologists in regard to the mind-body problem in his
manifesto of behaviorism

in 1913, "Psychology as the Be

haviorist Views It."

declared forcefully:

He

In it [behaviorism] one avoids both the Scylla of
parallelism and the Charybdis of interaction.
Those
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Fig. 17.
Author's acceptance of Monism and
Dualism in 75 APA presidential addresses coded by
three judges.
(The average acceptance of all 36
prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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time-honored relics of philosophical speculation
need trouble the student of behavior as little as
they trouble the student of physics.
The considera
tion of the mind-body problem affects neither the
type of problem selected nor the formulation of the
solution of that problem.
I can state my position
here no better than by saying that I should like to
bring my students up in the same ignorance of such
hypotheses as one finds among the students of other
branches of science {1913, p. 166).

Naturalism - Supernaturalism
Figure 18 shows that Naturalism was strongly accepted
in American psychology in the 1890*s.

Since that time

Naturalism has been moderately widely accepted,

except for

the last decade when it was not accepted at all.
The findings shown in Figure 18 are difficult to
interpret,

since the naturalistic prescription is usually

taken for granted in psychology,

as it is in all sciences.

The paradox is resolved when the results are interpreted
(and this is the writer's personal conviction)

as portraying

a situation in which the naturalistic basis of American
psychology is so deeply implicit that it provides only a
little objective evidence of its existence.

In the 1 8 9 0 ’s,

American psychology was becoming established and psychologists
were eager to assert that psychology was a natural science
along with the other sciences.

Since that time Naturalism

has been mostly taken for granted, while Supernaturalism was
never accepted at all in American psychology.
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Pig. 18. Author's acceptance of Naturalism
and Supernaturalism in 75 APA presidential addresses
coded by three judges.
(The average acceptance of
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)

117

Rationalism., - Irrationalism
Neither Rationalisn^ nor Irrationalism has been
widely accepted in American psychology,
Figure 19.

according to

Rationalisn^ was moderately widely accepted

during the beginning of psychology's history, when psychology
was defined as the study of the conscious mind.
decades Irrationalism became moderately accepted;

In later
this de

velopment was probably influenced by the integration of
selected psychoanalytic ideas into the mainstream of American
psychology.

On the whole,

Irrationalism has been more widely

accepted in the history of psychology than Rationalist!^.
One of the APA presidents, Walter Dill Scott, described
the historical decline in the acceptance of Rationalist!^ in
his address,

"Changes in Some of Our Conceptions and Practices

of Personnel."
A second change in our conception and practice of
personnel administration is seen in the decreasing
importance ascribed to Reason as a factor in de
termining human action.
For many centuries man was
defined as the reasoning animal* Aristotle's "Logic"
was the standard textbook for all students desiring
to learn the best method of influencing and controlling
men.
For persuasion the syllogism was believed to
be the most perfect tool.
Arguments to be effective
must be analyzed and presented in a logical form.
The hearer was supposed to criticize appeals by the
most rigorous of logical standards.
The change in this point of view has come about
so gradually that we fail to appreciate its extent.
At the hands of certain authors the importance of
reason is minimized by an emphasis upon suggestion
as descriptive of the process of influencing men.
Others contrast reason and instinct, urging the
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Author's acceptance of Rationalisn^
and Irrationalism in 7 5 APA presidential addresses
coded by three judges.
(The average acceptance of
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal
lin e .)
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important part instincts play not only in the
behavior of young children but also in the more
important acts of adults.
Still other scientists stress the significance
of sentiments and emotions, of impulse and habit,
or of other forms of human response not reducible
to any standard type of reasoning.
This change in
our concept of the importance of reasoning is ob
servable in the writings of modern psychologists,
and is reflected also in the practices of the more
progressive leaders in personnel administration
(1920, pp. 85-86) .

Staticism^ - Developmentalism
Figure 20 shows that Staticism^ has increased slightly
in acceptance over time.

The status of Developmentalism has

followed an almost cyclical pattern over time: it was initially
widely accepted,
decades,

decreased to moderate acceptance for several

and then rose to wide acceptance again.

The overall

pattern of these two prescriptions relative to each other,
is that Developmentalism has been dominant and Staticism^
counter-dominant throughout the history of American psychology.

Staticism^ - Dynamicism
Figure 21 shows that Staticism^ has been consistently
weak as a prescription in American psychology.

Dynamicism,

on the other hand, has increased in acceptance during the
first few decades of the century,

a trend that ma y have been

enhanced by the advent of psychoanalysis,
off at the status of "average" acceptance.

and then leveled
The psychoanalytic

concept of defense mechanisms, which are dynamic in nature.
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became part of American psychology.

The importance of moti

vation and the emphasis on change were also accepted in
American psychology.

The relation between these two pre

scriptions is one in which Dynamicism is consistently
dominant and Staticism^ counter-dominant.

There is no evidence

of a progression from Staticisn^ to Dynamicism,
(1968)

as Coan

found, but simply an early trend toward wider acceptance

of Dynamicism,

followed by consistent "average" acceptance

during the last 50 years.
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VI.

PRESCRIPTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY:
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Having examined changes over time in the status of

contrasting prescriptions,

this chapter considers the status

of prescriptions in contemporary American psychology.

5

Con

temporary American psychology is operationally defined in
terms of the last two decades,
combined for this period,

1951 to 1970.

The data were

and consequently the interpretations

of the findings are restricted to this time span.
Prediction 1 4 :

The following prescriptions will be among

the most widely accepted prescriptions in contemporary
American psychology
considerations:

(1951-1970), irrespective of temporal

Conscious mentalism,

Contentual subjectivism,
vism, Nomotheticism,
tivism.

Contentual objectivism,

Empiricism, Methodological objecti

Purism, Utilitarianism,

and Quantita-

This prediction is based on the writer's background

reading and personal judgments.

The findings relevant to Prediction 14 are presented
in Table 3.
5
Prediction 13, which concerns the relative proportion of
explicitly and implicitly accepted prescriptions over time,
is examined in Appendix H.
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Table 3
Ten Prescriptions with Highest Acceptance in 19 APA Presi
dential Addresses Representing Contemporary American Psy
chology

(1951-1970)

judges.

(Each number is the average of three

The mean for all prescriptions was 5.4 acceptance

codings.)

Empiricism3

18.67

Methodological objectivism

16.00

Purisma

13.67

Contentual objectivism3

12.33

Utilitarianism3

12.00

Quantitativism3

12.00

Nomotheticism

a

10.00

Functionalism

9.33

Developmentalism

8.67

Contentual subjectivism3

8.33

a
Predicted to be among the most widely accepted of the 36
prescriptions (N = 9) .

The average number of acceptance codings across
judges out of 19 addresses was 5.4.
tion around the mean,

as expected.

There was wide varia
Table 3 shows the ten

most widely accepted prescriptions in contemporary American
psychology, as represented by the last 19 APA presidential
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addresses.

Of the nine prescriptions predicted to be among

the most widely accepted,
ten in Table 3.

eight were listed among the top

Functionalism and Developmentalism were the

unpredicted prescriptions occurring in this list, while
Conscious mentalism, which was predicted,

ranked nineteenth

in acceptance.
While Table 3 shows the ranking of prescriptions in
contemporary American psychology relative to all 36 pre
scriptions,

Table 4 shows the relative acceptance of contrast

ing prescriptions by comparing their degree of acceptance.
The magnitude of the difference between the two prescriptions
is used as an operational definition of the dominance of
one over the other.
Considering the findings in Table 4 individually,

it

is evident that Empiricism is the most widely accepted pre
scription in contemporary American psychology and that it
incites no opposition from Rationalism^.

There is no question

that Empiricism provides a major part of the philosophical
foundation of contemporary American psychology,

as it does

for all sciences.
Methodological objectivism is very widely accepted,
while Methodological subjectivism is counter-dominant.
Methodological objectivism is most widely accepted in academic
psychology.

In the opinion of the writer, Methodological
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Table 4
Prescriptions in 19 APA Presidential Addresses Representing Contemporary
American Psychology (1951-1970) Arranged in Order of Dominance (Each num
ber is the average of three judges.

The mean for all prescriptions was

5.4 acceptance codings.)

More Widely Accepted
Prescription

Less Widely Accepted
Prescription

Empiricism (18.67)

Rationalism^ (.33)

Difference

18.34

Methodological objectivism (16.00) Methodological subjectivism (3.00)

13.00

Quantitativism (12.00)

Gialitativism (4.67)

7.33

Functionalism (9.33)

Structuralism (2.67)

6.66

Determinism (6.67)

Indeterminism (.33)

6.34

Developnentalism (8.67)

Staticism^ (3.33)

5.34

Nanotheticism (10.00)

Idiographicism (4.67)

5.33

Contentual objectivism (12.33)

Contentual subjectivism (8.33)

4.00

Eynamicism (6.33)

Staticism^ (2.33)

4.00

Centralism (4.00)

Peripheralism (2.00)

2.00

Molarism (5.00)

Molecularism (3.33)

1.67

Naturalism (1.67)

Supematuralism (0)

1.67

Purism (13.67)

Utilitarianism (12.00)

1.67

Irrationalism (2.67)

Rationalism^(1.00)

1.67

Mechanism (1.67)

Vitalism (.67)

1.00

Conscious mentalism (3.33)

Unconscious mentalism (2.67)

.66

Deductivian (5.67)

Inductivism (5.33)

.34

Monism (0)

Dualism (0)

0
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subjectivism can be seen in contemporary American psychology
in the various forms of psychotherapy

(including the technique

of free association), in the use of phenomenological methods,
and in the recent popularity of T-groups in their various
forms.
Quantitativism is dominant, but it does stand in
significant contrast to Qualitativism.

Commenting on the

relationship between these two prescriptions,

Watson

(1965)

wrote:
Desire to follow a quantitative prescription in re
search is very evident.
The urge toward quantifi
cation . . . is drilled into all American psycholo
gists.
Speculation, no matter how brilliant, is
apt to be considered worthwhile only if it be a
prelude to a form in which it can be restated so
as to be measured.
Speculation leads to quantita
tive hypothesis formation formulation and is not an
end in itself (1965, p. 135).
Functionalism is dominant; Structuralism counter
dominant.

Functionalism is expressed in contemporary Ameri

canpsychology

in "the stress on

in theacceptance
psychology,

'activities'

and advancement of

as utilities,

the applications of

and in the utilization of the contingent meaning

of function in research planning and interpretation"

(Watson,

1965, p. 134).
Determinism incites no opposition from Indeterminism.
This finding agrees with that of Watson

(1965).

Developmentalism is dominant; Staticism^ counter-
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dominant.

The acceptance of the developmental prescription

may be underestimated in contemporary American psychology.
Nomotheticism is dominant; Idiographicism counter
dominant.

This relationship was not unrecognized.

example, Watson wrote:

"The search for general laws,

For
even

if expressed within the modest limits of miniature theories,
clearly marks American psychology as primarily nomothetic
in character.

There are, of course,

the idiographic,

staunch defenders of

for example in Gordon W. Allport and many

clinical psychologists"

(1965, p. 136).

Contentual objectivism is dominant; Contentual sub
jectivism counter-dominant.

This relationship was predicted

by the writer in Prediction 6.

The findings show that the

primary data of psychology are behavioral,

and that sub

jective experience is secondary.
Dynamicism is dominant; Staticism^ counter-dominant.
American psychologists place more emphasis on change than
they do on enduring aspects of psychology's subject matter.
The relationship between Molarism and Molecularism
shows a lack of dominance,

since the two prescriptions are

about equally widely accepted.
Naturalism is too deeply implicit to provide objective
evidence of its true degree of acceptance,
the writer.

in the judgment of

It has no opposition from Supernaturalism.

The
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unopposed status of Naturalism was also pointed out by
Watson

(1965).
Purism and Utilitarianism are about equally widely

accepted in contemporary American psychology.
The findings show that Deductivism and Inductivism
are also about equally widely accepted in contemporary Ameri
can psychology.
Neither Monism nor Dualism is accepted at all in
contemporary American psychology.
In sum,

it is apparent that certain prescriptions in

contemporary American psychology are so dominant that they
have no counter-dominant prescription.
Determinism,

and Naturalism.

These are Empiricism,

Other prescriptions in con

temporary American psychology are dominant but do have
counter-dominant prescriptions.

Methodological objectivism

is dominant; and Methodological subjectivism counter-dominant;
Quantitativism is dominant,
Functionalism is dominant,

and Qualitativism counter-dominant;
and Structuralism counter-dominant;

Developmentalism is dominant,
Nomotheticism is dominant,

and Staticism^ counter-dominant;

and Idiographicism counter-dominant;

Contentual objectivism is dominant,
jectivism counter-dominant;
Staticisrr^ counter-dominant.
fest no dominance,

and Contentual sub

and Dynamicism is dominant,

and

Still other prescriptions mani

since the members of the pair are about
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equally widely accepted.
Purism-Utilitarianism,

These are Deductivism-Inductivism,

and Molarism-Molecularism.
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VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This investigation is offered as a contribution to
the study of historical change in American psychology.

It

makes use of a previously untapped source of scientific
literature,

the speeches given by the presidents of the

American Psychological Association since its founding in
1892,

as the basis for a systematic historical analysis taking

W a t s o n ’s (1967,

1971)

prescriptive approach.

The 75 APA

presidential addresses were selected for analysis because
(1)

they express the thinking of very eminent psychologists,

(2) they are likely to be sensitive to current issues and
developments in the discipline,
preferences and biases,
tinuity from 1892,

and

and explicit about the author's

(3) they provide temporal con

thus making it possible to investigate

trends in the history of American psychology.

Watson's

approach to the history of psychology is based upon a theo
retical framework consisting of certain conceptions which
are particularly significant in terms of their role in the
history of psychology,

called prescriptions.

Prescriptions

are characterized by the orientative function they serve
for psychologists and by the fact that they can be traced
over an appreciable period of time,

thus forming trends.

Watson's prescriptions have been demonstrated to be important
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in the history of psychology,

and consequently the list of

prescriptions was adopted as the conceptual framework for
this study.
above,

On the basis of the three reasons mentioned

it was assumed that the APA presidential addresses

constitute a body of scientific literature which reflects
the prescriptions in American psychology.

The ultimate goals

of the study were to trace the status of the prescriptive
conceptions in the development of American psychology,

and

to assess their status in contemporary American psychology.
The specific objective was to compare the status of each
prescription with all others and with an individual con
trasting prescription,

and by so doing to derive an

empirically-based characterization of American psychology,
both historical and contemporary.
It was assumed that the relative status of pre
scriptions in American psychology could best be ascertained
by using some form of systematic quantitative analysis,
the method adopted was that of content analysis.
judges,

including the author,

and

Three

each coded each of the 75 APA

presidential addresses in terms of Watson's 36 prescriptive
concepts.

The results of this coding process were system

atically recorded on a formal coding form.

The concepts and

rules governing the coding process were made explicit in the
Coding M a n u a l , which was followed by all three judges.

The
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initial task of the judge was to determine,

for a given

address, whether each of the 36 prescriptions was Present
or Absent.

Prescriptions which were judged to be Present

were considered further in terms of the author's position:
Acceptance,

Neutral,

or Rejection.

The Acceptance codings,

which constituted 78.3% of the total Present codings, were
then used as the basis for tracing the changes in the status
of contrasting prescriptions over time.

Eighteen graphs,

each one portraying the status of two contrasting prescriptions
by decades,

were used to present the major portion of the

findings.
Before presenting the findings with respect to the
status of prescriptions in American psychology,

some findings

were presented which concerned the nature and scope of the
APA presidential addresses.

It was found that two major

transitions have occurred in the tradition of APA presidential
addresses.

The first was a transition from broad addresses

which encompass psychology as a whole,

or treat a problem

which transcends specific areas and is significant for
psychology as a whole,

to narrow addresses which are limited

to a specialized area or problem within psychology.

The

transition occurred shortly after the first decade of the
twentieth century.

Before that time the presidents thought

in broad terms and frequently discussed the philosophical
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foundations of psychology or psychology's relation to other
sciences, while after that time the addresses were more
limited in scope.

The second transition which occurred in

the APA tradition was less pronounced than the first and
occurred later.

It was the trend away from addresses which

were expository in nature toward more formal research pre
sentations.

This trend showed its greatest shift in the

1930's and 19 4 0 's, and has progressed to the point where al
most 40% of the addresses since 1931 have been research-oriented.
Considering these two trends together,

it was concluded that

the tradition of APA presidential addresses has been char
acterized by a progression from broad expositions about psy
chology to narrow research investigations within psychology.
It was also found that expository and research
addresses express about the same number of prescriptions,
although the proportion of implicitly expressed prescriptions
is significantly larger in the research addresses than in
the expository addresses.
The major portion of the findings concerned the
status of the prescriptions in American psychology.
found that American psychology,

It was

viewed in historical per

spective, may be characterized by certain accelerated pre
scriptive trends.

These are: Methodological objectivism

{use of methods open to verification by another competent
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observer), Contentual objectivism

(psychological data viewed

as behavior of individual), Quantitativism

(stress upon

knowledge which is countable or measurable), Nomotheticism
(emphasis upon discovering general laws), Developmentalism
(emphasis upon changes with time), and Utilitarianism

(seek

ing of knowledge for its usefulness in other activities).
American psychology,

viewed in historical perspective,

shows certain prescriptive trends which show a decrease over
time.

These are: Conscious mentalism

of mental structure or activity),

(emphasis on awareness

Contentual subjectivism

(psychological data viewed as mental structure or activity of
individual), Structuralism
contents), Centralism

(psychological categories are

(stress upon psychological events taking

place within the bod y ) , and Methodological subjectivism

(use

of methods not so open to verification by another competent
observer) .
Some prescriptions in the development of American
psychology exhibit a pattern of rise and fall, with their
strongest acceptance occurring at different times.

Dualism

(fundamental principle or entity in universe is of two kinds,
mind and matter) was most widely accepted in the first two
decades of the twentieth century,
disappeared.

and then almost completely

Unconscious mentalism

of mental structure or activity)

(emphasis on unawareness

rose to its widest acceptance
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in the 1920's and declined after that.

Peripheralism

(stress

upon psychological events taking place at periphery of body)
rose to its widest acceptance in the 1930's and then declined,
while Mechanism

(activities of living beings completely

explicable by physiochemical constituents) was most widely
accepted in the second,
clined thereafter.

third,

and fourth decades and de

Dynamicism,

on the other hand,

in acceptance up through the 1920's,

increased

and then leveled off at

a consistent degree of acceptance.
In addition,

a relatively consistent pattern of

acceptance in the development of American psychology was
revealed by other prescriptions,

including Empiricism

(major,

if not exclusive source of knowledge is experience), Purism
(seeking of knowledge for its own sake), Functionalism
(psychological categories are activities), Qualitativism
(stress upon that which is different in kind or essence),
and Molarism

(psychological data most aptly described in

terms of relatively large units).

The specific pattern of

each prescription was discussed within the context of the
development of American psychology.
In terms of contemporary American psychology,

it was

found that certain prescriptions are so dominant that they
have no counter-dominant prescription.
Determinism

These are Empiricism,

(human events completely explicable in terms of
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antecedents), and Naturalism

{nature requires for its

operation and explanation only principles found within i t ) .
Other prescriptions in contemporary American psychology are
dominant but do have counter-dominant prescriptions: Methodo
logical objectivism is dominant,

and Methodological sub

jectivism counter-dominant; Quantitativism is dominant,

and

Qualitativism counter-dominant; Functionalism is dominant,
and Structuralism counter-dominant; Developmentalism is
dominant,

and Staticism^

(emphasis upon cross-sectional view)

counter-dominant; Nomotheticism is dominant,
cism

and Idiographi-

(emphasis upon explaining particular events or individuals)

counter-dominant;

Contentual objectivism is dominant,

Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant;
dominant,

and Staticism^

counter-dominant.
dominance,

and

and Dynamicism is

(emphasis upon enduring aspects)

Still other prescriptions manifest no

since the members of the pair are about equally

widely accepted.

These are Deductivism-Inductivism

(investi

gations begun with assumed established truths— with facts
or observations), Purism-Utilitarianism,
Molecularism

and Molarism-

(psychological data most aptly described in terms

of relatively large units— relatively small units).
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APPENDIX A
Notes on the American Psychological Association

The American Psychological Association was founded on
July 8, 1892, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts,
on invitation of G. Stanley Hall, president of the university.
This meeting, which Hall reports took place in his study
(Hall,

1923), was the preliminary or organizational meeting.

Later in the same year, on December 27, the first annual
meeting was held at the University of Pennsylvania.
Although the published reports of the preliminary
meeting state that seven psychologists attended
Anon.,

1894),

(Anon.,

1892?

the validity of these reports has been questioned.

A recent study addressed to the question of who attended the
preliminary meeting

(Dennis

&

Boring,

1952)

concluded that of

the 26 charter members, only 10-18 were actually present.
Probably it will never be known for sure exactly who attended
the organizational meeting.
was elected president,

It is known, however,

that Hall

that the scientific character of the

organization was firmly established,

that five new members

were elected in addition to the 26 charter members,
of these 31 persons,

and that

18 attended the first annual meeting at

the University of Pennsylvania on December 27,

1892.
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The membership of the APA has grown phenomenally
since 1892.
later,

From 31 in 1892,

to over 3,000 fifty years

in 1942, to over 31,000 today.

At this rate, one

might estimate its membership to be over 200,000 by psychology's
centennial in 1992.

According to E. G. Boring,

continues to grow at its present rate,

if the APA

by sometime in the

twenty-second century there should be more psychologists
than people in the worldI
The APA was founded in 1892 to advance psychology as
a science.

However,

there has been a growing trend over the

years toward professionalization.

In the 1930's,

applied psychological organizations were formed:
metric Society

(1938),

of Social Issues

the Psycho

the Society for the Psychological Study

(SPSSI,

for Applied Psychology

three

1936),

(AAAP,

incorporated into the APA,

and the American Association

1937).

In 1945,

the AAAP was

so that scientific and professional

interests were united in a single national organization.
purpose of the reorganized APA became:
as a science,
welfare.

a profession,

The

to advance psychology

and a means of promoting human

The American Psychologist was established in 1946

and became the publication outlet of the Association.
the purpose of the Association reads:
ology as a science,

Today

"to advance psych

and as a means of promoting human w e l 

fare by the encouragement of psychology in all its branches

in the broadest and most liberal manner"

(APA,

1970).

Throughout its history the effort has been to keep the
science and profession of psychology together.

APPENDIX B
Title of the Presidential Addresses of the American Psychological Association,

Year_____ President

Title of Address

1892

History and Prospects of Experimental

G. S. Hall

1892-1970

Place of Publication

Psychology in America

(Not. published)

1893

G. T. Ladd

The Problems of Psychology

PR,

1894,

1, 1-21

1894

W. James

The Knowing of Things Together

PR,

1895,

2, 105-124

1895

J. McK. Cattell

Psychology and the Other Sciences

PR,

1896,

3, 134-148

1896

G. S. Fullterton

The "Knower" in Psychology

PR* 1897, 4, 1-26

1897

J. M. Baldwin

On Selective Thinking

PR,

1898, 5, 1-24

1898

H. Mtinsterberg

Psychology and History

PR,

1899, 6, 1-31

1899

J. Dewey

Psychology and Social Practice

PR' 1900, 7, 105-124
(also : S, 1900,

11, 321-332)

1
The following code has been used to save space:

PR = Psychological Review;

PB = Psychological Bulletin; AP = American Psychologist.

= Science;

1900

J. Jastrow

Some Currents and Undercurrents
in Psychology

1901

J. Royce

PR, 1891, 8, 1-26

Recent Logical Inquiries and Their
Psychological Bearings

PR,

1902, 9, 105-133
1903,

1902

E. C. Sanford

Psychology and Physics

PR,

1903

W. L. Bryan

Theory and Practice

PR, 1904,

11, 71-82

1904

W. James

The Experience of Activity

PR,

12,

1905

M. W. Calkins

A Reconciliation of Structural and
Functional Psychology

1906

J. R. Angell

H. R. Marshall

G. M. Stratton

1-17

PR, 1906,

13, 61-80

PR,

1907,

14, 61-91

PR,

1908,

15, 1-24

PR,

1909,

16, 67-84

The Methods of the Naturalist and
Psychologist

1908

105-119

The Province of Functional
Psychology

1907

1905,

10,

Toward the Correction of Some Rival
Methods in Psychology
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1909

C. H. Judd

Evolution and Consciousness

PR, 1910,

17, 77-97

1910

w. B. Pillsbury

The Place of Movement in Consciousness

PR, 1911,

18, 83-99

1911

c. E. Seashore

The Measurement of a Singer

s,

1912

E. L. Thorndike

Ideo-motor Action

PR,

1913

H. C. Warren

The Mental and the Physical

PR, 1914, 21, 79-100

1914

R. S - Woodworth

A Revision of Imageless Thought

PR,

1915,

22,

1915

J. B. Watson

The Place of the Conditioned Reflex
PR*

1916,

23, 89-117

in Psychology

1912,
1913,

35, 201-212
20, 91-106

1-27

1916

R. Dodge

The Laws of Relative Fatigue

PR* 1917, 24, 89-113

1917

R. M. Yerkes

Psychology in Relation to the War

PR*

1918

J. W . Ba ird

(No address)

1919

W. D. Scott

Changes in Some of Our Conceptions and
Practices of Personnel

1918,

25, 85-115

PR, 1920,

27, 81-94

1920

S. I. Franz

Cerebral-mental Relations

PR, 1921,

28, 81-95

1921

M. F. Washburn

Introspection as an Objective Method

PR* 1922,

29, 89-112

1922

K. Dunlap

The Foundations of Social Psychology

1923

L. M. Terman

The Mental Test as a Psychological
Method

1923,

30, 81-102

PR, 1924,

31, 93-117

PR,

1924

G. S. Hall

(No address)

1925

M. Bentley

The Major Categories of Psychology

PR, 1926, 33, 71-105

1926

H. A. Carr

The Interpretation of the Animal Mind

PR, 1927,

34, 87-106

1927

H. L. Hollingworth

Sensuous Determinants of Psychological
PR,

1928,

35, 93-117

Attitudes
1928

E. G. Boring

The Psychology of Controversy

PR, 1929,

36, 97-121

1929

K. S. Lashley

Basic Neural Mechanisms in Behavior

PR, 1930,

37, 1-24

1930

H. S. Langfeld

A Response Interpretation of
Consciousness

PR,

1931,

38, 87-108

1931

W. S. Hunter

The Psychological Study of Behavior

PR, 1932,

1932

W. R. Miles

Age and Human Ability

PR,

1933, 40,

99-123

1933

L. L. Thurstone

The Vectors of Mind

PR,

1934, 41,

1-32

39,

1-24
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1934

J. Peterson

Aspects of Learning

PR,

1935, 42,

1935

A. T. Pofferiberger

Psychology and Life

PR,

1936, 43, 9-31

1936

C. L. Hull

Mind, Mechanism,

PR,

1937, 44,

1-32

PR,

1938, 45,

1-41

PB,

1939,

36,

1-24

and Adaptive

Behavior
1937

E. C. Tolman

The Determiners of Behavior at a
Choice Point

1938

J. F. Dashiell

1-27

Some Rapprochements in
Contemporary Psychology

1939

G. W. Allport

The Psychologists Frame of Reference

PB,

1940, 37,

1-28

1940

L. Carmichael

The Experimental Embryology of Mind

PB,

1941,

38,

1-28

1941

H. Woodrow

The Problem of General Quantitative
PB,

1942,

39, 1-27

PB,

1943, 40- 1-24

PB,

1944, 41, 1-29

Laws in Psychology
1942

C. P. Stone

Multiply, Vary, Let the Strongest Live
and the Weakest Die - Charles Darwin

1943

J. E. Anderson

Freedom and Constraint or Potentiality
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and Environment

1944

G. Murphy

The Freeing of Intelligence

1945

E. R. Guthrie

Psychological Facts and Psychological
Theory

1946

H. E. Garrett

A Developmental Theory of Intelligence

1947

C. R. Rogers

Some Observations on the Organization
of Personality

1948

D. G. Marquis

PB,

1945, 42,

1-19

PB,

1946, 43,

1-20

AP,

1946,

1 , 372-378

AP,

1947,

2, 358-368

AP,

1948, 3, 430-438

Research Planning at the Frontiers
of Science

1949

E. R. Hilgard

Human Motives and the Concept of Self

AP'

1949, 4, 374-382

1950

J. P. Guilford

Creativity

AP,

1950, 5, 444-454

1951

R. R. Sears

A Theoretical Framework for Personality
AP,

1951, 6 , 476-483

AP,

1952, 7, 608-622

AP,

1953, 8, 608-623

and Social Behavior
1952

J. McV. Hunt

Psychological Services in the Tactics
of Psychological Science

1953

L. F. Shaffer

Of Whose Reality I Cannot Doubt
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1954

0. H. Mowrer

The Psychologist Looks at Language

AP,

1954,

1955

E. L. Kelly

Consistency of the Adult Personality

AP*

1955,

1956

T. M. Newcomb

The Prediction of Interpersonal
AP,

1956,

AP,

1957,

Attraction
1957

L. J. Cronbach

The Two Disciplines of Scientific
Psychology

1958

H. F. Harlow

The Nature of Love

AP,

1958,

1959

W. Ktthler

Gestalt Psychology Today

AP'

1959,

1960

D . 0. Hebb

The American Revolution

AP,

1960,

1961

N. E. Miller

Analytical Studies of Drive and Reward

AP,

1961,

1962

P. E. Meehl

Scbizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia

AP' 1962,

1963

C. E. Osgood

On Understanding and Creating Sentences AP'

1963,

1964

Q. McNemar

Lost:

M'

1964,

1965

J. E. Bruner

The Growth of Mind

AP,

1965,

1966

N. Hobbs

Helping Disturbed Children:

AP,

1966,

Our Intelligence?

Why?

Psychological and Ecological Strategies

1967

G. Lindzey

Some Remarks Concerning Incest,
Incest Taboo,

the

and Psychoanalytic

Theory
1968

A. H. Maslow

(No address)

1969

G. A. Miller

Psychology as a Means of Promoting
Human Welfare

1970

G. W. Albee

AP,

1967,

22, 1051-1059

AP,

1969,

24,

1063-1075

The Uncertain Future of Clinical
Psychology

AP, 1970, 25, 1071-1080
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APPENDIX C

Eminence of the APA Presidents
Election to the office of president of the APA is an
honor received by relatively few psychologists, yet even here
one would expect to find individual differences in eminence.
A recent study of "Important Psychologists,
Boring, & Watson,

1600-1967"

(Annin,

1968) makes it possible to assess the rela

tive eminence of 45 of the past 78 APA presidents, both
individually and collectively.
Essentially,

the method used inthe Annin et al. study

was to prepare a list of 1,040 deceased persons contributing
to psychology from 1600 to 1967,

each of which was then rated

on a scale fran 1 to 3 by an international panel of nine judges.
A judge was instructed to give the person a score of 1 if he
recognized the name in the history of psychology,
could not specify the person's contribution;

even if he

a score of 2 if

he could identify the person's contribution to psychology,
even if not very precisely;

and 3 if he considered the person

of such distinction that his name should be included in a
list of the 500 most important psychologists since 1600 and
not living.

Thus,

the highest possibly score was 27.

In the

present comment, each score was treated as a separate category
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of eminence and called an "eminence score."

Since the goal

of the Annin et al. study was to report on approximately
500 of the most important deceased contributors to psychology
since 1600, the 1,040 names had to be reduced by about onehalf.

A decision to include persons scoring 11 or above

yielded 538 names.

A list of these 538 persons was published

(Annin et a l . , 1968), while a list of those receiving scores
of 10 or below was deposited with the American Documentation
Institute.

The published list was arranged by score and again

alphabetically with dates of birth and death.

The dates of

birth and death were checked again in a follow-up study
(Merrifield & Watson,

1970),

and another study was made to

ascertain the particular profession,
period of the 538 persons

nationality,

(Watson & Merrifield,

and temporal

in press).

This latter study showed that about one-half of the 538
most important contributors to psychology were psychologists
per se, while the others were primarily identified with
other fields.

The ultimate goal of these studies was to pro

vide the basis for a forthcoming bibliography which will
contain about 50,000 primary and secondary references relevant
to these important contributors to psychology

(Watson,

in

preparation) .
Forty-seven APA presidents were among the deceased
important contributors to psychology evaluated in the Annin
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et al. panel study

(see Table 5).

Table 5 contains mostly familiar names and shows a
preponderance of high eminence scores.

However,

tains a few relatively unknown psychologists,

it also con

at least to

the nine present-day judges in the Annin et al.

study.

lowest scores were 9, received by Joseph Peterson?
by Henry R. Marshall;

The

10, received

and 11, received by Walter D. Scott.

The

presence of these low scorers suggests that there may some
times be grounds other than scientific eminence for the
selection of a psychologist to be president of the APA.

This

inference agrees with one made previously based on the last
20 APA presidents as part of a study in which scientific
eminence was related to journal citations

(Myers,

1970).

Of the 47 APA presidents in Table 5, 45 were included
among the published list of 538 most important contributors to
psychology.

How distinguished are these APA presidents as a

group compared with their peers?

Perhaps the most appropriate

comparison is with those contributors to psychology who were
later classified as "American psychologists" by Watson and
Merrifield

(in press), rather than with the whole heterogeneous

group of contributors.

The most important American psychologists

(N = 129) and the subgroup o f APA presidents

(n = 45)

on the variables of nationality and profession

are alike

(except for

three presidents classified as "American philosophers"

—
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Dewey, James,

Royce) but differ in degree of eminence:

(a)

On the scale from 11 to 27, the mean of the eminence scores
of American psychologists was 18.50
mean of the APA presidents was 23.16

(Mdn = 19), while the
(Mdn = 24).

(b) While

13.18% of the American psychologists scored in the highest
category of eminence
nine judges),
category.

(indicating perfect agreement among the

37.78% of the APA presidents scored in this

These comparisons testify to the eminence of the

APA presidents as operationally defined with reference to
the Annin et al. study and the Watson and Merrifield study.

Kenneth R. Gibson
University of N e w Hampshire

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST - June 1972
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Table 5

Forty-Seven Deceased Presidents of the APA Arranged by Score
for Importance to Psychology

President

Eminence score

Year(s) of
presidency

Gordon W. Allport

27

1939

James R. Angell

27

1906

John Dewey

27

1899

G. Stanley Hall

27

1892,

Clark L. Hull

27

1936

William James

27

1894,

Wolfgang Ktthler

27

1959

Karl S. Lashley

27

1929

Lewis M. Terman

27

1923

Edward L. Thorndike

27

1912

Louis L. Thurstone

27

1933

Edward C. Tolman

27

1937

John B. Watson

27

1915

Robert S. Woodworth

27

1914

Robert M. Yerkes

27

1917

1924

1904
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26

1895

Edwin R. Guthrie

26

1945

James M. Baldwin

25

1897

Walter S. Hunter

25

1931

George T. Ladd

24

1893

Hugo Milnsterberg

24

1898

Carl E. Seashore

24

1911

Harvey A. Carr

23

1926

Howard C. Warren

23

1913

Margaret F. Washburn

23

1921

Knight Dunlap

22

1922

Joseph Jastrow

22

1900

Chalres H. Judd

22

1909

George M. Stratton

22

1908

Madison Bentley

21

1925

Walter B. Pillsbury

21

1910

Mary W. Calkins

20

1905

Raymond Dodge

20

1916

Shepherd I. Franz

20

1920

Harry L. Hollingworth

20

1927

Herbert s.

20

1930

James McK.

Cattell

Langfeld
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Edmund C. Sanford

20

1902

John W. Baird

17

1918

William L. Bryan

16

1903

Josiah Royce

16

1901

Calvin P. Stone

16

1942

George S. Fullerton

14

1896

Walter D. Scott

11

1919

10

1907

9

1934

Henry R. Marshall

Joseph Peterson3

Note.

—

a

As judged by an international panel of nine

psychologists.

Score from Annin et al.

(1968).

aNot among the 538 most important psychologists whose names
were published in the Annin et al.

(1968) study.

Their

names were on a list of the remaining psychologists which was
deposited with the American Documentation Institute.
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I,

Introduction

In the broadjst sense, this study is addressed to the question, How
has the conception of American psychology changed since the 19th century
and what is its present status as a science?

Until recently, textbooks

on the history of psychology have often followed one of two theories of
historical changet

either the Great Man theory, which attributes the

dynamics of history to the genius of great men, or the Zeitgeist theory,
which attributes the dynamics of history to social forces, the "spirit
of the times,"

Stimulated by the work of Kuhn in the history of the physi

cal sciences, Watson has recently proposed a third alternative, known as
prescriptive theory (1967).

The present study focuses on a portion of

American psychology of special significance, the presidential addresses of
the American Psychological Association (APA), within the framework of this
third alternative, using the method of content analysis.

The immediate

purpose of the study is to analyze the contents of the presidential addresses
as official documents prepared by eminent psychologists who often look at
their primary task as the presentation of a formal statement of their
scientific and professional credo.

In the broader sense, it is asstmed

that the addresses constitute a rich source of information about the his
torical changes that have taken place in American psychology.

The essence

of the study is to determine the growth and contemporary status of the
views of American psychologists in as scientific a fashion as possible.
Taking his point of departure from Kuhn's recent analysis of the
development of scientific revolutions (19^2), Watson has argued that
psychology is still at a relatively early stage of scientific development
(1967).

Unlike the older, more mature sciences— which have reached the

level of guidance by what Kuhn calls a "paradlgn"— psychology does not
seem to have a single, unifying contentual model which defines the field
and which is accepted by all psychologists.

Persistent disagreement over
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-2fundamental Issues such as subject matter and methodology, the fact that
schools of psychology still have their adherents, and the presence of
national differences in psychology— ‘these facts suggest that psychology
is still at the pre-paradigaatic stage of a science.
Psychologists are not neutral toward either the subject matter of
the methods of their science.
biases.

They have definite preferences or cognitive

They rely on habits of thougit which are partly a matter of

temperament and partly due to the influenoe of their teachers, their reading,
and the ethos of the school which they attended.
guide their psychological activities.

These habits pf thought

The habits which can be traced

historically over an appreciable period of time, thus forming trends or
themes, are what Watson calls prescriptions. Examples of prescriptions
are the emphasis upon discovering general laws (Nemotheticism), the stress
upon psychological events taking place at the periphery of the body
(Peripheral!sm), and the stress upon knowledge which is countable or
measurable (Quantltativism),

Prescriptions may be defined as attitudinal

perspectives, basic orientatlve assumptions, or modes of conceptualisa
tion, and they play an important role in enabling the psychologist to
deal with the problems of subject matter and methodology.
In this content analysis, prescriptions will be used in one of the
ways they function, that is, as contrasting pairs.

For example, the

emphasis upon discovering general laws (Nomotheticism) contrasts with the
emphasis upon explaining particular events or individuals (Idiographic!sm),
the stress upon psychological events taking place at the periphery of the
body (Peripheralism) contrasts with the stress upon psychological events
taking place within the body (Centralism), and the stress upon knowledge
which is countable or measurable (Quantltativism) contrasts with the stress
on that which is different in kind or essence (Qualltatlvism),

There are

166

-

18 pairs of prescriptions*

3-

This study may be thought of as an attempt to

quantify the prescriptions which hove been expressed In the presidential
addresses of the APA.
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II.

The Coding System

In this content analysis* the process of coding an address with re
spect to a prescription is a two-fold task.

First* the judge must deter

mine whether the author of the address expresses the prescription in
question.

This will take practice because a prescription is not a unit

of communication for which physical guides exist.

Second, if the author

does not express the prescription* it is left blank on the Coding Formi
but if he does express the prescription* the judge must determine his
position or attitude toward it.

The judge indicates which of three possi

ble categories (existing along a single dimension) best describes the
author's position.

These categories aret

Acceptance
1

j
1

Neutral

I

Rejection

o

-1

The specific meaning of these three categories* which together con
stitute the coding system* is as follows.
(1) Acceptance - The prescription is supported, advocated, or other
wise accepted by the author.
(2) Rejection - The prescription is disapproved, repudiated, or
otherwise rejected by the author.
(3) Neutral - The prescription is mentioned, but the author does not
take a position or reveal an attitude of acceptance or rejection.

This

does not mean that the author has no position, but rather that the pres
cription* as expressed, is not accepted or rejected.

If the author neither

aocepts nor rejects the prescription, then it is neutral in status with
respect to that particular manifestation.

168

-5In order to aid the judge in his two-fold coding task, the next
section provides a dictionary of prescriptions with corresponding coded
examples of prescriptions.

The value of the content analysis rests on

the extent to which the judges rely on this dictionary as the basis for
coding.

The dictionary and examples of the prescriptions constitute the

essence of this Coding Manual.
The format of the dictionary is as follows.

Each prescription is

followed by Watson's definition in quotations (1967)*

In most cases the

meaning is amplified, either by myself or by relevant definitions taken
from Warren, Dictionary of Psychology (193*0 or English and English, A
Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytic Terms (1958)*
Sometimes several variations of a prescription are given, or different shades
of meaning are accentuated.

An attempt has been made to relate the concept

to contemporary psychology whenever possible by mentioning areas where it
may be found.
Following the definition of each pair of contrasting prescriptions
there are some examples of those prescriptions.

Quoted passages which in

clude the contrasting prescriptions together come before quotations which in
clude only one prescription.

Examples of single prescriptions are then ar

ranged by tho author*s position in the order of Acceptance, Neutral, Rejection.
The passages, and the examples of prescriptions found in each passage, are
numbered consecutively.

There are 1k5 examples of prescriptions, or an

average of about eight examples per pair of contrasting prescriptions.
Following each sample passage are some comments relevant to the
prescription(s) expressed and the author's position (except in cases where
I felt the coding was self-evident).

These are intented to clarify the

basis of the preferred coding, which takes the formi
position.

Prescription— Author's
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-6Scne quoted statements or passages are clear-cut and easily coded*
Others are extremely equivocal*

Most fall between these two extremes*

It Is hoped that by standardizing the coding procedure as much as possible
that high reliability between Judges may be obtained,
A problem exists in coding the sample passages which will probably not
be as great during the coding of the actual articles*
of context*

It is the problem

Bie sample passages axe frequently taken out of context* and

this makes It especially difficult to determine the author's position*

Is

he making an argument and therefore commited to the prescriptions he ex
presses (which should elicit the Acceptance category), or is he simply
describing the subject matter and trying to be objective (which should
elicit the Neutral category)?
codings*

Questions such as this make for equivocal

As noted before, however, this problem should not be as great

when the Judge is coding articles instead of isolated passages*
Unavoidably, the prescription which is being illustrated is sometimes
accompanied by other prescriptions} these additional prescriptions are
coded too*

This means that in the sample passages there are different

combinations of categories which may be used to describe the prescriptions*
For example, with two prescriptions in a passage, there are (3)
possible combinations of categories which may be employed.
logical possibilities arei

or nine

These nine

Acceptance, Acceptance} Acceptance, Neutral}

Acceptance, Rejection} Neutral, Acceptance} Neutral, Neutral} Neutral,
Rejection} Rejection, Acceptance} Rejection, Neutral} Rejection, Rejection*
The number of logical possibilities increases exponentially as the number
of prescriptions in the passagei

three prescriptions = (3)^ or 2? combina

tions, four prescriptions = (3)^ or 81 combinations, etc.

With this information about the coding system and general format of
the dictionary of prescriptions, the next section contains the dictionary
itself*
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Dictionary of Prescriptions with Examples

Conscious mentalism - "Emphasis on awareness of mental structure or
activity,"

Mentalism is the belief that there is a unique group of men

tal phenomena not reducible without remainder to physical phenomena.
Conscious mentalism refers to mental activity of which a person is fully
aware at any given time.
Unconscious mentalism - "Emphasis on unawareness of mental structure
or activity,"

Mentalism is the belief that there is a unique group of men

tal phenomena not reducible without remainder to physical phenomena.
Unconscious mentalism refers to mental activity which is outside the
range of conscious awareness.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Many people, both inside and outside £psychologicalJ science, are satisfied
with the assumption that consciousness alone is psychical} in that case
nothing remains for psychology but to discriminate among psychical phenomena
between perceptions, feelings, thought-processes a«d volitions. It is
generally agreed, however, that these conscious processes do not form un
broken sequences which are complete in themselves} there would thus be no
alternative left to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes
which are concomitant with the psychical ones and which wo should neces
sarily have to recognize as more complete than the psychical sequences,
since some of them would have conscious processes parallel to them but
others would not. If so, it of course becomes plausible to lay the stress
in psychology on these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence
of what is psychical and to look for some other assessment of the conscious
processes, The majority of philosophers, however, as well as many other
people, dispute this and declare that the idea of something psychical being
unconscious is self-contradictory.
But that is precisely what psycho-analysis is obliged to assert, , • .
It explains tho supposedly somatic concomitant phenomena as being what is
truly psychical, and thus in the first instance disregards the quality of
consciousne ss•
In this passage conscious processes are deemphasized and unconscious
processes emphasized as the primary data of psychology.
dering in terms of the Coding System would bei
Rejection} Unconscious mentalism— Acceptance,

An accurate ren

Conscious mentalism—
(The passage also illustrates

Contentual subjectivism, which will be defined later,)

171

-8Passage 2 - Examples 3 A ^
Professor Kirkpatrick suggests that , , . psychology be broadened to
include the functioning of all organisms, whether conscious or unconscious,
and suggests the term organosis.
Hie reference to conscious and unconscious functioning warrents the codings
of Conscious mentalism and Unconscious mentalism, respectively.

Since the

statement Is descriptive of Professor Kirkpatrick, it should be coded as
Neutral with respect to the author's position.

Codingi

Conscious menta

lism— Neutral; Unconscious mentalism— Neutral,

Passage 3 - Example 5
An investigation of normal, stable states, in which the frontiers of the
ego are safeguarded against the id by resistances (anticathexes) and have
held firm, and in which the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego,
because they work together harmoniously— an investigation of that kind
would teach us little, The only thing that can help us are states of con
flict and uproar, when the contents of the unconscious id have a prospect
of forcing their way into the ego and into consciousness and the ego puts
itself once more on the defense against this invasion. It is only under
these conditions that we can make such observations as will confirm or
correct our statements about the two partners. Now, our nightly sleep is
precisely a state of this sort, and for that reason psychical activity
during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is our most favourable object
of stucfcr.
Tho meaning of this passage revolves around the concept of the unconscious
id, and the author gives our dreams as an example of unconscious activity.
Coding!

Unconscious mentalism— Acceptance. (This passage also illustrates

Contentual subjectivism, Structuralism, and Ijjmamicism, to be defined
later.)
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individual,”

The point of view concerning the subject matter of psychology

which focuses on what is open to external observation, namely, the beha
vior of organisms.
Contentual subjectivism - "Psychological data viewed as mental
structure or activity of individual,"

The point of view which focuses

on mental states as the primary subject matter of psychology.

Some of the

terms which reflect either acceptance or rejection of Contentual subjecti
vism arei

mind, consciousness, experience, soul, spirit, psyche, private

events, imagery, cognitive processes, covert behavior, internal response
states.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
What we need to do is to start work upon psychology, making behavior, not
consciousness, the objective point of attack,
Codingi

Contentual objectivism— Acceptance! Contentual subjectivian—

Rejection,
Passage 2 - Examples _3 & ^
Nobody has as yet invented a complete terminology that avoids all reference
to mental activity! and even if it were possible to construct such a new
language, it would have to be learned and understood through the medium of
consciousness, because all communication requires not merely the behavioris
tic processes of signalling through spoken or written or gesture language,
but also the reference to the past experiences of the individual who re
ceives the signals.
The author's defense of the concepts of "mental activity" and "conscious
ness" is an expression of Contentual subjectivism.

The reference to a

"complete terminology that avoids all reference to mental activity" suggests
Contentual objectivism, which is repudiated by the author,

Codingi

Con

tentual subjectivism— Acceptance; Contentual objectivism— Rejection,
Passage 3 - Examples 5 & 6
I believe we can write a psychology, define it as Pillsbury, and never go
back upon our definitioni never use the terms consciousness, mental states,
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, . , Imagery, and the like.

Since the author believes a psychology can be developed without
Contentual subjectivism, he simultaneously implies a commitment to Con
tentual objectivism,

Codingi

Contentual objectivism— Acceptance! Con

tentual subjectivism— Rejection.
Passage k - Examples 7 & 8
Enough has been said to show that there are certain aspects of human
nature in which the interrelations of behavior and consciousness are so
intimate and so essential to the facts involved that an artificial separa
tion of the two distorts the facts and leads to one-sided interpretations
or abstractions. We must therefore conclude that psychology should not
split into two new sciences nor limit itself exclusively to either con
sciousness or behavior, because both are mere abstractions from the con
crete events to be studied.
The author rejects tho dichotomy between behavior and consciousness,
so the paragraph may be coded asi

Contentual objectivism— Rejectioni

Contentual subjectivism— Rejection.
Passage 5 - Example 9
The behaviorist asksi Why don't we mako what we can observe the real
field of psychology? Lot us limit ourselves to things that can bo ob
served, and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we
observe? Wo can observe behavior— what the organism does or says. And
lot us point out at oncei that saying is doing— that is, behaving.
Speaking overtly or to ourselves (tliinklng) is just as objective a type
of behavior as baseball.
This is a statement of the rationale of Contentual objectivism, which
should bo coded as Acceptance. (In addition, tho identification of thinking
with speaking to ourselves warronts tho coding of Peripheral!sm— Acceptance.)
Passage 6 - Examples 10
[Psychology's J theoretical goal is tho prediction and control of behavior.
• • • Tho behaviorist, in his efforts to got a unitary scheme of animal
response, recognizes no dividing lino between man and brute. The behavior
of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of
the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation.
Codingi

Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,

Passage 7 - Example 11
I have a profound admiration and respect for tho large amount of fine
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-11original work done by all the workers In scientific psychology* But I
confess that a very large part of their work as well as their method seems
to me to be unpsychological. They are studying something, but it is not
consciousness or psyche, and psychology is the science descriptive of con
sciousness. That should be the root of the matter, whereas, with them, it
is at most a convenient general abstract term to hold together a lot of
abstractions, from the activity of the concrete psyche.
The author defines the subject matter of psychology as consciousness,
thus revealing his commitment to Contentual subjectivism.

Codingi

Con

tentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage £ - Example 12
, « , yet there remain many facts of psychological observation • • • [which]
, , , are subjective in their very nature and cannot be observed by any
body but the person who experiences them. What is to be done with this
subjective material in our science? European psychologists evidently have
not worried themselves much over this question, but in this country a
group of psychologists have arisen who feel that the recognition of sub
jective facts is irreconcilable with scientific accuracy and measurement
and should be excluded from the subject-matter of psychology. Whether we
are to agree with this movement or not will depend upon our answers to
the two questionsi What is psychology? and, What are its objectives? We
must therefore understand the full significance of these important questions.
The description of "subjective facts" is a statement of Contentual
subjectivism.

The allusion to the behaviorists' rejection of such con

ceptualizing is not quite explicit enough to be coded for Contentual objecti
vism,

The passage is historical and descriptive! the author's position

should be considered Neutral,

Codingi

Contentual subjectivism— Neutral,

(The reference to scientific measurement warrants a coding of Quantltativism,
to be defined later,)
Passage 9 - Example 13
"States of consciousness," like the so-called phenomena of spiritualism,
are not objectively verifiable and for that reason can never become the
data for science,
Codingi

Contentual subjectivism— Rejection.

Passage 10 - Example 14
* The time seems to have come whon psychology must discard all reference
to consciousnessf whon it need no longer delude itself into thinking that
it is making mental states the object of observation. We have become so
enmeshed in speculative questions concerning the , , , mind, the nature of
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-12conscious content (for example, imageloss thought, attitudes, and Bewusseinslage,
etc,) that I , , , feel that something is wrong with our premises and types
of problems which develop from them,
Codingi

Contentual subjectivism— Rejection,
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cedents."

The doctrine that human behavior is determined by (or is a

necessary consequence of) antecedent factors, which may be external (e.g.,
temperature) or internal (e.g., motives).

It follows that human behavior

is predictable, in principle, from knowledge of these antecedent factors,
although such knowledge has never been complete.
Indeterminism - "Human events not completely so explicable in terms
of antecedents."
the theory that man can act or choose reflectively in relative
independence of given stimuli (Warren, 193*0#
The chief form of indeterminism Is the doctrine of free will, which asserts
that man's deliberate choices may transcend the matrix of cause-and-effoct.
free-will doctrine = the theory that the course of thought and
volition is or may be directed by the individual himself, regard
less of external influences and (according to some) regardless
of internal or mental constitution (Warren, 193*+)#
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of
scientific method to tho study of human behavior. The free inner man who
is hold responsible for the behavior of the external biological organism
is only a proscientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are
discovered in the course of a scientific analysis. All these alternative
causes lie outside the individual.
This is a rejection of Indeterminism and simultaneous acceptance of
Determinism.

The author's repudiation of the "inner man" in favor of the

"external biological organism" may be interpreted asi
vism— Re joctionj Contentual objectivism— -Acceptance,

Contentual subjecti
(In addition, a

coding of Peripheral!sm— Acceptance would not be inappropriate, due to
the emphasis on the external biological organism and external causes of
human behavior,)
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & **
Man, we once believed, was free to express himself in art, music and
literature, to inquire into nature, to seek salvation in his own way.
could initiate action and make spontaneous and capricious changes of

He
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-14course , , , But science insists that action is initiated by forces im
pinging upon the individual, and that caprice is only another name for
behavior for which we have not yet found a cause.
This is a rejection of Indeterminism and argument for Determinism,
Codingi

Indeterminism— Rejection* Determinism— Acceptance.

Passage 3 - Examples 5 & 6
To me this kind of world would destroy the human person as I have come to
know him in the deepest moments of psychotherapy. In such moments I am
in relationship with a person who is spontaneous, who is responsibly free,
that is, aware of this freedom to choose who he will be, and aware also
of the consequences of his choice. To believe, as Skinner holds, that all
this is an illusion, and that spontaneity, freedom, responsibility, and
choice have no real existence, would be impossible for me.
Codingi

Indeterminism— Acceptance* Determinism— Rejection.

(Since

the author is a psychotherapist, a coding of Utilitarianism is also jus
tified, )
Passage 4 - Example 7
To the psychologist, conduct is a matter of cause and effect, of natural
law. His business is to know tho laws of that part of nature which we call
human nature . , . For him, even the most capricious conduct has its causes,
even the most inexplicable has its explanation~if only the cause can be
unearthed . . .
The emphasis on the concepts of causo, effect, and law suggest a coding
of*

Determinism— Acceptance,

(The author's conviction that psychology be

limited to tho realm of nature also suggests a coding of Naturalism—
Acceptance,)
Passage 5 - Example 8
Freedom is man's capacity to take a hand in his own development. It
is our capacity to mold ourselves. • • , But by our power to be conscious
of ourselves, we can call to mind how we acted yesterday or last month,
and by learning from theso actions we can influence, even if ever so
Ittle, how we act today. And we can picture in imagination some situation
tomorrow— say a dinner date, or an appointment for a job, or a Board of
Directors meeting— and by turning over in fantasy different alternatives
for acting, wo can pick the one which will do best for us.
Hore tho emphasis is on freedom as reflective choice.
determinism— Acceptance.

In

In addition, the author's mention of "our power

to be conscious of ourselves."
Acceptance,

Codingi

suggests a coding of Conscious mentalism—

Empiricism -"Major, if not exclusive source of knowledge is experience,"
The approach which relies on sense experience or sense perception— what the
senses receive from the environment— in the search for truth,

The kind of

experience referred to in this original conception is common, everyday,
practical, experience, without systematic questioning of nature.
However, the modern form of Empiricism emphasizes controlled observa
tion, experiment, and recording of data.
is synonymous with experimentalism,

In this latter sense, Empiricism

Thus thore are two conceptions of

Empiricism, a broader and a narrower one,

There common feature is tho

emphasis on sonso experience as tho major source of knowledge.

Even though

oxporlmentalism adds tho element of control, it is still basod on tho
assumption that oxperionco is tho major sourco of knowledge.
Rational!smi (vs. Empiricism) - "Major, if not exclusive source of
knowledge is reason."

Tho approach which relies on reasoning or thought

in tho search for truth.

This concoption of Rationalism]_has boon associated

with scholastic logic and recourse to authority during tho Middlo Agos,
Somo of tho modern forms of Rationalism arot

rational consideration

of empirical data (interpretation), theorizing, use of models (including
mathematical models), and philosophical psychology.

What thoso various

activities havo in common is tho use of reason or thought as a major sourco
of knowledge.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The processes of science are characteristic of humans in that they move by
tho union of empirical fact and rational thought in a way which cannot bo
disentangled. There is in science, as in all our lives, a continuous to
and fro of factual discovory, then of thought about tho implications of
what wo have discovered, and so back to the facts for testing and discovery
— a stop by stop of experiment and thoory, left, right, loft, right, for
ever, This union of two methods is tho very basis of scionco.
This is an explication of tho integration of Empiricism and Rationalism^
in scientific activity.

They are inexplicably intortwined.

Empiricist!— Acceptancei Rationalism^— Acceptance.

Codingi

-16-
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Passage 2 - Examples 3 &
Modem science has two inseparable components— tho empirical and the
theoretical. Hie empirical component is concerned primarily with observa
tion f the theoretical component is concerned with the interpretation and
explanation of observation. A natural event is explained when it can be
derived as a theorem by a process of reasoning from (1) knowledge of the
relevant natural conditions controlling it, and (2) one or more relevant
principles called postulates.
Coding!

Qnpiricism— Acceptance; Rationalism-^— Acceptance,

(Since

tho typo of reasoning favored by the author is deductivo reasoning, his
statement should also receive a coding of Deduetivism— Acceptance.

Another

appropriate coding is Naturalism— Acceptance,)
Passage 3 - Examplo 5
. . . I, as an experimental student, fool that something is wrong with our
premisos and types of problems which dovelop from them,
Tho author makes explicit his commitment to exporimontalism, so the
coding is Empiricism— Acceptance,

(A coding of Methodological objectivism

— Acceptance is also appropriate.)
Passage k - Examplo 6
, , , and I look to neurophysiological theory for an eventual emendation
and supplementation of behavior theories.
The emphasis on theory warrants a coding of Rationalism^— Accoptanco,
and the specification of behavior thoory warronts a coding of Contontual
objectivism— Accoptanco,

Functionalism - "Psychological catogorios aro activities."

The belief

that psychology should concern itself with what the processes of mental
life and behavior do.
the doctrine that an essential feature of all psychological pro
cesses is the part which they play in tho adaptive functions of
the organism (Warren, 193*0.
Hence, any doctrine or practice that lays stress upon function, use, adapta
tion, or adjustment.
Structuralism - "Psychological categories aro contents."
Whon the catogorios of psychology aro conceived as montalistic,
Structuralism takes the view that psychology should bo concerned with the
"structure" of tho human mind, or alternately, tho "structures" of personality.
In tho first subclass, tho focus is on conscious "contents," like sensations,
images, and affections.
posed.

Those aro the elements of which tho mind is com

In the socond subclass, tho focus is on personality conceived as

made up of systems or stable acquisitions rather than as a single process.
For example, the id, ego, and superego aro personality structures.
On the other hand, when the categories of psychology are conceived as
bohavioral, Structuralism takes the view that psychology should bo concerned
with tho "structure" of behavior, e.£.» tho conception that personality is
build up out of habits.
Passago 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The point which I wish now to make is thisi that, employing the samo
principlo of division, we can represent modern psychology as the exact
counterpart of modern biology. . ...
1. We find a parallel to morphology in a very largo portion of "ex
perimental" psychology, Tho primary aim of the experimental psychologist
has boon to analyzo the structuro of mindj to ravel out the elemental
processes from tho tanglo of consciousness, or (if we may change tho
metaphor) to isolate the constituents in tho given conscious formation.
His task is a vivisection, but a vivisection which shall yield structural,
not functional results. * . •
2. There is, however, a functional psychology, over and above this
psychology of structuro, . . . Wo may rogard [the mind) . . . as the collec
tive name for a system of functions of tho psychophysical organism, . . .
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Just as experimental psychology Is to a large extent concerned with
problems of structure# so Is "descriptive" psychology# ancient and modern#
chiefly occupied with problems of function#. Memory, recognition, imagina
tion, conception, judgnent, attention, apperception, volition, and a host
of verbal nouns, wider or narrower in denotation, connote, in the discussions
of descriptive psychology, functions of the total organism# That their
underlying processes are psychical in character is, so to speak, an acci
dent! for all practical purposes they stand upon tho same level as digestion
and locomotion, secretion and excretion.
This passage contrasting structural and functional psychology warrents
codings of Structuralism and Functionalism, respectively,

(The description

of structural psychology includes expressions of Molecularism in the roforencos
to "elemental processes" and "constituents in the given conscious formations#")
The concepts of mind, consciousness, and psychical process throughout should
be coded as Contentual subjoctivism,

Tho author's purpose is descriptive,

so his position should bo considered as Noutral on all prescriptions,
Codingi

Structuralism*— Neutral! Functionalism— Neutral| Molecularism—

Neutral! Contentual subjectivism— Neutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & h
We have seen that man tends to organize his behavior and thought and
to adapt to the environment. These tendencies result in a number of
psychological structures which take different forms at different ages.
The child progresses through a series of stages each characterized by dif
ferent psychological structures before ho attains adult intelligence,
Codingi

Functionalism— Acceptance! Structuralism— Acceptancei Con

tentual objectivism— Acceptance i Contentual subjoctivism— Acceptance |
Devolopmentalism— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Examplo J5
To put tho whole case as concretely as possible, tho hypothesis treats
human cognition as part and parcel of the way of life of a species of
living creatures— as one of the ways in which hunan beings, as biological
organisms, roact adaptively to their environment.
This is a statement of Functionalism, but tho author's position is
not clear.

Tho preference is for an Acceptance rather than Neutral coding,

since the author is summarizing a previous argument.
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-19Passage 4 - Examplo 6

Psychology is one of the sciences of human nature which . . . deals
with the concrete ways in which human beings are impressed by, and respond
to, their physical and social environment,
Codingi

Functionalism— Acceptance,

Passage 5 - Example *]_
It is proposed to define intelligence as capacity for variability or versa
tility of response.
This definition means that with greater intelligence thoro is greater
capacity to succeed or to fail, to make greater and raoro successes or
failures, to adapt or to maladapt, to learn more things, to make more
applications of what has boon learned, to make finer distinctions, to spin
more theories, to make a larger number of trial and error responses, to
act in terms of more ends, including more romote ends, etc. But it must
not bo forgotten that it means more mistakes as well as more successful
responses, Tho finer intelligence can mako more abstractions and generali
zations, can bo more general and comprehensive, more productive and
original, can do more unhabitual things, solvo more problems, and find
moro solutions for tho same problems than can tho poorer intelligence; tho
rango or scope of analysis and selection is vastly incroasod. Reflex moans
relative invariability; intelligence means variability, flexibility,
versatility, plasticity, resourcefulness.
This passage is functional in substance.

Since tho author is giving

his own definition, tho coding is Factionalism*— Acceptance,

(The author

mentions the ability to "make moro applications of what has been learned,"
and to "spin more theories,"

Those abilities suggest tho prescriptions of

Utilitarianism and Rationalism-^., respectively,)
Passage 6 - Examplo 8
In short, whether or not a potential stimulus becomes effective depends
on the individual. It depends on tho species to which he belongs, on the
anatomy of the sense organs, the stage of maturation, tho capacities for
sonso organ adjustment, the habits of attention, the activity in progress,
and the possibilities of oducating tho attention of tho individual. Such
facts make up the field of perceptual development and perceptual learning.
At the lower levels they are called facts of sensory physiology; at the
higher levels, facts of attention or exploration, but they are all one
problom.
The emphasis on adjustment and activity in this passage warrants a
coding of Functionalism,

Since the author is attempting persuasion, tho

most appropriate coding is Functionalism— Acceptance. (In the last sentence
the author mentions a continuum with sensory physiology at one end and

attention at the other end.

Those levels seem to corrospond to the mole

cular (sensory physiology) and molar (attention, exploration), but dis
cussion of these prescriptions will be reserved until later,)
Passage 7 - Example 9
As to structural analytic or idea-psychology. This form of psychology
is strictly analytical of psychoses, states of consciousness, ideas • , ,
It is after the elements in any psychosis and their quantity , , ,
Structural psychology is here defined in terms of analysis of states
of consciousness into basic elements, a conception that corresponds to
one example of Structuralism,

The inclusion of consciousness justifies a

coding of Contentual subjectivism, and the specification of molecular
units justified a coding of Molocularism,

The author is describing struc

tural psychology and has not yet indicated his attitude toward it, so
those prescriptions should be coded as Neutral,

Codingi

Structuralism-

Neutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral; Molocularism— Neutral,
Passage 8 - Example 10
The total personality • . , consists of throe major systems.
called the id, the ego, and the superego.
Coding!

These are

Structuralism— Acceptance,

Passago 9 - Example 11
It is obvious that the different kinds of habits based on training,
oducation, and discipline of any sort are nothing but a long chain of
conditioned reflexes.
This is a behavioral example of Structuralism,
aro the units out of which habits are built.

Coding!

Conditioned reflexes
Structuralism—

Acceptance,
Passago 10 - Example 12
Personality is the sum of activities that can be discovered by actual
obsoryatipn^of^behayior_.over a long _enough time to give reliable informa
tion, In other^ words, personality is but the end product of our habit
systems. , , , Among these activities, however, there aro dominant systems
in the manual field (occupational), in the laryngeal field (groat talker,
raconteur, silent thinker), and in the visceral field (afraid of people,
shy, given to outbursts, having to bo potted, and in general what we call
emotional).
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process*

It is the sum of a person's habits or habit systems revealed

through observation of his behavior.
Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,

Codingi

Structuralism— Acceptance»
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-22Inductivism - "Investigations begun with facts or observations."

The

approach which is characterized by reasoning from particular facts to
general principles.

More specifically, it is the sort of inference which

attempts to reach conclusions about all the members of a class from obser
vation of only some of them,
Deductivism - "Investigations begun with assumed established truths,"
Iho approach which is characterized by reasoning from assumed established
truths (premises) to valid conclusions.
deduction = a type of inference or reasoning from premises or
propositions to more concrete and specific truth (Warren, 193*0.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
There aro two broad and diametrically opposed schools of thought concerning
tho most effective methods for integrating diverse data. Tho difference
botwoon the two schools lies, not in tho presence or absonce of theory, but
in tho way theory is brought into the picture. In one case, tho theories
are formulated first and then tested deductively by means of experiment,
Tho other method is to experiment first and let the theories emerge induc
tively from the data.
The most explicit prescriptions in this passage are Deductivism and
Inductivism,

The author also mentions theories and how they are experi

mentally tested, which warrants codings of Rationalism^, Empiricism,
and Methodological objectivism.

Coding!

Deductivism— Neutral; Inductivism

— Neutral; Rationalism^— Neutral; Empiricism— Neutral; Methodological
o bjectivism— Neutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & ^
Throughout the history of moder science there has been a running debate
between two groups of researchers on tho issue of the utility of theories.
On one side have appeared the defenders of abstraction and speculation, the
people who, like James (1892) calling for a "Lavoisier or Galileo of
psychology," see theory as an essential step in tho scientific process.
For them, tho mere recitation of accumulated "facts" would never constitute
a system of knowledge, but rather they seek tho groat theoretical insight
that will reveal the secrets of nature. Counter to this devotion to
generalized statement is tho attitude of the research 'workers who are
usually called "pure empiricists," From Newton's (1713) celebrated and
probably misunderstood "Hypotheses non fingo" to Skinner's (1950) "Are
learning theories necessary?" there has been a steady line of defense
drawn for tho position that what matters in science is the patient collee-
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tion of data, to which end worrying about heady abstractions will be more
of a diversion and waste of time than a help to prediction and control*
Coding*

Deductivism*— Noutralj Inductivism— ‘
Neutralj Rationalism^

— Neutralj Empiricism— Neutral; Naturalism— Neutral,
Passage J3 “ Examples 5 & 6
I never faced a Problem which was more than the eternal problem of
finding order, I never attacked a problem by constructing a Hypothesis*
I never deduced Theorems or submitted them to Experimental Check* So far
as I can see, I had no preconceived Model of behavior— certainly not a
physiological or mentalistic one andf I believe, not a conceptual one*
The author rejects the deductive approach in psychology.
the inductive approach of simply "finding order" in nature.

He favors
He also re

jects mentalistic data in favor of behavioral data, although this bias
is secondary to tho inductive-deductive theme.

Coding!

Deductivism—

Rejection! Inductivism— Acceptance! Contentual subjectivism— Rejection!
Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,
Passago k - Example 7
An adequate impetus is supplied by the inclination to obtain data showing
orderly changes characteristic of the learning process. An acceptable
scientific program is to collect data of this sort and to relate them to
manipulable variables, selected for study through a common sonse explora
tion of the field.
The author favors the inductive approach in psychological science.
Coding!

Inductivism— Acceptance! Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,

Passage 5 - Examples 8
Tho grand aim of all science is to cover tho greatest number of empirical
facts by logical deduction from tho smallest number of hypotheses or axioms.
Coding!

Deductivism— Acceptance! Empiricism— Acceptance,

Passage 6 - Example 9
The progress of science comes about through tho experimental testing
of theorems, l/ftion agreement is found, tho postulate system generating
the theorem remains in the running! when disagreement is found, a search
is made for the faulty postulate, if such there be, and the postulate is
then revised. Possibly, if no faulty postulate can be found, a new postu
late may have to be added. Thus the system is self-correcting, and only
those features survive that have stood the scrutiny of meticulous experi
mental testing.
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prescriptively called Deductivism,

The author seems to be making an

argument so his position may be considered as Acceptance,

Codingi

Deduc-

tivism— Acceptance; Empiricism— Acceptance; Methodological objectivism—
Acceptance,
Passage 7 - Example 10
I, The definitions and postualtos of a scientific system should be
stated in a clear and unambiguous manner, they should be consistent with
one another, and they should be of such a nature as to permit rigorous
deductions,
II, The labor of deducing the potential implications of tho postulates
of the system should be performed with meticulous care and exhibited,
preferably step by step and in full detail. It is these deductions which
constitute the substance of a system,
IH, Tho significant theorems of a truly scientific system must take
the form of specific statements of the outcome of concrete experiments or
observations. The experiments in question may be those which have already
been performed, but of particular significance are those which have not
previously been carried out or oven planned. It is among these latter,
especially, that the crucial tests of a theoretical system will be found,
IV, Tho theorems so deduced which concern phenomena not already known
must be submitted to carefully controlled experiments. The outcome of these
critical experiments, as well as of all previous ones, must agree with the
corresponding thoorems making up the system.
This is a more detailed account of the "hypothetical-deductive method,"
Codingi

Deductivism— Acceptance; B&piricism— Acceptance; Methodological

objectivism— Accoptanco; Rationalism-^— Acceptance,
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Mechanism - "Activities of living beings completely explicable by
physiochemical constituents."

In addition to this basic meaning, there

is a derived meaning of Mechanismi
mechanism * a machine or machine-like system, fitted to perform
certain activities in fairly precise manner. . . . As applied to
human behavior, the term refers to those activities which are
machine-like in their constancy and regularity (Warren, 193*0.
These two meanings are reconciled by the fact that for behavior to be
machine-like it must first be completely explicable by physiochemical
constituents.
Vitalism - "Activities of living beings not so explicable by physio
chemical constituents."
The doctrine that phenomena of life possess a character sui
generis by virtue of which they differ radically from physio
chemical phenomena. The vitalist ascribes the activities of
living organisms to the operation of a "vital force" (Ross,
1970).
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
No other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within
the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by
these forces, one has either to find the specific way or form of their
action by means of the physical-mathematical method or to assume new forces,
equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, redu
cible to the force of attraction and repulsion.
This passage illustrates a rejection of Vitalism and an explicit
endorsement of Mechanism. Codingi

Vital!sm— Rejection* Mechanism— Aceeptance,

Passage 2 - Examples 3 & h
The behaviorist finds no scientific evidence for the existence of any
vitalistic principle . . . We need nothing to explain behavior but the
ordinary laws of physics and chemistry. . .
Coding*

Vitalism— Rejection! Mechanism— Acceptance* Contentual

objectivism— Acceptance •
Passage 3 - Example 5
. • • let us try to think of man as an assembled organic machine ready to
run . . . . Take four wheels with tires, axles, differentials, gas engine,
body; put them together and we have an automobile of a sort. The auto
mobile is good for certain kinds of duties. . . . In a similar way this
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man, this organic animal, this John Doe, iho so for as parts aro concerned
is mado up of head, arms, hands, trunk, legs, feet, toes and nervous,
muscular and glandular systems, • • is good for certain jobs.
This analogy says that man is like a machine, rather than is a machine,
but the best overall description is one of Mechanism— Acceptance,
Passage ^ - Example 6
Man is a machine, but he is a very complex one. At present he is far
beyond the powers of men to construct— except, of course, in the usual
biological way. , , , as our understanding of human behavior increases we
appeal less and less to explanatory fictions and we can then accept the
fact that the essential differences between machines and men concern com
ponentry, The problem of simulation is the technical problem of working
with the stuff of which tho human body is made.
Coding*
Passage _5 -

Mechanism— Acceptance; Contentual objoctivism— Acceptance,
Example 7,

A strictly mechanistic study of man cannot deal with 'fellow-members of
socioty viewing each othor, * Such conceptions belong only to a psychology
which recognizes human beings as something more than merely infinitely
complex mechanisms.
This kind of psychology has always oxisted, since Aristotle, and will
continue to exist as an honorable member of tho group which , , , wo usually
speak of as the natural sciences. It is only this kind of psychology which
deserves to bo called 'objective psychology,' because it alone studies
tho objective or concroto events occurring to human beings . , ,
The author is using the word "mochanistic" in the prescriptive sense,
and ho is reacting negatively to this conception.

He favors instead m

psychology which studios tho objective and concrete events occurring to
human beings,

Codingi

Mechanism— Rejection; Contentual objoctivisn—

Acceptance,
Passage 6 - Example 8
The vital forco causes a decomposition of the constituents of food, and
destroys the forco of attraction which is continually exerted between their
molecules , , , The phonomonon of growth, or incroaso in tho mass, prosupposos that tho acting vital forco is more powerful than tho resistance
which the chemical force opposes to tho decomposition or transformation
of tho elements of the food.
This description of digestion and growth illustrates the use of the
concept of "vital force,"

Codingi

Vitalism— Acceptance,
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-27Passago £ - Example 9
Wo find both structural and functional psychologists to bo chary and
wary of psyche* They fear its recrudescence, just as biologists fear any
recrudescence of vitalism,
Codingi

Vitalism— Neutral; Structuralism-Neutral; Functionalism-

Neutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral,

Mothodological objectivism - "Uso of methods open to verification by
another competent observer*’*
Methodological subjectivism - "Use of methods not so open to verifica
tion by another competent observer,"
Preliminary
In the past, the concepts of objoctivity-subjoctivity have been used
indiscriminately in psychology to refer to either subject matter or method.
Hie prescriptive approach makes a distinction between subject matter and
method as referents of these terms.

Hie former, called Contentual objecti-

vism-subjectivism, has already been defined; the latter, Methodological
objoctivism-subjoctivism, is considered here.

Iho nood for this distinc

tion is due to tho fact that psychology became differentiated from philoso
phy not in terms of its subject matter, but bocauso of its application of
the experimental method to problems of mind,

Wundt, for oxample, took a

methodologically objective approach to contontually subjoctive problems.
Later, with the advent of the behaviorists, tho subject matter of psychology
bocame objective too,
Paradox
Tho utility of tho method of introspection has been a thorny issue in
tho history of psychology,

Tho controversy stems from Wundt's and Titchoner's

uso of experimental introspection, or describing one's ojqjeriences under
controlled laboratory conditions.

Experimental introspection is distinguished

by its control of a variable, its discipline, tho training required, and
its technical vocabulary.

The paradox of this mothod in terms of tho present

content analysis is this;

Compared to the philosophy out of which psychology

grow, it is methodologically objective, because it is experimental; com
pared to behaviorism, it is methodologically subjective, because it is
introspectivo,

Resolution
The resolution of this paradox lies in tho realization that experimental
introspection can be either methodologically objective or subjective, depending
upon which component— experiment or introspection— is considered dominant
by the writer.

That is, it depends upon tho author's moaning, which can be

assortained only by considering the context of his statomont.

It can be

assumed that the experimental component was accepted, in principle if not
in practice, by all writers in tho history of American psychology,

Ihe issue

concerns the introspective component.
Guidelines
Tho following guidelines should bo considered when using Methodological
objoctivism-subjoctivism as coding categories.
(1) Certain methods are typically referred to when tho contrast is
with philosophy and tho omphasis is on observation and experiment, thus they
should be coded as Methodological objectivism.

Those methods (somo of which

are described by synonyms) include classical introspection, experimental
introspection, controlled introspection, systematic experimental introspec
tion, and experimental phenomenology,
(2) Certain other mothods are typically referred to when the compari
son is with othor psychological methods.

They should be coded as Methodolo

gical subjectivism. Those mothods include uncontrolled introspection,
phenomenological observation and description (without controls), existen
tial analysis, and froo association,
(3) Many references encounterod in tho psychological literature do
not fall easily into either of tho above two classes.
dependent upon context for their meaning.

They are moro directly

Those terms include introspection,

introspective observation, introspoctionism, and introspoctive psychology.
The general rule is to consider these references as instances of Methodolo
gical subjectivism unless there is specific reason for doing otherwise.

Verbal report
A special case which depends upon context is the use of verbal report.
There are at least two main uses of verbal report*
speoch reaction,

as observation and as

(1) Verbal report is sometimes interpreted as an indica

tion or observation of something else, namely, inner experience (thoughts,
feelings).

Another competent observer cannot verify the truth value of

the subject's verbal reports when they refer to intra-psychic events, so
it is best described as Methodological subjectivism.

This use of verbal

report exists in clinical psychology, counseling psychology, and psycho
pharmacology,

(2) Verbal report is sometimes taken at face value as a

speech reaction, as language behavior, or in Skinnerian terms, verbal be
havior,

In this use, verbal report, like any other kind of behavior, is

open to verification ty another competent observer, and is an expression
of Methodological objectivism.

It exists in psychophysics and in psycholo

gical testing.
Passage 1 - Examples 1

&

2

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experi
mental branch of natural science, , , , Introspection forms no essential
part of its mothods , . ,
The emphasis on objectivity and the rejection of introspection (without
qualification of what kind of introspection) suggest the codings of methodo
logical objectivism— Acceptance; Methodological subjectivism— Rejection.
Tho passage should also receive codings of Contentual objectivism— Accep
tance; Empiricism— Acceptance; Naturalism— Acceptance,
Passago 2 - Examples 3 & ^
But most of tho work in the new science is carried on without intro
spection, tho only door into the specific subject-matter of psychology.
The author's commitment to introspection warrents a coding of Methodo
logical subjectivism— Accoptance, and since it is the only genuine method,
all objective methods are simultaneously excluded.

Also, the author's
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-31reference to the "specific subject-matter of psychology" warrants a coding.
Codingi

Methodological sub jectlvlsm— Acceptance* Methodological objectivism

— Rejections Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Example 5
Only by looking inward can we gain a knowledge of mental processes*
only by looking inward undor standard conditions can we make our knowledge
scientific, , . . 'Wb must always fall back upon experimental introspection.
For our own mind is our only moans of interpreting tho mind *df another
organism* we cannot imagine processes in another mind that we do not find
in our own.
Ihe author specifically refers to experimental introspection, so it
is coded as Methodological objectivism.

Since this method is used to

study mind, Contentual subjectivism is also expressed.

Codingi

Methodolo

gical objectivism— Acceptance * Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example

6

It remains to give a somewhat more extended discussion of objective
methods as employed in human psychology, . . .
When we come to look them ovor, , , ,we find that most of them fall
within the following general classification!
I, Observation, with and without instrumental control,
II. The conditioned reflex methods,
(a) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned secretion reflexes.
(b) Mothods employed in obtaining conditioned motor reflexes,.
Ill, Iho verbal report mothod.
IV. Methods of testing.
Tho author considers verbal roport as an objective method, so that is
how it should be coded,

Codingi

Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,

Passage 5 - Example 7
The kind of introspection which prevailed in Leipzig and Cornell was rigorous
and pedantic, with strict rules and woll-deflned procedures, Ihe subjects
used in laboratory experiments had to be thoroughly trained in it, and
their reports supplemontod by measurements with instruments such as the
chronoseope. This typo of introspection is referred to as classical.
The emphasis on experiment and quantification warrants codings of
Methodological objectivism— Noutral; QuantitAtivism— Neutral,
Passago 6 - Example 8
The Wllrzburg group introduced systematic experimental intro spection, a name
proposed by N. Ach (1905), a member of the school.
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fies that systematic experimental introspection is an expression of Methodo
logical objectivism.
Passago ? - Example

The author’s position is Noutral.
$

Introspective Observation is what we have to roly on first and fore
most and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined— !t means,
of course, tho looking into our own minds and reporting what wo thero
discover. Every ono agrees that we there discover statos of consciousness,
Tho author is commitod to Methodological subjectivism and Contentual
subjectivism,

Codingi

Methodological subjectivism— Acceptance i Contentual

subjoctivism— Acceptance,
Passago 8 - Example 10
Wo gather tho material for our work from a varioty of sourcos— from
is convoyod to us by tho information given us by tho patient and by
froo associations, from what he shows us in his transference*, from
wo arrivo at by interpreting his dreams and from what ho betrays by
slips or parapraxos,

what
his
what
his

Tho method of freo association is an oxprossion of Methodological
subjectivism,

Codingi

Methodological subjoctivism— Accoptancoj Conten

tual subjectivism— Acc optanco,
Passago 9 ~ Example 11
Watson, Moyor, and Weiss soem to lead in a willingness to abandon to
tho dogs tho introspoctivo observation of conscious responses. Many aro
glad to sound praises to their high scientific standard when they insist
that science must stick to observable facts and their relations, and when
they load against any return of psychology to tho abandoned fortress
in which names aro roifiod or deified,
"Introspective observation of conscious responses" is a phrase which
reveals both Methodological subjectivism and Contentual subjectivism.

The

idea that "scionce must stick to observable facts and their relations" may
bo considered a general statement of Contentual objoctivism.

The author

is describing tho position of others, not taking a position himself,
Codingi

Methodological subjectivism— -Neutral; Contentual subjectivism—

Noutral j Contentual objoctivism— Neutral,
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(The phenomenological method} consists of examining whatever is found
in consciousness, or in other wards, the data or phenomena of consciousness.
Its primary concern is not tho act of consciousness, but tho object of
consciousness, that is, for instance, all that is perceived, Imagined,
doubted, or loved, Ihe ultimate goal is to reach and grasp tho essences
of things appearing in consciousness.
There is no indication here that tho author's conception of the
phonomenological method is of an experimental nature,

Codingi

Methodolo

gical subjoctivism— Noutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral; Qualitativism— Noutral.
Passage 11 - Example 13
Ihe psychologists' use of "introspection" as its principal method has been
another very serious bar to progress.
Faced with a lack of context to help determine the author's conception
of "introspection," a judge may follow tho Guideline which considers such
references as expressions of Mothodological subjectivism,
logical subjectivism— Rejection.

Codingi

Methodo

Molocularism - "Psychological data most aptly described in terms of
relatively small units.

The strategy demanding that the subject matter

of psychology be analyzed into its basic components and described as such.
If the subject matter is conceived as consciousness, then molocularism
takes the form of a soarch for the elementary units of consciousness (£•£• *
sensations, images, affections); if the subject matter is conceived as
behavior, it takes tho form of a soarch for tho elementary units of behavior
(e.g., habits, roflexos, conditioned responses, muscular movemonts, glan
dular socretions).
or atomism.

Molecularism is sometimes referred to as elomentarism

Contemporary operant research, which moasuros rate of res

ponding, illustratos a molecular approach to behavior.
Molarism - "Psychological data most aptly described in terms of rela
tively largo units,"
molar behavior; 1, a large-unit segment of tho total behavior
stream that possesses essential unity, , , . 3. a behavior unit
considered as an emergent phenomenon, having qualities not statable
as a sum of tho parts (English & English, 1958)*
The following are oxamplos of relatively molar behaviors;

going swim

ming, having a dato, studying for an exam,
Iho torms [molecular and molar]characterize not so much two classes
of behavior as two ways of describing or conceiving the same beha
vior event. Going to class would probably bo called molar beha
vior , . , but tho same phenomenon can also bo described as a
sequonco of molecular units, i,e,, as a sories of stepping movemonts
or even as a succession of nouromuscular processes (English & English,
1958).
Passage 1. - Examples 1 & 2
On tho ono hand, he has defined behavior in terms of its strict underlying
physical and physiological details, , , , Wo shall designate this as tho
molecular dofinition of behavior. And, on the other hand, ho has come to
recognize . , , that behavior, as such, is more than and different from
tho sum of its physiological parts. Behavior, as such, is an "omorgont"
phenomenon that has doscriptive and dofining proportios of its own. And
wo shall designate this latter as the molar dofinition of behavior.
The author's preference for Molarism is rovoalod try his phrase "has
come to rocognizo . , , that behavior, as such, is more than and different
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-35from tho sum of its physiological parts,"

Codingi

Molecularims— Rejection*

Molarism— Acceptance; Contentual objectivism— Acceptanco.
Passage 2 - Examples 3

& }*

Ever since Tolman, bohavior theorists have been agreeing that psychology
is concerned with molar responses, not molecular ones. Accordingly we try
to observe and moasuro what an organism is doing, not how all its muscles
aro contracting. With this kind of observation on the response sido thoro
should be a corresponding kind of observation on tho stimulus side. We
should try to discover what an organism is responding to, not what excites
all the little receptors,
Ihe concopts of molar and molecular aro used here in tho prescriptive
sonse, with an oxtonsion to stimuli,

Ihe author makes clear his acceptanco

of Molarism and rejection of Molocularism,

Codingi

Molarism— Acceptance;

Molecular ism— Rejection; Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,
Passage _3 - Examples J? & _6
An act of behavior has distinctive properties all its own, to be identified
and described irrespective of whatever muscular, glandular, or neural
processes underlie it. The molecular facts of physics and physiology upon
which behavior rests have identifying properties of their own, which are
not the properties of behavior as molar,
Codingi

Molocularism— Rejection; Molarism— Acceptance; Contentual

objectivism— Acceptanco.
Passage

fy

- Example 7

The aim of tho psychologist is throe-fold. Ho seeks (1) to analyze con
crete (actual) mental exporienoe into its simplest components, (2) to dis
cover how these elements combine, what aro the laws which govern their
combination, and (3) to bring them into connoction with their physiologi
cal (bodily) conditions,
Codingi

Molocularism— Acceptanco; Structuralism— Acceptance; Con-

tontual subjectivism— Acceptanco,
Passage Jj - Example 8
As to structural analytic or idoa-psychology, This form of psychology
is strictly analytical of psychoses, states of consciousness, ideas, as
more phenomena, abstracted from any active psycho. It is aftor tho ele
ments in any psychosis and their quantity, so as to construct a psychicautomaton. It is hold to bo scientifically irrelevant to ask whose
psychosis one is analyzing. Ideas are atoms, instead of being experienced
functionings of a self. Explanation is sought in non-psychic terms by

I
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-36reference to physiological distinctions. It treats its analyzod elements
as real parts, whose mechanical composition is tho mental life. Whether
there is any personal mind back of the stroam of ideas, says Titchenor,
is a question that cannot bo raisod in psychology.
Ihe author's protest is against Molecularism, Structuralism, and
Mechanism,

Ho is not objocting to montalistie data in psychology but

rather to its artificial analysis into elements and thoir "mechanical
composition" ("Ideas are atoms, instead of being experienced functionings
of a self,").

Ho calls this "structural analytic or idea psychology."

Since tho author foels that the solf or "personal mind" is missing in
structural psychology, his position also illustrates Contentual subjectivism.
Coding*

Molocularism— Rojoction; Structuralism— Rejection; Mechanism—

Rejection; Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
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-37Monism - "Fundamental principlo or ontity in univorso is of one kind,"
tho view that ultimate reality is of only one kind or quality,
Tho view that the phenomena of psychology are of tho same kind
as, or aro completely reducible to, those of tho physical sciencos
(English & English, 1958).
A general namo for thoso thoories which deny the duality (i,o,
tho existence as two ultimato kinds of substance) of matter and
mind. Thus materialism and idealism or spiritualism aro both
species of monism; the namo is ofton applied specifically to a
blind variety, viz, the doctrine that physical and psychical
phenomena aro alike manifestations of a reality which cannot be
identified with either matter or mind (Murray, 1888-1928),
Dualism -"Fundamental principle or entity in universe is of two kinds,
mind and matter,"
tho theory that reality consists of two different, relatively
independent substances; moro specifically, tho assumption that
psychic and physical phenomena aro both real but aro fundamentally
different in nature (Warren, 193*0.
Tho major varieties include Intoractionism (two separate and interacting
processes), parallelism (two soparato but correlated sorios of ovonts), and
occasionalism (one typo of ovont is tho occasion for God to produco other
typo of ovont),
Passago 1 - Examples 1

&

2

I fool that behaviorism is tho only consistent and logical functionalism.
In it ono avoids both tho Scylla of parallelism and the Charybdis of inter
action, Thoso time-honored relics of philosophical speculation need trouble
the student of bohavior as little as they trouble tho student of physics,
Tho consideration of the mind-body problem affects noither tho type of
problem solocted nor tho formulation of tho solution of that problem, I
can state my position hero no bettor than by saying that I should like to
bring my students up in tho samo ignorance of such hypotheses as one finds
among tho students of other branches of science.
The author explicitly rules out intoractionism and parallelism, which
aro varieties of Dualism, and by implication Monism as well, since it too
is an alternative "solution" to tho mind-body problem.

The author also

expresses a commitment to tho study of behavior (Contentual objoctivism),
and to conceptualizing that study as a form of functionalism,

Codingi

Dualism— Rejection; Monism— Rojection; Contentual objectivism— Acceptance!

201

-38Punctlona1± sm— Ac ceptanco.
Passago

2

— Example 3

I plead for a monistic, naturalistic view of the mental and tho
physical . . ,
Codingi

Monism— Acceptance; Naturalism— Acceptance,

Passage J3 - Example h
The appearance of now qualitative characteristics in tho psychological
univorso not found in the physical universe, points to the need for another
concept of uniform sequence than those already described,
Tho emphasis on tho qualitative difference between the "psychological
universo" and tho "physical universe" suggests a coding of Dualism, although
this is equivocal,

Tho author sooms to be taking this for granted, so tho

coding is Dualism— Acceptanco; Qualitativism— Acceptance,
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-39Naturalism - "Nature requires for its operation and explanation only
principles found within it,"

The assumption that explanation of events

should bo sought within tho same system as tho one in which tho events
occurred, namely, tho systom of spatio-temporal phenomena,
a philosophy which holds that tho universe, , , is self-existent,
self-explanatory, self-operating, and solf-directingj that the
world procoss is not teloological and anthropocentric, but pur
poseless and only incidentally productive of man. Also, that
human lifo-physical, mental, moral and spiritual— is an ordinary
natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary
operations of nature (Ross, 1970),
When oxplicit mention is made of the naturalistic basis of modern science,
it should be coded as Naturalism,
Supernaturalism - "Nature requires for its operation and explanation
transcendent guidance as well as principles found within it,"

The assump

tion that tho explanation of events should be sought within a different
systom than tho system of spatio-temporal phenomena in which tho events
occurred,
supernatural = belonging to a higher order or.system 'than that
of nature, or transcending tho ordinary course of nature (Warren,

193*0.
Supornaturalism is accepted when a psychologist conceptualizes scientific
psychology within a thoistic religious framework,
Passago 1 - Examples 1 4 2^
When I speak of tho psychological tradition I strongly emphasize the fact
that tho science of psychology has not enjoyed a continuous naturalistic
development. As is well known, tho evolution of psychology includes
periods in which scholars not only limited their studies to human interbohavior and neglected tho behavior of other organisms, but, in addition,
failed to describe and interpret that intorbohavior as natural events.
Instead, they thought of it as at least partially oxtranatural. Such
theological and metaphysical periods must, however, bo taken strictly into
account because thoy articulate with and influence the naturalistic stages
of psychological tradition. In fact, these scientific dark spots continue
to influence tho curront course of psychological history,
Codingi

Naturalism— Acceptanco; Supernaturalism— Rejection; Conten

tual objoctivism— Acceptance,
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-40Passago 2 - Examples

3 &

4

Throughout this period [the Patristic and Medieval Period]) the ideal
of investigating any kind of events was set aside in favor of such other
interests as man's salvation, his place in a thoistic cosmos, and his rights
and duties with respect to God and State. Since tho theological and church
civilization placod man and his habitation at tho center of the universe,
his ossential behavior was envisaged as of a spiritual order. By means
of verbal and symbolic formulations man, in part at least, was removed
far from his actual place in a spatio-temporal world and mado into a
being who, because he was endowed with a soul, was in part akin to God
and the angels. Psychological thinking lost the sense of scientific
investigation and became preoccupied with ehristological doctrines.
This is an explication of tho concopt of Supornaturalism, which should
be coded as Noutral,

Tho author contrasts this with "[man's] actual place

in a spatio-temporal world" and "the sonse of scientific investigation,”
which is enough to rocoivo codings of Naturalism and Methodological
objectivism.

Codingi

Supernaturalism— Neutral; Naturalism— Neutral;

Methodological objectivism— Noutral; Contentual objoctivism— Noutral,
Passage 3 - Examples

& 6

No man can give a rational account how it is possible that such a general
flood should coma, by any natural means. And if it be supernatural that
grants the thing I am proving, namely, such a Supreme Being as can alter
the course of nature.
Codingi

Naturalism— Rejection; Supernaturalism— Acceptance.

Passage 4 - Example 7
Psychology as tho bohaviorist views it is a purely objective experi
mental branch of natural science,
Tho author makes oxplicit tho fact that Naturalism is tho philoso
phical basis of modern science when ho refers to "natural science," Also,
sinco tho author identifies himsolf as a behaviorist, tho statement should
be coded for Contentual objectivism.

In addition, ho says that behavioristic

psychology is purely objoctivo and experimental, a characteristic which
rovoals commitments to Methodological objectivism and Empiricism,

Codingi

Naturalism— Acceptanco| Contentual objoctivism— Acceptance; Methodological
objectivism— Acceptance; Empiricism— Acceptance.
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Pa ssa go 5 ~ Example

41-

8

, . . tho concoption of God as self-conscious Mind and Will struggling with
tho forcos of chaos and constantly expressing Himsolf, not only through
all tho various lovols of law and order in tho universe, but also through
all its qualitative aspocts~and supremely through the highest creative
capacities of man himself, including tho latter's scientific triumphs. Not
only does this conception not conflict with tho claims of scionce, but
also, since God is conceived as involved in all of lifo and as active on
all levels, rather than as shrinking, His roalm is really expanding. It
also moans that man can come to tho aid of God as well as God to tho aid
of man, in the common task of building a now world.
The dominant prescription in this passage is Supernaturalism.
dary proscription is Qualitativism ("qualitative aspects").
position is ono of acceptance of these proscriptions.

A secon

Tho author's

Codingi

Super

naturalism— Acceptance j Qualitativism— Acceptance,
Passage 6 - Example

9_

To seek the cultural roots of transcendentalism and supernaturalism,
one must turn to tho evolution of tho church which grow up in the Roman
state, competed with it, and replaced it in the history of Western Europe,
Codingi
Passage

7_

Supornaturallsm— Neutral.

- Example 10

Tho intellectual aspect of this new culture, Transcendentalism, is well
named sinco its votaries built their doctrines and boliefs on the premise
that they were in contact with a reality which transcends the things and
events of everyday life, and which is known by means that contrast with
observation and observational inference, tho stand-bys of ordinary
scientific investigation.
This dofinition of Transcendentalism is equally appropriate as a
dofinition of Supernaturalism, which is contrasted with "observation and
observational inference."

Codingi

Supernaturalism— Rejectionj Empiricism

— Acceptance; Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,
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-42Nomotheticism - "Emphasis upon discovering general laws."
characterizing procedures and methods designed to discover general
laws (English & English, 1959 )•
Examples of nomothetic research areas include the principles of learning*
theories of emotion, national stereotypes, language development, stages
of cognitive growth.
Idiographloism - "Emphasis upon explaining particular events or
individuals."
pertaining to, or characterizing, an account of particular indi
vidual cases or events (English & English, 1958),
Clinical and counseling psychology, when the stress is on individual
patients or clients, are idiographic activities in psychology.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 &

2

It is because of their essential stereotypy and lack of variation that
psychologists like to draw their generalizations from lower animals.
But for my part I venture the opinion that all of the infrahuman verte
brates in the world differ less from one another in psychological
functioning and in complexity of organization, than one human being does
from any other.
And so I wonder whether the time has not come for students of personality
to shake themselves loose from a too-rigid response set, and perhaps even
to reverse it. Instead of growing impatient with the single case and has
tening on to generalization, why should we not grow impatient with our
generalizations and hasten to the internal pattern?
Ihe author of this passage is talking about ihe ncmothetic and
idiographic approaches to personality, and stating his preference for the
latter.

Coding)

Nomotheticism*— Rejection) Idio graphicism— -Acceptance,

Passago 2 - Examples 3

&

4

The idiographic point of view is an artistic one that strives for a
scientific goal) the nomothetic, a caricature of science that bears
resemblance to anything that exists today. Since no useful purpose
served ly retaining these mischievous and difficult terms, they had
disappear from our scientific vocabularies,
Codingi
Passage

3

Idiographicism-— Rejection) Nomo theticism— Rejection,

" Example _5

Thejscienco of personality must by its very nature be nomothetic.

nonlittle
is
best
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-43Coding i Nomothe ticism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example

6

Here we see the issues drawn clearly. Is personology to be an art,
devoted to word portraits that seek to evoke in the reader the thrill of
recognition, tho gratifying (if perhaps illusory) feeling of understanding
unique individuals? Or is it to be a science, which enables us to study
these same persons in all their uniqueness and to derive from such study
general propositions about the structure, development, and other significant
aspects of personal!-ty? If we elect for a science, we must abandon art
whenever it takes us in a different direction than the one demanded by the
scientific method, and we must recognize that the ideal of an idiographic
science is a will-o'-the-wisp, an artistic and not a scientific goal.
Science may be supplemented by art, but not combined with it.
The predominant theme of this paragraph is the author's rejection of
Idiographic! sm.

At first it may seom that he is clearing tho way for a

nomothetic approach to personality, but closor scrutiny indicates that he
is advocating a comprehensive, inductively-based science.

Evidence for

Inductivism may bo found in his preference for "a science, which enables
us to study these samo persons in all their uniqueness and to derive from
such study general propositions about the structure, development, and other
aspects of personality,"

Codingi

Idiographicism— Rejection* Induetivism

— Acceptance! Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,
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-44Peripheralism - "Stress upon psychological events taking place at
periphery of body."
a point of view that emphasizos, for psychological explanation,
the events that take place at the periphory or boundaries of
tho body rather than ovonts in tho central nervous system (English
& English, 1958)•
poripheralist position. A view hold by some psychologists that
all thinking goes on in action (in speech or other movements)
(Hllgard, Atkinson, & Atkinson, 1971)*
Centralism - "Stress upon psychological events taking place within
the body."
centralist psychologyi a point of view that gives major importance
in explanation of behavior to events that take place in the brain
(English & English, 1958)*
centralist position. A theoretical position held by certain
psychologists who believe that thinling can best be explained as
processos going on inside tho brain or nervous system, with muscu
lar movements as mere accompaniments or facilitators of tho central
processos (Hllgard, Atkinson>& Atkinson, 1971).
Passage 1 - Examples 1

&

2

Another distinction which is perhaps of growing importance is that
betwoen "centralists" and "periphoralists," The former hold that behavior
cannot be accountod for by correlations between stimuli and responses but
that account has to bo taken of central procosses in tho brain or nervous
systom that determine the course of both perception and response. To this
extont they call in question the , , , ^viewpoint forj| . . . correlating
events at the "periphory" of the organism, that is, the stimuli impinging
on it and the . . . obsorvablo responses made.
Coding*

Centralism— Neutral* Poripheralisra— Neutral* Contentual

objectivi an— Noutral.
Passage 2 - Sxamplo

3

We thus think and plan with the whole body. But since, as I pointed
out above, word organization is, when present, probably usually dominant
over visceral and manual organization, we can say that "thinking" is
largely subvocal talking— provided wo hasten to explain that it can occur
without words.
This is a "decentralized" or peripheral conception of thinking.
Codingi

Poripheralism— Accoptanco.
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-45Passage 3 - Example 4
A stimulus arouses in a rocoptor an impulse, a, which is transmitted to
the cortox. In the cortex, the impulse is propagated along a series of
neurons, b, until, somo time later, it leads to some motor impulse, c, to
an effector, at which time tho rosponse occurs. Blinking would correspond
to tho nervous impulses in the cortex, b,
Biis is an oxposition of tho centralist position in psychology.
Codingi

Centralism-Neutral,
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Purism - "Seeking of knowledge for its own sake,"
Utilitarianism - "Seeking of knowledge for its usefulness in other
activities,"
the philosophical doctrine that makes practical usefulnoss tho
criterion of value (English & English, 1958),

Utilitarianism is expressed wherever the application of knowledge is evident,
£,jj, , clinical, counseling, educational, and industrial psychology.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Tho matter I wish to examine is an aspect of a familiar issue in psychologyl
the relation between our scionce and its applications. Concern with the
issue is about as old as the field itself, Titchenor, for example, dealt
with it* ho proposed that wo reserve the namo psychology for the science
and designate its application as psychotechnology.
Here the author states what in proscriptivo terms is called tho Purism
— Utilitarianism issue.

On the basis of what is given, the author*s

position should be coded as Neutral,

Coding*

Purism— Neutral* Utili

tarianism— Noutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3. & 4
Hie point is rather that wo note a marked difference of emphasis between
toxt-books of functional psychology and toxt-^books of other sciences,
A text-book of physics will discuss various types of engines and machines,
but it will discuss them as illustrative of physical laws, A text-book
of physiology may discuss various types of pathological phenomena, but it
will discuss them in connection with physiological methods and physiological
principles. The text-books of functional psychology, on the other hand,
tend— it is true, in varying degree— to make of psychology either an
introduction to philosophy or an aid to individual and social welfare. In
so far as these tendencies prevail* in so far as functional psychology,
in its exposition of psychology proper, goes out to meet tho problems of
philosophy or of our customary human life* in so far there is real danger
that tho pains and seriousness which are the due of psychology as scionce
are withdrawn from psychology and expended in those other fields,
Tho author takes a position against psychology as "an aid to indi
vidual and social wolfaro" and for psychology as "science,"

Therefore,

this passage should bo coded for Utilitarianism and Purism,

Since the

focus of tho author's protest is tho application of knowledge rathor than
functional psychology as such, Functionalism should probably bo coded as
Neutral,

Codingi

Utilitarianism— Rejection* Purism— Acceptance*
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Functionalism-Neutral,
Passage

3

** Example _5

^Tho psychologist's^ business is to know the laws of that part of nature
which wo call human naturo, and to use those laws, as fast as discovered,
for solving tho problems presented by the human individual or group.
Coding!

Utilitarianism— Acceptance} Naturalism— Acceptance,

Passage 4 - Example 6
I have deliberately borrowed the phrase "the welfare of man" from
tho ethical codo of the American Psychological Association, In my view,
it is the ethical responsibility of all psychologists— as individuals
and as monitors of their scientific and professional associations— to see
to it that psychology is used for peace rather than war, for reducing the
arms raco rathor than intensifying it, for eliminating ethnocentrism and
prejudice rathor than fostering than, for removing social and economic
injustices and inequalities rather than perpetuating them. Since Hiroshima
wo can no longer pretend that science or scientists can plead innocence
with respect to the social consequonces of their scientific activities.
The author mentions specific social problems to which he believes
psychological knowledge should be applied, including peace and war, the
arms raco, ethnocontricism and prejudice.
Acceptance,

Coding!

Utilitarianism—
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-48Quantitativism - "Stress upon knowledge which is countable or measureablo."
quantity = a characteristic whoso variations admit of numerical
expression (Warren, 19340•
A concern with moasureability, or comparison of results of various quanti
ties, or counting with the aim of being objective, e.jg., characteristic
current research in psychological testing, psychophysics, learning,
Qualitativism - "Stress upon that which is different in kind or
essence,"
Having to do with the most distinguishable aspects of experiencesour, blue, middle Ct etc. These are called "qualitative" aspects
of experience or merely "qualities," in contrast to the intensive
or "quantitative" aspects of experience, such as the sourness of
what is sour, the brightness of blue, the loudness ofmiddle C,
etc, (Munn, Fernald, & Fernald, 1969).
Examples of areas in psychology which are likely to reflect qualitativism
and psychotherapy and counseling.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
To mako a clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative
differoncos lot us define quantitative differences as those which can be
stated in terms of amount or position. Two facts or relations are quali
tatively different when ono cannot be described completely in terms of
a different amount or arrangement of the other, A new quality is dis
covered when there is something in the fact or in tho relation morethan
in the mere summationof the qualities previously described.
Coding:

Quantitativism— Neutral; Qualitativism— Neutral,

Pas sago 2 - Examples _3 & 4
When you can measure what you are spoaking about, and express it in num
bers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and un
satisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowlodge, but you havo
scarcely, in your thou^vts, advanced to the stage of science.
This passage is a endorsement of Quantitativism,

Qualitativism is

almost synorymous with lack of moasureability, so that is tho best des
cription of what tho author is talking about.
Acceptance; Qualitativism— Rejection,

Coding!

Quantitativism—
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-49Passage 3 - Examples Jj & 6
This problem of measuremont has roraainod a stumbling block oven at the
present writing. Since tho pioneer work of Weber and Fochnor and Helmholtz,
psychologists have found many opportunities fro exact measurement in their
subject-matter; yot thoro remain many facts of psychological observation
to which direct measurement cannot be applied , , .
In addition to montion of tho problem of measurement, the author
boliovos thoro are many psychological facts to T-jhich direct measurement
cannot bo applied.
in nature.

This belief assumes that such facts are qualitative

Coding;

Quantitativism— -Neutral; Qua litativisn— -Acceptance,

Passage 4 - Example 7
A broad view of tho placo of psychology in science should recognize that
psychology is especially favored in any effort to discover qualitative
differences, The data with which it deals are moro complex, moro rare in
nature and more likely to show now qualities of content and relationship.
Psychology should, therefore, bo especially keen to detect and to describe
qualitative differences in facts and in thoir relations,
Tho author of this passage seems to be using tho word "qualitative"
in tho prescriptive sense, and his position is clearly one of acceptance.
Codingi

Qualitativism*— Acceptance,
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-50Rationalism, (vs. Irrationalism) - "Emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sonso and intellect,"

The belief that the essenco

of man is his rationality, or that intellectual factors play a greater role
in human life than emotional ones,
rational behavior, rational conduct = behavior of organisms which
rests upon reasoning or which is interpreted or judged as proceeding
in a logical mannor (Warren, 193*0#
Soma personality theories reflect this proscription.
Irrationalism - "Intrusion or domination of emotive and conative
factors upon intellectual procossos,"

Tho conception of human nature in

which personal, particularly emotional, factors interfere with intellectual
processes.
acts,

The rosult of this interference may be illogical or irrational

Man is often swayed by emotion rather than reason.

The extreme

irrational view is that man is the pawn of his instincts and passions.
Some personality thoories reflect this prescription.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Man is sometimes referred to as a rational animal. Re is intelligent)
ho exorcises reason; ho uses logic; and he argues from a scientific
standpoint. Indeed, man is considorod by man to bo the only rational
animal.
An individual's action or behavior, of courso, is sometimes considered
irrational. This is tho opposite of rational, Tho irrational person
defies tho laws of reason; ho contradicts that which is considorod rational
by some particular community of people.
Coding*
Passago

2

Ratdonalispig— Noutral; Irrationalism-Neutral,

- Example 3

When wo speak of man-tho-scientist we aro speaking of all mankind and not
merely a particular class of mon who have publicly attained the stature
of "scientists," . . . we may , , , propose that every man is, in his own
partiaular way, a scientist. , . , Now what would happen if we were to re
open the question of human motivation and use our long-range view of man
to infer just what it is that sets the courso of his endeavor? , , • Might
not tho individual man, each in his own personal way, assume moro of tho
stature of a scientist, over seeking to predict and control the course of
events with which he is involved? Would he not have his theories, test
his hypotheses, and woigh his experimental evidence? And, if so, might not
the differences between tho personal viewpoints of different mon corres
pond to tho differences botwoen tho theoretical points of view of dif
ferent scientists?

214

-51Tho general conception of man as scientist, and the specific emphasis
on testing hypotheses and weighing evidence, argue for codings of Rationalising
— Acceptance; Empiricism— Accoptance; Methodological objectivism— Acceptance;
Rationalism]— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Example 4
Wo may insist as much as we like that the human intellect is weak in
comparison with human instincts, and bo right in doing so.
This is a statomont of oxtrome Irrationalism, which is accepted by
tho author.

Codingi

Irrationalism— Acceptance,

Passage 4 - Example 5
The logical laws of thought do not apply in tho id, and this is true above
all of tho law of contradiction. Contrary impulsos oxist side by side,
without cancelling oach othor out or diminishing each other i at the most
they may converge to form compromises under the dominating economic
pressure towards tho discharge of energy.
This passage is primarily an expression of Irrationalism, which is
accepted by the author,

Codingi

Irrationalism— Acceptance; Structuralism

— Acceptance; Bynamicism— Acceptance,

Staticismi (vs. Developmentalism) - "Qnphasis upon cross-sectional
view,"

The view which stresses the control of behavior in the present,

or viewing the most prominent features of the subject matter irrespective
of changes with time,

Staticism^ exists in animal psychology! one pro

cedure in animal studies is to control the history of the animals as much
as possible so that all the animals will have the same developmental his
tory and their behavior may then be studied as a function of the experi
mental condition.

This type of behavioral explanation is conceived as

the interaction of variables in the present situation,
Developmentalism - "Qnphasis upon changes with time,"
continuous change in an organism over time.

Emphasis upon

Specifically, emphasis on

the historical roots of present behavior, focusing on accumulating ex
perience as the individual grows and learns,
Developmentalismi

Ihe following areas reflect

developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive

growth, and certain personality theories.
Passage 1 - Example 1
Ihe purpose of this study was to demonstrate that the development
of adequate depth perception depends partly upon the activity of the
organism, Thus, one kitten travelod about the experimental room using
normal self-locomotion, while the other traveled the same route passively,
riding in a gondola. By these restrictions, and by rearing the kittens
in darkness, their visual experiences were controlled and kept essentially
the same. When tested later for depth perception, the active kitten
showed normal visual development and the passive one was retarded.
In this study, the experimenter controlled tho visual experiences
of the animal subjects so that he could tost the effects of activity on
their depth perception.
one,

Codingi

This is a static explanation, not a developmental

Staticism^— Acceptancej Dnpirlclsm— Acceptancej Methodolo

gical objectivism— Accoptance,
Passage 2 - Example

2

• , , we shall here strongly defend the thesis that neither past nor
future psychological facts but only the present situation can influence
present events. This thosis is a direct consequence of the principle that
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-53only what exists concretely can have effects. Since neither the past nor
the future exists at the present moment it cannot have effects at the
present. In representing the life space therefore we take into account
only what is contemporary.
The author shows a strong preference for the static type of explana
tion,

Coding*

Staticism]— Acceptance,

Passage _3 - Example 3
Functional psychology is a bit less abstract. It has at least
processes instead of cross-sections of consciousness, or rather of the
psycho-physical organism in its reaction to oxternal environment.
The reference to "cross-sections of consciousness" suggests Staticism^
toward which the author implies disapproval,

Tho object of the cross-

sectional view is consciousness, so it should also be coded for that
feature.

The author’s position is ambiguous, but the suggested coding is*

Functionalism— Acceptance} Staticism-j— Rejectionj Contentual subjectivian
— Neutral,
Passage 4 - Example 4^
Whenever we try to understand growth, it is well to remember the
epigenetic principle which is derived from the growth of organisms in
utero. Somewhat generalized, this principle states that anything that
grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise,
each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts ^avo
arisen to form a functioning whole.
This is a statement of Developmentalism, which is accepted by the
author, although Developmentalism need not include the epigenetic prin
ciple,

Coding*

Developmontalism— Acceptance.

Passage jj - Example jj
Haro is my answeri Psychology is one of the sciences of human nature which.
from the existential and tho genetic point of view, deals with the concrote ways in which human beings are impressed by. and respond to. their
physical and social environment.
Tho word "genetic" connotes a developmental, and "existential" a sub
jective, point of view.
of Functionalism,

The main part of the definition is an example

Because It is the author’s own definition, the three

proscriptions are accepted.

Coding!

Developmentalism— Acceptance}
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-5£J~
Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance} Functionalism— Acceptance.
Passage 6 - Example 6
Personality can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the
human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to bo aware of, and to
interact with, a widening social radius, beginning with the dim image of
a mother and ending with mankind, or at any rate that segment of mankind
which "counts" in the particular individual's life.
Coding*

Developmentalism— Acceptance,

Passage 7 - Example 7
, , , psychology— the science which describes and explains the evolution
— the self-realizing and ripening of the soul, self, personality, or
spirit that forms the central subject-matter of psychology,
The most striking feature of this statement is its omphasis on sub
jective phenomena as the subject matter of psychology, which makes it an
example of Contentual subjoctivism,

But the words "evolution", "self-

realizing," and "ripening" connote personal growth or development,

The

author is presenting his personal conception of psychology, so all the
prescriptions are acceptod,

Codingi

Developmentalism— Acceptance}

Contentual subjectivism— Accoptance,
Passage 8 - Example 8
(psychoanalysis] implies moro than the mere analysis of composite phenomena
into simpler ones. It consists in tracing back one psychical structure to
another which preceded it in time and out of which it developed , , , Thus
from the very first psycho-analysis was directed toward tracing developmen
tal processes, It , , , was led , , , to construct a genetic psychology
•

•

*

This passage shows the omphasis on developmental processes in psycho
analysis, and should rocoivo a coding of Developmentalism,

Also tho reference

to psychological structures warrants a coding of Structuralism,

Since the

author is describing psychoanalysis, and not necessarily defending it, his
position should bo codod as Neutral,
Structuralism— Neutral,

Codingi

Dovolopmentalism— Neutral}

Static!sm? (vs. Eynamicism) - "Dnphasis upon enduring aspects,"

A

lack of change is considered characteristic of some aspects of the subject
matter, ».£•, traits, defense mechanisms.
Dynamicism - "Emphasis upon change and factors making for change."
Hie conception of the subject matter of psychology as undergoing change,
either from internal motives or social factors.
dynamic = pertaining to the cause* and effects of behavior and
mental activities, often with special emphasis on motivation
(Warren, 193*0.
Examples of areas where Eynamicism may be found include psychoanalysis,
field theory, and group dynamics.
Passage _1 - Examples 1 & <2
It should be kept in mind that those drawings [lewin's diagramsJ represent
momentary situations. There is nothing fixed or static about them, and
they are constantly changing as a result of dynamic forces.
This quotation rofers to diagrams which represent the person in his
"life space" at a particular moment, a method for which Lewin became
famous.

The author rejects Staticisir^ and accepts Eynamicism.

In addi

tion to these two prescriptions, the kind of atemporal, cross-sectional
view which is being referred to suggests Staticism^.

Hence, this quotation

illustrates a position in which ono type of Staticism is rejected and the
other type is accepted.

Codingi

Staticisnig— Rejection; Eynamicism—

Acceptance; Staticism^— Acceptance.
Passage 2 - Example

3

. . , it has been possible to follow the devolopment of several hundred
individuals over a period of about a dozen years, and while many have
shown sharp fluctuations in weight, we have discovered no case in which
there has been a convincing change in the somatotype. . . . It can be
said that the case has yet to occur in which a nutritional disturbance
has caused a physique either to become unrecognizable or to simulate
another somatotype strongly enough to cause any justifiable confusion,
Tho emphasis on the permanence of somatotypes, which the author
bases on empirical evidence, warrants a coding of Staticismg— Acceptance*
Bnpiricism— Acceptance; Methodological objoctivism— Acceptance.
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-56Passage

3

- Example 4

It is clear that the inferences involved in identifying a trait imply
consistency. Thus, by definition, a trait is known only by virtue of
certain regularities or consistencies in the manner in which an individual
behaves.
Codingi

Staticisn^— Neutral,

Passage 4 - Example _5
Our purpose is not merely to describe and classify the phenomena,
but to conceive them as brought about by tho play of forces in the mind
. . . which work together or against one another. We are endoavouring
to attain a dynamic conception of mental phenomena.
This statement expresses Eynamicism coupled with Contentual subjectivism.
The former prescription is expressed as the underlying "play of forces,"
while the later is expressed by the specification that the forces are "in
the mind."

Tho author is committed to both prescriptions,

Codingi

Eynamicism— Acceptanco} Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance.
Passage Jj - Example 6
The human organism is a complicated energy system, deriving its energy from
the food it eats and expending it for such purposes as circulation, res
piration, digestion, nervous conduction, muscular activity, perceiving,
remembering, and thinking. There is no reason to bolievo that the energy
which runs tho organism is essentially any different from the onorgy
which rims tho universe. Energy takes many forms— mechanical, thormal,
electrical, and chomical--and is capablo of boing transformed from one
form into another, Tho form of energy which operates tho throe systems
of personality is called psychic energy. . . . It performs work or is capable
of performing work as does any form of energy. Psychic onorgy performs
psychological work— e._g,, thinking, porcoiving, and remembering--just as
mechanical energy performs mechanical work,
Tho conception of man as a complicated onergy system warrants a coding
of Eynamicism— Acceptanco,

Since the form of enorgy is psychic onergy,

tho author may be regardod as favoring montalistic terminology and his con
ceptual bias coded as Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,

Tho reference

to three systems or structures of personality suggests Structuralism,
which is also accepted by tho author.

Codingi

Eynamicism— Acceptanco }

Contontual subjectivtai— Acceptance j Structuralism— Acceptance.
Passage 6 - Example 7
Tho forces which wo assume to exist behind tho tensions caused ty tho
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needs of the id are called instincts, They represent the somatic demands
upon tho mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they
aro of a conservative naturej the state* whatever it may bo, which an
organism has reached gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state
so soon as it has been abandoned.
Coding*

Eynamicism1— Acceptance| Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance}

Strueturalism— Acc eptance *
Passage

7_

- Examplo 8

We approach the id with analogies 1 wo call it a chaos, a cauldron full
of seothing excitations* We picture it as being open at its end to soma
tic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which
find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substra
tum, It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has
no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring
about satisfaction of the instinctual! needs subject to the observance of
tho pleasure principle.
This vivid description of the id justifios a coding of Eynamiciso.
The id is a personality structure, which moans the author accepts Structura
lism,

Sinco the author uses montalistic torminology ("psychic expression"),

a coding for Contentual subjectivism also sooms warranted,

Codingi

Eynamicism— Acceptanco} Structuralism— Accoptancoj Contentual subjoctivism
— Acceptance,
Passage 8 - Examplo 9
Psychical energy is released whon the psychic system (tho person)
attempts to return to equilibrium aftor it has been thrown into a state of
disequilibrium. Disequilibrium is produced by an increase of tension
in ono part of tho systom rolativo to tho rest of the system, either as
a result of external stimulation or internal change. When tension through
out tho system becomes equalized again, tho output of energy is halted and
the total system comes to rost,
Codingi

Eynamicism— Acceptance} Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,

Passago 9 - Example 10
[Psycho-analysis isj a dynamic conception which reduces mental life to the
interplay of reciprocally urging and chocking forces,
Codingi

Eynamicism— Neutral} Contontual subjoctivism— Accoptanco,
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General Guidelines for Coding

(1) Dio prescriptions should bo treated singly and individually,

Diis

moans that when a judge is coding an address he should consider each of
tho 36 prescriptions soparatoly as much as possible, so that whatever
relations exist among proscriptions are pormitted to emerge from the data,
(2) Die question arises as to whother a judge should code for the
prescriptions as they become evident in an article or wait until he has
finished reading tho article in its entirety.

It has been found by the

writer that tho strategy of immediately coding is superior.
strain on the judge's memory.

It reduces tho

But the judge must be alert to changes in

tho author's position as ovidonco increases, and mako revisions accordingly.
Die suggestion offered is that tho coding bo done at tho time a prescription
bocomos evidont, subject to later revision.
(3) If a proscription is montioned twico in tho same address, with
tho author's "position" oxprossed differently, tho genoral rule is that
codings of Acceptance or Rojoction take precedence ovor a coding of Neutral,
(1+) A prescription should generally bo verbalized explicitly in an
addross for it to be coded,
include1

Somo of the ways prescriptions are expressod

reference by name or synonym, description of general meaning,

a sub-type or specific instance of its uso,
(5) How much ovidonco must be prosent for an addross to bo codod into
a particular category on a particular proscription?
amount spocifiod.
ovon one word.

Diero can be no

It may bo as little as one sentence, one phrase, or

At tho other oxtromo, thoro could conceivably be as much

as a whole addross dovotod to tho explication of a single proscription.
(6) Since tho proscriptive approach was formulated to encompass tho
history of psychology from ancient timos on, thoro is considerable varia
tion in expression of prescriptions in tho rolativoly short history of
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Nevertholoss, the coding should bo basod solely on

tho contents of tho addrossos.

In no caso should tho judgo's decision bo

basod on -what he thinks is tho generally accepted position in American
psychology, indopondent of tho address in quostion.

For example, if there

is no evidence in an addross for the accoptanco of Naturalism, Nomothetic!sm,
Detorminism, or Functionalism, thoy should not be coded.
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Coding Fbrm
for Content Analysis
of Presidential Addresses of APA
Code Number of Address_________________________
Name of Coder

..._________ ____________

Date of Coding____________

__

-— — ■(Leave Blank)—
Author of Address

___

—
.

Year of Presidency_____________________________
Title of Address______

...______

Instructions» Code the address with respect to the prescriptive concepts
below. Circle the number in one of the corresponding three categories
which most closely reflects the author's position. Make the decisions on
the basis of the information in the Coding Manual. When a prescription is
not present in the address leave the categories blank.

Prescription
Conscious mentalism

Acceptance

Neutral

1

0

Rejection

........ . f. ...

0

Unconscious mentalism
Contentual objectivism

1

Contentual subjectivism

1

°-0

Determinism

1

0

-

- - ... .......
—1

Indeterminism

i

1

0

Empiricism

r

i

0

-1

Rationalism-^ (vs. Empiricism)

j

1

0

-1

Functionalism

;
i

i

0

-i.
...

i

0

Structuralism
Induetivism

j

1

0

Deductivism

j

1

0

!
»
.

*
-1

J
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Prescription

Acceptance

Neutral

Mechanism
Vitalism
Methodological objectivism
Methodological subjectivism
Molecularism
Molarism

0

Monism
Dualism
Naturalism
Supernatural! am
Nomothetlclsm
Idlographlclsm
Peripheral!sm
Centralism
Purism
Utilitarianism
Quantitativism
Qualitativism
Rationalise^ (vs* Irrationalism)
Irrationalism
Staticism^ (vs. Developmentalism)

0

Developmentalism

0

Static!sm^ (vs. Qynamicisn)

0

Eynamicism

0

Rejection

APPENDIX E
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C03IMG fc;-s:

CoCiG Numb'.r of Ar!H-i*agg

Hato of C o d i n ^ _ -_ -M-pill

if3.**!G o f J u d ? G

•—

(Lonvs Blank)—

Author o' Address

Year o'* Presidency,

Titls of Address__________________________________________

Motst At the end o" thin Codin^ iform you T.dll bo asked about tha nature
and scope of tho address. ;Jach of theso two questions requires a
dichotonous docision.
Instructions! Gods tho address ■i th respect to the prescript^^ concepts
bolo'-r, by circling the aooropriate symbol. Consider implicit as "oil as
explicit proscriptions,
Jhen a prescription is not expressed in the address
leave the categories blank. The dimension of centrality is a continuin as
follows t

Central
1
oaliont

Peripheral
2
Kotable

3
Kodorato

Incidental

Centra lity
dimension

Sxolicitj
Implicit

Proscription

Author's Position

Conscious ’iiontnlisrr.

Acc.

Meut.

Hoj,

1 2 3'J

£

Unconscious mentalism

Acc.

Mout.

ifcj-

12 3 h

3 I

Contentual objectivism

Acc. Ncut,

3 2 3 !-

E

Contentual subjoctivism

Acc.

ftcut.

aej.

1 2 3

ii I

:Joterminism

Acc.

Kout.

Hoj.

3 2 3

I

Indetermini sm

Acc.

ftout.

Hoj.

1 2 3

Hoj.

c

I

I

I

'rinpirlcism

Acc*

Ncut.

Raj,

1 2

3

h

E

I

Rationalism^ (vs. Empiricism)

Acc.

IIout.

Rej,

1 2

3

A

3

I

Functionalism

Acc.

Ncut.

Haj.

1

2

3

A

E

I

Structural! r"i

Acc,

T'eut,

Uoj.

1 2

3

A

3

I

Indue tivi an

Acc.

Ncut.

Roj.

1 2

3

A

li I

Doduetivism

Acc.

Jiout,

Raj.

1

2

3

T'cehanism

Acc.

I’uut,

Roj,

1

2

3

’/Italian

Acc.

lout.

Rej.

1 2

!othodolordcal objectivism

Acc.

M n U t.

Raj.

''cthodolo fric-a1 subjcetivi sm

Acc.

Mfiut.

I oloculnrism

Acc.

Kolarism

E

I

A

7

I

3

A

E

I

3 2

3

A

1
j I

R«j.

1 2

3

A

3

I

7 out.

tcj.

1 2

3

'+

E

I

Acc,

7 out.

Roj*

1 2

3

A

i'i I

Konism

Acc,

11out.

Aoj.

1 2

3

na*.

dualism

Acc.

^ cut.

:iJ1 *

1 2

3

■I-

KatuTalisri

Acc.

Hcut,

Raj.

1 2

3

Suooma turali sm

Acc.

I]cut.

Raj*

1 2

3

nomotheticism

Ace,

Nnut.

Roj.

3 2

3

Idiofraphicism

Acc,

Nout.

Roj,

1 2

3

Poriphornlism

Acc.

IIcut.

Roj.

1 2

3

Centralism

Acc,

I!out.

iej.

1 2

Pori an

Acc,

flout.

Rej.

Utilitarianism

Acc.

7 cut.

;;unntitativi sm

Acc,

lualitativisn

Acc.

I
Z

I

s

I

A

3

I

A

s

I

3

I

A

r>
2i

I

3

'■I

tS

I

1 2

3

A

e

I

Roj.

3 2

3

A

L'

I

ilout.

Roj.

1 2

3

E

I

KrtUt,

Aej.

1 2

3

3

I

4
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Rationalism^ (vs. Irrationalism) Acc.

Neut.

Hoj.

1 2

3

h

E

I

Irrationalism

Acc.

Neut.

Raj.

1 2

3

i*

S

I

Static!SPij (vs, Tovolopmentalisn )Acc.

Neut.

Rej.

1

2

3

k

E

I

Developmental! sn

Acc,

Neut,

Rej.

1

2

3

fir

E

I

Statieism^ (vs, Dynanicism)

Acc.

Nout,

Raj.

1 2

3

■r

1,

3

I

Dynamicism

Acc.

Neut,

Roj.

1

3

h

E

I

I.

2

nature of Addross (check category)i
Sxpository-orjuntation (Characterized by an exposition of the
meaning of sons aspect of or all of psychology, whose burden
does not directly dopend upon ampirical data,)
_____ dosearch-orientation (Characterized by the presentation of in
formation feasod upon empirical, but not necessarily experi
mental, data, or tho presentation of a viewpoint deriving from
empirical data.)

H,

Scope of Addrossi
Broad (Encompasses psychology as a 'hole, or treats a problem
■Jhich transcends specific areas and is significant for psych
ology as a whole.)
Narrow (Limited to a soecialized area or oroblcm within psych^fyT)
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APPENDIX F
Reliability of Judges

This appendix contains three kinds of results per
taining to the reliability of judges:

(1) information con

cerning the use of the coding categories by the three judges;
(2) inter-judge reliability coefficients;
liability coefficients.

(3) intra-judge re

Inter- and intra-judge reliability

values are given for both of the major decisions made by the
judges:

Presence or Absence of prescriptions,

position

(Acceptance,

Neutral,

and the author's

Rejection).

The conventional method of measuring reliability is to
use the percentage of agreement of coding responses among the
judges involved, _i._e., the percentage of judgments on which
two judges agree,
this study,

out of the total number of judgments.

In

the agreement is represented by simultaneous

Presence or Absence codings, or by simultaneous Acceptance,
Neutral, or Rejection codings.

However,

the writer considered

the percentage-of-agreement method to be incomplete when used
alone, because it does not reveal the percentage of agreement
due to chance.
chance alone,
Hence,

Agreement would be expected to increase, by
as fewer categories are used in the coding system.

there is no way of telling how far the actual empirical
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agreement exceeds the chance level of agreement.
reason,

For this

a supplementary method of reporting reliability was

used.
The method of measuring reliability developed by Scott
(1955) was found suitable for the writer's purposes.

Scott's

Index of Inter-Coder Agreement, jai, may be interpreted as the
extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance.
appropriate for nominal scale coding,

It is

it corrects for both

the number of categories in the coding question and the fre
quency with which each is used,

and it varies from 0 to 1.

The most important factor to consider,

however,

is that Scott's

Index provides a conservative measure of reliability.

Since

it is a measure of the extent to which the coding reliability
exceeds chance,

it will almost always yield lower values than

the corresponding empirical percentage agreement values,
hence it is not directly comparable to reliability values
reported in the literature which are based upon empirical
percentage agreement.

and
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Table 6

Average Number of Prescriptions Coded Present in Each
Address Out of 36 Possibilities

Judge

Prescriptions/Address

Judge 1 (Gibson)

12.3

Judge 2 (Goodman)

13.0

Judge 3 (Merrifield)

15.5

Table 7

Use of Coding Categories as Percentage of Total Number of Prescriptions Coded Present

Judge

A u t h o r 's
Position

Form of
Expression

Centrality

A

N

R

1

2

3

4

E

I

Judge #1

(Gibson)

75

16

7

41

23

19

14

68

31

Judge #2

(Goodman)

83

11

5

21

23

28

25

64

35

Judge #3

(Merrifield)

76

16

6

15

20

26

37

72

27

78

14

6

26

22

24

25

68

32

Mean
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Table 8

Percentage of Agreement Between Judges on
Coding the Presence or Absence of 36 Prescriptions in
Each of 75 AP A Presidential Addresses
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)

Gibson

Note.

—

Goodman

.79(.54)

Merrifield

.76(.49)

Goodman

.74(.46)

Mean of three coefficients = .76(.50).
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Table 9

Percentage of Agreement Between Judges on
Coding the Author's Position on Prescriptions Expressed in
Each of 75 APA Presidential Addresses.
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)
Based on 573 Prescriptions Coded Present by
All Three Judges

Gibson

Note.

—

Goodman

83(.47)

Merrifield

80(.46)

Goodman

83 (.49)

Mean of the three coefficients = .82(.47).
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Table 10

Intra-Judge Reliability on Coding Presence or
Absence of 36 Prescriptions in Each of
Four ApA Presidential Addresses
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)

Judge

Note.

—

Reliability

Judge 1 (Gibson)

.88 (. 75)

Judge 2 (Goodman)

.78 (.53)

Judge 3 (Merrifield)

.90 (.80)

Mean of three coefficients = .85 (.69).
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Table 11

Intra-Judge Reliability on Coding Author's Position on
Prescriptions Expressed in Four AP A Presidential Addresses
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)
Based on the Number of Prescriptions Coded Present on Each
of Two Codings for Each Judge

Judge

Note.

Reliability

Judge 1 (Gibson)

.97 (.90)

Judge 2 (Goodman)

.91 (. 62)

Judge 3 (Merrifield)

.84 (.42)

-- Mean of three coefficients = .91 (.65).
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APPENDIX G
Prominence of Prescriptions

The expression of a prescription in an address is
defined operationally in terms of Present codings.

Prominence

is thus the relative frequency of Present codings of a
particular prescription in comparison with all others.
Prediction 5 :

Since the prescriptive approach was formulated

to encompass the history of psychology from ancient times on,
there is undoubtedly extreme variation in the expression of
prescriptions in the relatively short history of American
psychology.

In this period,

the following prescriptions will

be among the most prominent of the 36 prescriptions,
tive of temporal considerations:
tentual objectivism,

irrespec

Conscious mentalism,

Contentual subjectivism,

Con-

Empiricism,

Methodological objectivism, Methodological subjectivism,
Nomotheticism.

The following prescriptions will be among the

least prominent of the group:
Naturalism,

Supernaturalism,

Irrationalism,

and

Staticism-^,

Vitalism, Monism,
Idiographicism,

and Staticisi^.

Dualism,

Ratio n a l i s m ^
This prediction

is based on the writer's general background reading and per
sonal judgments.
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The following computer printout contains a ranking
of the 36 prescriptions in terms of their prominence;

from

most frequently expressed to least frequently expressed.

It

shows which prescriptions were most frequently expressed in
the presidential addresses and therefore the ones most rele
vant to modern American psychology.

In this context “relevance1'

means expressed in American psychology, whether it be an
acceptance of the prescription,
prescription,

a neutral expression of the

or a rejection of the prescription.

Of the

seven prescriptions predicted to be among the most prominent,
six are among the top ten listed in the printout.

The most

frequently expressed of all the prescriptions was Empiricism.
Contentual subjectivism and Contentual objectivism,

two of

the basic prescriptions pertaining to the nature of the sub
ject matter of psychology, were both among the most prominent,
as predicted.

Methodological objectivism was more frequently

expressed than either Contentual subjectivism or Contentual
objectivism,

which suggests that American psychology is

oriented toward the use of objective methods at least as much
as toward a particular conception of its subject matter.
Some of the most prominent prescriptions were unpredicted.
These include Purism,

Functionalism, Utilitarianism,

and

Quantitativism.
The printout also shows which prescriptions were
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least frequently expressed in the presidential addresses and
therefore the ones least relevant to modern American psy
chology.

Of the ten prescriptions predicted to be among the

least prominent,
the printout.

eight are among the lowest ten liste'd 'in

With the exception of Naturalism,

the pre

scriptions at the bottom of the list played some role in
American psychology but that role was minor in comparison to
the role of other prescriptions.

Many of these prescriptions,

such as Supernaturalism and Vitalism,
other historical periods.

are more relevant to

In the case of Naturalism,

it

appears that this prescription is so strongly accepted in
psychology that it is taken for granted and provides no ob
jective evidence for its existence.
The role of prescriptions in psychology may take
different forms.

The most frequent form of expression of a

prescription is that of acceptance on the part of an author.
In fact,

78.3% of all prescriptions were judged accepted in

this study.
the mean.

However,

there was considerable variation around

The printout shows the proportion in which each

prescription was Accepted,

Neutral,

and Rejected relative to

the total number of times it was expressed.

The prescriptions

which are most likely to be accepted when they are expressed
(over 90% of the time)
piricism,

and Purism.

are: Inductivism, Nomotheticism,
The prescriptions which are most

Em

239

likely to be rejected when they are expressed are Super
naturalism
Vitalism

(63% of the time), Rationalism^

(43%) , and

(35%).
In terms of the Dimension of Centrality,

the pre

scriptions which were most often salient when they were
expressed were Empiricism
(43%).

(44%)

and Contentual subjectivism

In the case of Empiricism,

the 44% is based on 32

times the prescription was considered Salient out of 73 times
it was expressed.

Contentual subjectivism was considered

Salient 25 times out of 58 times expressed.

The data show

that when Empiricism and Contentual subjectivism are expressed
they are salient themes almost one-half of the time.
other hand,

On the

Supernaturalism and Unconscious mentalism were

never salient themes in the addresses, but were mostly
incidental when they were expressed.
The mode of expression of the prescriptions was pre
dominantly Explicit:
prescriptions

68% Explicit vs. 32% Implicit,

(Appendix F - 9 ) .

for all

All but four prescriptions

were more frequently Explicit in expression than Implicit.
The four exceptions were Nomotheticism
(70%) , Staticism^

(74% Implicit), Purism

(56%) , and Inductivism

(53%) .

APPENDIX G

PROMINENCE OF PRESCRIPTIONS
PKtiCiUPTIUN

PRESENCE
A

AUTHOR'S
PCSITIUN
N

R

1

CENTRALITY
2
3

4

FORM OF
EXPRESSION
E
I

LHP IK 1C iSH

FREQ
X

73.33
100.00

67.67
92.27

5.67
7.73

0.00
0.00

32.67
44.55

22.67
30.91

13.67
18.64

4.33
5.91

51.67
70.45

21.67
29.55

27

PUKlSH

f REQ
X

64.00
100.00

59.00
92. 19

3.67
5.73

1.33
2.08

12.33
19.27

19.67
30.73

19.00
29.69

13.00
20.31

19.33
30.21

44.67
69.79

IS

ML IUJJJLualC AL ODJfcCTIVlSM

FREQ
X

50.67
loo.no

53.33
89.39

5.33
8.94

1.00
1.68

19.33
32.40

18.67
31.28

12.67
21.23

9.00
15.08

40.67
68.16

19.00
31.84

FREQ
X

100.00

50.00
86. 71

4.00
6.94

3.67
6.36

25.00
43.35

12.33
21.39

12.67
21.97

7.67
13.29

44.67
77.46

13.00
22.54

7

A

l UN 11<11UAl

SUUJECTIVISM

57.67

3

Lj UE'.TUa L OdJECTIVlSM

FREQ
X

50.00
100.00

42. 33
84.67

5.00
10.00

2.67
5.33

15.00
30.00

15.67
31 .33

12.09
24.00

7.33
14.67

36.33
72.67

13.67
27.33

9

F JNCTu n ALISM

FREQ
t

47. 33
100.00

37.67
79.58

9.PC
19.01

0.67
1.41

11.67
24.65

10.67
22.54

15.33
32.39

9.67
20.42

33.67
71.13

13.67
28.87

u TI LI 1ArtIAN TSH

FREQ
*

46.33
100.CO

40.o7
87.77

5.00
10.79

0.67
1.44

18. 33
39.57

8.33
17.99

6.67
14.39

13.00
28. C6

39. 33
84. 39

7.00
15.11

FREQ
X

45.00
100.00

36 .67
81.48

7.67
17.04

0.67
1.48

11.67
25.y3

9.67
21.48

11.67
25.93

12.CO
26.67

36.67
81.48

8.33
18.52

NJMulrltTlCISM

FREQ
X

4n.33
100.00

3 7.67
9 3.39

2.33
5.79

0.33
0.8 3

12.67
31.40

9.00
22.31

14.CO
34.71

4.67
11.57

10.67
26.45

29.67
73.55

LJNaClUJS MENTALISH

FREQ
X

33,33
100.00

3 3.00
86.09

4.CO
10.43

1.33
3*4 B

12.00
31. 30

7.33
19.13

10.00
9.00
26.09' 23.48

24.33
63.48

14.00
3b.52

lc

i Ti\Ow IORAL 1SM

FREQ
X

36.67
100.00

2T .67
56. 36

10.67
29.09

5.33
14.55

6.67
18. 18

8.33
22.73

9.CO
24.55

12.67
34.55

28.00
76. 36

8.67
23.64

34

JtVtLJP.HtNl ALISH

FREQ
X

31 •t>7
100.00

27.67
87.37

3.67
ll.5b

0.33
1.05

9.00
28.42

6.33
20.00

7.67
24.21

9.67
27.37

26.33
83.16

5.33
16.84

t>L 1Lk MI N1SiH

FKEU
X

27.67
100.00

25.33
8 5. 39

3.67
12.36

0.67
2.25

2.33
7.87

8.00
26.97

10.67
35.96

8.67
29.21

19.67
66.29

10.00
33.71

MJLEC0LAR15M

FREQ
X

27.33
100.00

16.33
59.76
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APPENDIX H
Form of Acceptance of Prescriptions

This appendix considers the relative proportion of
explicitly and implicitly accepted prescriptions over time.
Prediction 1 3 :

There will tend to be a higher proportion of

explicitly accepted prescriptions before 1930 than after,
because during the period of the schools of psychology the
issues were controversial,

whereas afterward psychologists

became more tolerant of alternative viewpoints and less likely
to defend their own.

Therefore,

the proportion of implicitly

accepted prescriptions will increase as one moves closer to
the present.

Figure 22 shows that the form of acceptance of the
prescriptions considered together has changed over time:

the

explicit form of expression has decreased in proportion,

while

the implicit form has increased.

There is a higher proportion

of Explicit codings of prescriptions which were accepted be
fore 1930 than after,

as predicted,

and the proportion of

Implicit codings increases as one moves closer to the present.
Overall,

the relative proportions have changed from about

70% explicit - 30% implicit,
plicit.

to about 55% explicit - 45% im

These trends show that the conceptual bases of

100

(71 Explicit Acceptance
I

| Implicit Acceptance

Percentage of Acceptance Codings
of All Addresses in Period

80

60

40

20

1891
1910

-

1911
1930
-

1931
1950
-
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Years
Fig. 22.
Explicit and implicit forms of
acceptance of 36 prescriptions coded in 75 APA
presidential addresses b y three judges.
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American psychology are becoming more and more deeply
ingrained.
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